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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By DANIEL S. HOFFMAN
Associate in the Denver firm of Fugate, May and Mitchem

and
EDWARD S. BARLOCK
Former Editor-in-Chief of DICTA, now serving in the United States Navy

In this article the authors have brought together decisions of the
Colorado Supreme Court from January 1, 1958 to January 1, 1959.
Only those cases involving procedure and appeals which suggest or
clarify principles of significance are the subject of comment.
REQUISITE OF PROHIBITION-AN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

Several cases came before the Colorado Supreme Court in 1958
as original proceedings in the nature of prohibition provided for in
Rule 106 (a) (4).' In two instances, the supreme court discharged its
rule to show cause, holding on each occasion that the circumstances did
not warrant relief in the form of prohibition.
In Prinster v. District Court' the plaintiffs sought to restrain the

lower court judge from hearing a case in which they had been named
among the defendants. Several holders of decreed water priorities filed
a complaint in the district court praying, in part, for an injunction
against alleged usurpations of their water rights. The priorities were
held under a 1948 adjudication. Some of the defendants in the district
court appeared specially and moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the 1948 adjudication decrees were null and void. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the defendants
to answer the complaint. Thereupon some of the district court defendants sought prohibition. The district court plaintiffs appeared before
the supreme court and answered on the merits.
The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hall, reiterated the long standing requisite for relief in the form of prohibition:
the supreme court will only prevent the exercise of lower court jurisdiction not granted by law.' The court further found that prohibition
was not a proper remedy to restrain a trial court from committing error
in deciding a question properly before it. Thus the court applied the
cardinal rule that so long as the lower tribunal has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, it is competent to proceed to a final
legal determination, subject to an appellate power of review.'
The majority opinion noted that the mere fact that issues of great
public importance are involved does not per se warrant the application
of prohibition.' Similarly, the mere fact that a lower court trial will
involve great expense and certain appeal does not warrant the application of prohibition. Thus the court shifted the emphasis of many
former opinions by stressing the absolute necessity of a jurisdictional
excess.'
I

Colo. R. Civ. P. 106 (a) (4).
p325 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1958).
See 73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 2 (b) (1951).
4 Id. at Prohibition § 11.
5325 P.2d at 940.
' Ibid. But cf. cases cited in the dissent by Mr. Justice Moore, 325 P.2d at 942.
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In the final analysis the court refrained from deciding the water
right issue through the use of prohibition as a matter of convenience
to the parties' or as a technique for establishing principle and
precedent."
In Leonhart v. District Court' the plaintiff sought to restrain the
district court from proceeding with a new trial. Plaintiff claimed the
issues under consideration had been foreclosed by a determination of
a foreign court through an application of the principle of res judicata.
The supreme court again held that prohibition was a proper remedy
only where the lower court was exceeding its jurisdiction. Prohibition
would not lie to avoid mere errors in the determination of the law.
In particular the court found that a defense of res judicata does
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, nor establish a claim in the
nature of prohibition; a conclusion well supported by case law in other
jurisdictions."0
NECESSITY OF MOVING FOR NEW TRIAL WHEN LESS
THAN ALL CLAIMS DISMISSED

One of last year's more important cases involving a procedural
issue is Graham v. District Court,' where it was held that an order of
dismissal under Rule 41 (b) (1) is an adjudication on the merits
whether it is directed to counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party
claims. This is true unless otherwise indicated by the court.
In the Graham case purchasers of realty sued their vendors and
two brokers for fraud. The vendors and the second broker cross-claimed
against the first broker, who, in turn, cross-claimed against the second
broker. The trial court sustained motions to dismiss all cross-claims and
granted the purchasers' motion for a directed verdict against the first
broker. Thereafter, the first broker filed a motion for a new trial. The
purchasers did not move for a new trial. Without notice to the vendors
or the second broker, the trial court granted the first broker's motion
for a new trial and made it effective as to all the parties. The supreme
court applied Rule 41'" and held that the trial court was without power
to grant a new trial as to all the parties. The purchasers' failure to move
for a new trial within the time permitted by Rule 59" was a fatal
procedural error. The purchasers were obliged to make their motion,
if at all, within ten days after the entry of the appropriate judgment.
This case is sound; Rule 41"1 is clearly and exactly applied. Rule
1

54,16 relating to judgments on multiple claims, is held inapplicable.

The Graham case says simply that unless a timely motion for a new trial
is made by the proper party in interest, a dismissal as to one of a group
of multiple claims operates as an adjudication on the merits as to that
claim. This is true regardless of the disposition of other claims in the
same action, notwithstanding the apparent conflict between Rule 41
and Rule 54.
7 See note 4, supro.
See 73 C.J.S.Prohibition § 8 (1951).
p329 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1958).
10 See Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1283, 1293 (1945).
11
323 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1958).
2
1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (1).
1 Ibid.
14 Colo. R. Civ. P. 59 (b).
15 Id. 41 (b) (1).

16 Id. 54 (a),

(b).
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The case illustrates a proper situation calling for the application
of a claim in the nature of prohibition.
RETURN OF SERVICE AND THE NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE

The underlying purpose and spirit of Colorado's non-resident
motorist statute" was given full expression in Nelson v. District Court.'
The facts were clear and undisputed. There was a proper service, but
there was no statutory compliance to demonstrate return and proof of
service". The court determined that the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statutory procedures following completion of service does
not add or detract from the validity of process and service.
The court pointed out that there may be valid service and a defective return or invalid service and a return showing valid service." ° A
sound analysis of the purpose of the return of service was made by the
court. That purpose is to enable the trial judge to make an intelligent
finding that the court has in fact acquired jurisdiction, or has not acquired jurisdiction, because of some defect in the process or the service
of process.
Jurisdiction of the Colorado court attaches when the service is
completed. The return deals with proof and is vital only if the plaintiff appears in court and seeks to prove service entitling him to a default
judgment."
WRIT OF ERROR FILED -

TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION ENDED

Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Denver' illustrates a harsh application
of a sound jurisdictional principle. Denver sued out a writ of error
seeking to reverse an adverse trial court judgment. While this writ was
pending in the supreme court, the trial judge vacated the lower court
judgment. Denver then moved to dismiss its writ of error without prejudice; this motion was granted. Denver recovered a favorable judgment
at the re-trial. Davidson then sued out its timely writ of error based on
the ground that the trial court could not vacate a judgment rendered
by it after the supreme court had acquired jurisdiction of the cause
through proceedings on error. The supreme court sustained Davidson's
contentions and vacated the judgment granted at the re-trial. The supreme court further ordered that the original trial judgment in favor of
Davidson be restored to its full force and effect, 3 since Denver had
withdrawn its original writ and had not then sought review within the
proper time under Rule 1L."
The high court, however, permitted the trial court to ascertain the
validity of the original judgment. The court noted that their reinstatement of this first judgment was not a determination as to whether or
not that judgment was substantively valid, voidable, or void. The court's
logic on this point is unassailable. If, in fact, the original judgment was
void, as compared to voidable, a mere failure to seek review in time
could not validate it. The trial court then vacated the original judgment, in effect, for the second time. On review, the supreme court found
17

Colo. Rev. Stot. § 13-8-2 (1953).
320 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1958).
1" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-3 (1953).,
"0 320 P.2d at 963.
2"

21 Ibid.

"2328 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1958); and see 330 P.2d 1116 (Colo.
23 328 P.2d at 379.
2, Colo. R. Civ. P. 111 (b).

t958).

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

the judgment to be voidable, not void, and therefore not subject to attack, since the time to review that original judgment had passed. 5
One principle emerges with uncertain clarity: when the appellate
court acquires jurisdiction of a cause, the lower court's powers are finally
suspended pending further directions from the higher court." Thus
Denver lost its opportunity to seek appellate redress by an apparently
unwarranted reliance on the extra-jurisdictional ruling of the lower
court.
This comment does not extend itself to the issue of due process
raised by Denver. The supreme court rather summarily dispensed with
that argument which is not within the scope of this analysis.
VACATING JUDGMENTS "UPON SUCH TERMS As ARE JUST"
In Prather v. District Court," the plaintiff sought to restrain the

lower court from imposing a bond requirement as a condition of vacating a cognovit note judgment against him. The trial judge had apparently acted within his determination of the scope of Rule 60 (b),"
which provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
in certain enumerated circumstances "upon such terms as are just." The
judge had fixed the bond in an amount equal to the demand and
prayer of the lower court plaintiff. The supreme court found such a
bond to be unwarranted and further noted that such action by the
trial judge involved a degree of predetermination of the merits.
Perhaps, the supreme court could have been more incisive in its
ruling by holding the imposition of a bond in such an amount to be an
abuse of the trial court's discretion in the particular circumstances. Certainly, this holding cannot mean the trial court is without any power
to impose reasonable conditions on its decision to grant relief from a
judgment. The bond should not be objectionable only because the trial
court had to concern itself with the probable outcome of the case before
a full hearing on the merits: this, by analogy, is often a prime consideration in. granting injunctive relief of a temporary nature.
STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS RAISED

UNDER

29

In Denning v. A. D. Wilson & Co.

A

GENERAL

DENIAL

the defendant counter-claimed

seeking penalty recoveries under the 1913 Money Lenders Act." Plaintiff replied by alleging " 'Said counter-claim is barred by the statute of
limitations of this State in such case made and provided.' ""' The supreme court held this reply to be a sufficient pleading within the scope
and spirit of Rule 8 (c) '2 relating to the pleading of affirmative defenses.
The supreme court commented that even a general denial would
have been sufficient to raise the issue of the statute of limitations with
regard to a claim for a penalty recovery under the Money Lenders Act.
It is generally held that a statute of limitations bars only a given remedy;
it does not extinguish the right to a claim.3" Thus, other remedies may
be available or the right to a remedy may be revived by a proper ac26330 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1958).
20 4A C.J.S.
Appeal and Error § 617 (1957).
27328 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1958).
29 Colo. R. Civ P. 60 (b).
29326 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1958).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-3-7 (1953).
31326 P.2d at 790.
.'Colo. R. Civ. P. 8 (c).
353 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 6 (b) (1948).
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knowledgment of the obligation or claim. However, where the particular limitation is part and parcel of the very statute creating the right and
liability, most courts determine that both the right and the remedy are
extinguished forever.3 ' The supreme court indicated that the requirement of affirmatively pleading a statute of limitations under Rule 8 (c)
does not extend to this latter situation and this observation is well supported by other authorities. " The dictum of the Denning case has
obvious application to other statutory claims.
HABEAS CORPUS CANNOT DIVEST A COURT OF ITS PROPER JURISDICTION.
3

Zimmerman v. Angele ' held that habeas corpus may not be used
in lieu of a writ of error. In the Zimmerman case the county court had
entered an order committing the respondent therein to the state hospital
for the insane until discharged according to law. Subsequently a petition was filed in the county court seeking an order of restoration to
reason. While the petition was pending, habeas corpus was brought in
the district court to secure the respondent's release. The supreme court
held that an order by the district court discharging her was void since
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the cause. If the commitment
order was erroneous, a writ of error or a restoration petition was available. Habeas corpus was held to lie only where a court excercising
jurisdiction has no power to exercise that jurisdiction. The case is well
documented by supporting authority.
DISTRICT COURT HABEAS CORPUS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDING

In contrast to the Zimmerman case, it was held in Johnson v.

Black, 7 that the district court had jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a mother to determine whether her child was being
unlawfully detained by its grandparents. The district court had jurisdiction in spite of the fact that the grandparents were awaiting the determination of an adoption proceeding brought by them in the juvenile
court. The supreme court found the jurisdiction of the district court and
34 Ibid.

3554 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 357 (b) (1948).
36321 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1958).
37 322 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1958).
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the juvenile court to be merely simultaneous, not concurrent. The high
court further found the issues before the two courts to be of a different
nature, so that the determination of one court would not affect the
determination of the other court.
DEFECTIVE SERVICE

DOES

NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL

In Fletcher v. District Court, 8 the lower court plaintiffs had the

defendants served with a copy of the summons stating the action was
in one district court, while the copy of the complaint stated the action
was in another district court. The original summons and complaint
indicated the action to be in the court named on the copy of the complaint. The action was filed in the court named on the copy and original of the complaint.
Rule 4 (c) " requires that the name of the court be so stated on the
summons. Rule 4 (e)" requires that personal service be accomplished
by the delivery of a copy of process to the defendant. The supreme
court found the summons to be void, so that no jurisdiction could attach
over the lower court defendants. However, the supreme court found
that the defective process did not warrant a dismissal. The lower court
should have quashed the summons and required the plaintiff to re-serve
the defendant, so that jurisdiction could properly attach over the person
of the defendant.
38322 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1958).
39
4 0 Colo. R. Civ. P. 4 (c).
Id. 4 (e).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By

HAROLD

E.

HURST

Professor of Law and Acting Dean, University of Denver College of Law

Attorneys reviewing the decisions of the supreme court of the
Centennial State, in the fields of constitutional law and administrative
law during 1958, will be at once pleased, astonished and confused.
Pleased with the court's insistence upon practical good sense in the
conduct of proceedings by administrative agencies and courts. Astonished
at the boldness with which the court takes a new course in waters thought
well-charted and marked with the buoys of precedent. And confused
by the diametrically opposite results arrived at in some of the cases.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

It is in the field of constitutional law that the most surprising decisions have come in the past year.
Is it Fish or Fowl?
In 1955 there appeared in the pages of DICTA' a rare gem of
satirical legal literature written by the Honorable Mitchell B. Johns,
Judge of the Superior Court of Denver, in which were dramatically
examined the incongruities of the Colorado rule that a violation of a
municipal ordinance imposing fine or imprisonment is tried as a civil
action. The doctrine was established early in Colorado jurisprudence,'
and has persisted despite the misgivings of judges who didn't like the
rule' but who felt bound by precedent. Judge Johns held up for all to
see a system in which a defendant in a civil action was denied a right
to answer, but rather required to plead guilty or not guilty; a system in
which, if the plea were not guilty, the defendant nevertheless might be
fined or imprisoned on a mere preponderance of the evidence in a trial
without a jury.
In one bold stroke, the Supreme Court of Colorado determined to
abandon the pseudo logic of former decisions. In Canon City v. Merris,
the court sustained a trial court rule that a person on trial for violation
of a city ordinance' punishable by fine or imprisonment was entitled to
all the constitutional guarantees traditionally surrounding criminal trials.
Operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor was a misdemeanor under a state statute' and punishable also
under the city ordinance."
In sustaining the dismissal of the case against Merris, the supreme
court began with the premise that the Home Rule Amendment of the
Colorado Constitution not only grants municipalities power to determine
local destiny, but also provides that, "any act in violation of the provisions of such charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal
132 DICTA 387 (1955).
2Dietz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323 (1871).
2Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516 (1892); Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Pac. 50 (1885).
4323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958).
6 Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The statute is not cited in the opinion, but the author confidently believes the statute alluded to may
be found at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-30 (1953).
7 The Canon

City ordinance Is not cited in the opinion.
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and punishable as such when so provided by any statute now or hereinafter in force."8

The court added:
"Even though an ordinance effectually covers a local and
municipal matter, and it is a counterpart of a law of the state,
its violation is triable and punishable as a crime where so
designated by the statute.
"Whether driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor is a municipal matter or of state-wide concern makes little
difference in the ultimate result of this case. Since there is a
statute making such conduct a crime, its counterpart in the
municipal laws of Canon City must be tried and punished as a
crime. The violation having been prosecuted and determined
as a proceeding civil in nature, the trial court was properly
moved to dismissal."'
The court then declared that driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor is a matter of state-wide concern
rather than local or municipal, leaving in no small doubt what the court
might hold if a home rule city prosecutes as a civil action the violation
of an ordinance imposing fine or imprisonment but going to strictly
local and municipal matters.
Perhaps the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moore may
be taken as the law which will be applied in the future. From his concurring opinion we may set down the following propositions:
(1) A city has no power, by its legislative acts and its municipal
courts, to punish, in any kind of action, an act which is a matter of
state-wide concern.
(2) Where the city ordinance imposes punishment for an act of
purely local concern, but a state statute also imposes punishment for
an identical act if committed outside a home rule city, the state constitution commands that the trial in the municipal court be surrounded
with the traditional safeguards of criminal proceedings.
Later in the year, in the second Alaniz case," the court applied the
Merris case to invalidate, as being unconstitutional, section 1, subsection
7 of a 1955 amendment to the Charter of Denver, providing that, "No
party shall be entitled to a jury trial in the municipal court in any
action arising under the ordinances and charter of the City and County
of Denver." The judicial pronouncement is broad and seems to require
criminal procedure in the trial of any ordinance violation for which
imprisonment is imposed, without regard to state statutes or the locality
of concern involved in the act punished. The court said:
"The last sentence in said subsection ...is invalid wherever
the ordinance violated has a counterpart in the criminal statutes
of the State (citing Merris and other cases) or the ordinance,
although not a counterpart of a statute, provides for imprisonment for its violation (again citing Merris) ."
Whether fish or fowl, a criminal proceeding is now a criminal
proceeding, be it for a violation of a city ordinance or state statute.
Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (emphasis supplied).
0 323 P.2d at 620.
10 Geer v. Alaniz, 331 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1958).
"I Id. at 262.
8

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

Former Jeopardy
In a case of first impression in Colorado," the supreme court held
that a defendant was once in jeopardy who had been charged, had
entered a plea of guilty on arraignment, and had been discharged by the
trial court at the conclusion of the pre-sentence hearing. The matter
came before the supreme court on a petition for a writ of prohibition
filed by the defendant below when he was a second time charged with
the same offense to which he had formerly pleaded guilty. Prohibition
was made absolute on the ground that, the petitioner having once been
arraigned and his plea of guilty accepted, a second trial for the same
offense was prohibited by article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution.
The case will be most interesting to many Colorado lawyers for its
dictum to the effect that a defendant is once in jeopardy when he has
been charged under a valid indictment or information, before a court of
competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned, has pleaded, and a jury has
been impanelled and sworn." The point at which former jeopardy
begins has been in some doubt in Colorado as a result of a dictum in
the Herman case:"
"... The plea of former jeopardy is available only when a
valid indictment or information has been found and presented;
and a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the case
and has returned a verdict."
If one dictum can have effect in cancelling or restricting another,
the court has adopted for Colorado the usual rule by which former
jeopardy is determined in those cases in which a defendant elects to
stand trial on a plea of not guilty.
Notice of the Proceedinig
5
In Weber v. Williams,"
the plaintiffs in a previous proceeding knew
the Chicago address of the equity owner defendant but never disclosed
the address to counsel, who obtained service f notice by publication.
In reversing and remanding the case, the supreme court said:
"Due process under applicable rules requires notice, by
actual or substituted service of process. Admittedly there was
no actual service. The order authorizing the service by publication was obtained by a verified motion, which no doubt was
made honestly and in good faith by plaintiff's attorney; however,
it contained a statement that was known by the plaintiffs, the
Williams, to be false.""
The court went on to hold that the failure by the plaintiffs to disclose their knowledge of the whereabouts of the defendant was fraud
upon the court and that such failure to disclose voided the jurisdiction
of the court in the absence of an appearance by the defendant.
It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether reversal was based
upon failure to meet the standards of due process or on failure to comply
"2Markiewicz v. Black, 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
13 Cited with obvious approval from 22 C.J.S CriminalLow §'241 (1940).
14 Herman v. People, 124 Colo. 46, 50, 233 P.2d 873, 876, (1951) (emphasis supplied).
1324 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1958).
"e Id. at 367

SACHS.LAULOR. CORPORATIOn SEALS-IILPInE 5-3422
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strictly with the rules of procedure regarding substituted service. However, the author would invite attention to such cases as Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 7 and Walker v. City of Hutchinson. 8 These cases hold that, to satisfy the requirements of due process,
something more effective than notice by publication must be given when
the whereabouts of a defendant can be ascertained with reasonable
diligence, even in the absence of fraud. Indeed, the cited cases make it
extremely hazardous to rely on service by publication without making a
search for the address of the defendant and forwarding a written notice
by first class or registered mail.
To Prohibit or Not to Prohibit
A curious, but highly important, confusion appears in the 1958
decisions dealing with petitions for judicial intervention in proceedings
in other agencies or tribunals. In our Anglo-American system we have
always, traditionally, looked to a court or a higher tribunal for relief
from unauthorized or unlawful harrassment at the hands of a government agent-be it judicial, executive or legislative. It has always been
deemed essential to the maintenance of liberty, and for the protection
of property rights, that unlawful impairment of such rights be prohibited or enjoined by the judiciary at an early moment, lest the victory
be Pyrrhic and a man's substance gone on the day he finally is adjudged
to be in the right. We ask with good reason, what does it profit a man
or society to compel a person to fight for a cause through the whole
hierarchy of tribunals, if his cause can be judged to be just at the outset
by a tribunal of higher authority. We spare the reader from citations
of authority for the propositions that equity will restrain the infliction
of injury for which-there is no adequate remedy, and courts will prohibit the exercise of power by a tribunal that has no authority over the
person or the cause.
Three cases reached the supreme court in 1958 in which the court
was asked to intervene in or pass upon the lawfulness of legislative,
administrative or lower judicial proceedings. In two of the cases the
supreme court agreed to pass judgment and terminate oppressive and
unlawful proceedings. But in the third case the court refused to intervene, subjecting its petitioner to months, perhaps years, of expensive
litigation of his rights in lower tribunals, and effectively suspending
the petitioner's means of livelihood.
In Markiewicz v. Black," the supreme court terminated, by writ of
prohibition, a second prosecution in the district court on the ground that
to prosecute the petitioner twice for the same offense is prohibited by
the state constitution."
In Denver v. Sweet,"' the court approved a district court injunction
restraining the City and County of Denver from holding a special
election to vote upon a charter amendment authorizing a city income
tax.
The third case. Board of Medical Examiners v. District Court,
held that the district court of El Paso County did not have power to
17339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18352 U.S. 112 (1956).
'9 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
20 Colo. Const. art II, § 18.
21329 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1958).
22331 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1958).
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restrain or control the Board in advance of its taking final action, even
though the statute under which the Board purported to act was allegedly unconstitutional. Here the Board had begun a proceeding against
a doctor to determine if his license should be revoked. The doctor went
to the district court asking that court to terminate the proceedings before
the Board on the ground that the Board was acting without authority
under a valid statute.
We note at once that Board of Medical Examiners presents a situation identical to that in Denver v. Sweet-a request by a person,
alleging the threat of irreparable damage, that a court step in to decide
the validity of the authority under which another branch of the government purported to be acting, and, if the authority be found not to exist
because of constitutional infirmity, to restrain or prohibit the act. But
despite the similarity, the supreme court permitted relief to one complainant and denied relief to the other.
In Sweet, the court said, "We deem it pertinent to this decision to
say that in view of our holding hereinafter set forth, the action of the
trial court in enjoining the plaintiffs in error (Denver) and the other
defendants below was proper relief."2" The "holding hereinafter set
forth" was that under Art. X, Section 17, of the state constitution the
state had exclusive power to lay an income tax. And, "Since the City
has no power to levy the tax in question, it follows that the Council has
no authority to call a special election of the City's electors to confer such
forbidden power upon it."'" In this case the supreme court examined the
constitutionality of the city's authority to act, found that the city was
acting without valid authority, and restrained the city and its election
commission from holding the election.
The basis for the opposite result in Board of Medical Examiners was
stated thus:
".... (E) yen a claim, as urged in the complaint filed below,
that the statute under which a department of the executive is
proceeding is unconstitutional will not clothe the judiciary with
power to interfere or control such department in advance of
its taking final action in the premises. In other words, the
question of constitutionality is a matter to be raised by writ of
error after the executive has performed its function.''2

It clearly appears in the opinion that the court assumed the validity
of the statute under which the Board was acting, for the court said:
"... (T) his court must intervene when formally requested
where, as in the case at bar, the lower court is attempting to
restrain a duly authorized administrative board from performing its duty pursuant to laws passed by the General Assembly.""
(Emphasis supplied.)
But the court assumed too much, because the constitutionality of
the authorization was among the questions of law raised by the complainant below. At no point in its opinion did the court consider the
constitutional authority of the Board, but told the complainant that he
must submit to the jurisdiction of the Board and raise the constitutional
question on writ of error in protracted and expensive trial and appellate
proceedings. We note that the supreme court did not require the tax22329 P.2d at
24 Id. at 447.
22 331 P.2d at
20

Id. at 505.
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payers of Denver in Sweet to submit to the election and raise the question
of validity of a charter amendment, if adopted, by writ of error after a
trial on the merits in a district court. We note, too, that the supreme
court did not assume the validity of the second trial in Markiewicz,
requiring the defendant to submit to the second trial, interpose former
jeopardy as a special plea in bar, and then carry an adverse decision to the
supreme court on writ of error.
In Board of Medical Examiners there is an attempt to justify the
result by saying that, "Significantly, the respondent District Court did not
find the only fact which would support its action, namely, that the board
lacked jurisdiction."" Actually, the trial court had no opportunity to
decide that question because the cause was removed to the supreme
court after the district court ordered the Board to show cause (authority)
for its proceeding, but before the issue was joined and argued in the
district court.
To add to our confusion, the same supreme court said in Markiewicz:
"We hold that petitioners have been in jeopardy and it
appears from the record before us without contradiction, that
respondent is about to place them in jeopardy a second time for
the same offense. In such a case prohibition is a proper proceeding to protect petitioners in their constitutional right
against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense.""
There is no question but that the district court had jurisdiction.
Further, former jeopardy is a matter that is ordinarily raised on a special
plea in the trial court; and an adverse decision is ordinarily reviewed
on writ of error from the supreme court. Yet the supreme court intervened in Markiewicz and refused to do so in the much stronger and more
proper situation for doing so in Board of Medical Examiners. It seems
clear that one or the other case is bad law.
The author has discussed these three cases at such length because
he feels that a large reason for such seeming confusion and contradiction
is the burden of work undertaken by the supreme court without adequate
assistance-that here is clearly demonstrated a desperate need, in the
interest of law and justice, for paid full time clerks for the justices.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Only a few cases in the field of administrative law were decided by
the supreme court during 1958, other than those such as Board of
Medical Examiners discussed above. In none of the cases was there a
wide departure from previously established rules.
Hearsay as the Basis for a Finding
Johnson v. Industrial Commission" re-affinned the rule that an administrative agency may not base a finding upon hearsay uncorroborated
by some "residuum of legal evidence," and denounced the practice of
permitting an expert witness to review the evidence and state his
conclusion as a finding or opinion of fact as to what happened.
331 P.2d at 505.
330 P.2d at 543.
)328 P.2d 384 lColo. 1958),
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1078 119571.
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Findings Must Disclose Evidentiaiy Basis
The record made before administrative agencies and the finding of
such agencies must set forth more than a finding of the ultimate facts
upon which the agencies act. The agencies must include in their findings
a statement of the evidentiary facts which support their findings, so that
a reviewing court can evaluate the results of the proceedings and determine if the findings be in accordance with the evidence."
Administrative Rule Cannot Modify Statute
In a case in which the validity of a voting list was in question, the
supreme court held that, "When a statute clearly provides a method for
accomplishing a desired result, it follows that an administrative commission cannot set up a regulation which is contrary thereto. ""
What to Do-Remand or Decide
Illustrative of the variation in procedure from one administrative
agency to another, and of the desirability of a statutory code of administrative procedure applicable to all agencies, are three cases decided
during the past year dealing with the disposition of cases in which the
supreme court found error in findings of agencies.
In Johnson v. IndustrialCommission," it appeared to the court that
the finding was based on uncorroborated hearsay. The case was remanded to the commission to "make further determinations consonant
with the views herein expressed."
In two other cases the supreme court sustained trial court orders
directing administrative agencies to take action directly opposed to
purported findings of such agencies. In one, Lindner v. Copeland,"' the
State Board of Examiners of Architects denied Copeland a license. The
trial court, on review of such record as was made or compiled by the
Board, ordered the Board to issue the desired license. In the second case,
Geer v. Smaldone,"' the supreme court reviewed the record made by a
liquor licensing agency as if the matter had never been heard by the
trial court, and affirmed the trial court order directing the agency to
issue the license.
80

Lindner v. Copeland, 320 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1958).
:2 Graham Furniture Co. v. Industrial Commission, 331 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1958).
2 328 P.2d 384 (Co o. 1958).
83 320 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1958).
84 326 P.2d 978 (Colo. 1958, following Geer v. Stathopulos, 135 Colo. 146, ,309 P.2d 606 (1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
Member of the Denver firm of Sears and Goldsmith
Instructor, University of Denver College of Law

As usual there were, during 1958, a large number of cases in the
broad general field of contracts. Some of the cases could be discussed
under more than one heading. These cases prove that basic contract
problems can plague courts' as well as lawyers.
CONSIDERATION-INCLUDING

JOINT VENTURE

AGREEMENT

AND A

POSSIBLE

NOVATION

At least five cases dealt directly with the subject of consideration for
a promise. In Rhodes v. Haberstich' suit was brought for return of a
deposit paid on a contract to purchase certain personal property including a hotel business. The purchasers contendedthat a provision of
the contract requiring the sellers to return the deposit in case they failed
or refused to close meant that the sellers had not bound themselves to
perform but could, at their option; return the deposit and terminate the
contract. In reversing a judgment entered for the plaintiff the supreme
court held that these were mutual promises of sale and purchase which
were consideration for each other. Each party was bound to perform.
The sellers' duty to return the deposit was not the purchasers' exclusive
remedy for breach by the sellers. The purchasers could have waived return of the deposit and sued for specific performance.
In the case of Lindsay v. Marcus' the supreme court held that when
the mutual promises of joint venturers were exchanged, even though
one party put up no cash, the joint venture was consummated. Lindsay,
Marcus and Holland entered into a joint venture to purchase and develop certain real property on which Lindsay already held a purchase
option. Lindsay, aided by Holland, was unsuccessful in his efforts to
secure an amended option, but later Lindsay did consummate the putchase on the terms of the original option. The joint venture agreement
was not disclosed to the vendor. After the purchase, Lindsay repudiated
the joint venture agreement. Prior to this repudiation, Marcus and
Holland had tendered performance of their capital contributions but
Lindsay always delayed accepting them. In affirming a decree ordering
specific performance of the joint venture agreement, and an accounting,
the supreme court reviewed and amplified the Colorado law on joint
venturers holding: (1) "Equity holds each joint venturer strictly accountable for completing ventures and will not permit the unilateral
withdrawal of one partner to the detriment of his fellow contractors without the consent of the latter,"' (2) Prior to termination or abandonment
of the joint venture, one coadventurer cannot exclude the others by
acquiring an interest in the property in his own name. If so acquired
the property will be treated as held in trust for the coadventurers, and
I In reviewing the 1958 cases it was observed that one district ludge was reversed
equal number of writs of error to review his judgments in cases Involving contracts.
a326 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1958).
S325 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1958).
' Id. at 270.
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(3) only slight evidence sustains the claim of a fiduciary's failure to
perform his duty to the principal.
The supreme court dealt with another problem of especial interest
to the legal profession in holding that the occasional prior legal services
rendered by Holland for Lindsay did not create a fiduciary relationship
between them in regard to the entry into the joint venture agreement.
Neither this case nor a case decided in 1957' dealt with the right of one
joint venturer to withdraw from the joint venture when a coadventurer
refuses or neglects to perform his duties.
An example of consideration for a promise being rendered to a person other than the promisor' is furnished by Reilly v. Korholz.' Here the
plaintiff financed a then current payrcll of Rock Wool Insulating Com
pany and later arranged for an additional $100,000 financing for the
company thereby preventing the company from being bankrupt. The
defendants had requested these acts and in exchange had promised to
to transfer 833 1/3 shares of their own capital stock in the company to
Korholz, without payment, and to vote their stock so as to elect Korholz
president of the company and chairman of its board of directors. Over a
month later, in an independent promise, the defendants promised to
transfer certain claims against the company and their remaining 507 1/6
shares of capital stock to Korholz as trustee.
When Korholz sued to enforce the promises, the trial court held that
Korholz was entitled to outright ownership of 833 1/3 shares, and to
transfer of the claims and the 507 1/6 shares to his name as "trustee,"
without defining the terms of the trust. The supreme court refused to
hold that the promise to vote the stock was illegal under the statute of
the state (not Colorado) in which the contract was made. It held that
the promise to vote the stock, if illegal, was severable from the promise
to transfer the stock. The promise to transfer the claims and the 507 1/6
shares to Korholz as "trustee" was held not supported by any consideration and the trial court was reversed on this point. The partial reversal
appears correct since no bargained-for exchange of performance was
shown to support this later promise.
Granberry v. Wright" would seem to be just another illustration of
an act as consideration for a promise but is worthy of note for the dictum
of the supreme court to the effect that the trial judge apparently fell into
error in seeking to satisfy both sides. The trial court had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint on a promissory note, and the defendant's counterclaim for damages arising out of an alleged nonperformance of the
services in consideration of which the note was given. The supreme court
held that the dismissal of the counterclaim should be regarded as a
finding that the services for which the note was given had been performed. Accordingly, judgment was reversed for the plaintiff.
Justice Frantz' dissent in Richie v. Phillebaum' makes it worthwhile
to examine this case. The decision affirms a trial court's decree ordering
foreclosure of a trust deed and the entry of judgment for attorneys fees.
The defendant, in consideration of his mortgagee's allowing him to remove and sell a deposit of sand, promised to pay, on his note, $5,000 of
the proceeds realized on such sale and further promised to refinance the
5 Smaller v. Leach, 136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (19571.
e See Restatement, Contracts § 75 (2) (1932).
7 320 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1958).
8 3 20 P.2d 979 (Colo. 19581.
e 3 2 4 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1958).
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note within ninety days after sale of the sand. The $5,000 was paid, but
the defendant failed to refinance. When the note fell into default, the
foreclosure suit was brought. Justice Frantz, in his dissent, applied the
theory that the permission given by the mortgagee, coupled with the
sale and $5,000 payment by the mortgagor, supports a substituted contract whereby the note and trust deed were "novated" leaving only an
unperformed obligation to refinance. If this were so, no attorneys fees
would be collectible and the instant suit should have been dismissed.
The possibility that a novation, in its broader sense1" could be found in
a case like this is intriguing. The majority opinion is consistent with a
theory (not expressly mentioned) that the agreement of the mortgagee
and mortgagor only resulted in a partially performed executory accord.
Viewed in this light, upon failure to refinance the mortgagee had the
right to elect to sue on the promise to refinance, or proceed, as he did,
to seek foreclosure and attorneys fees, under the note and trust deed.
INTERPRETATION

AND

REFORMATION

OF CONTRACT

Some of the recent cases deal with questions of interpretation and
concern matters that are of frequent interest to the legal profession. In
Culley v. Grand Junction Legion Building Corp." the supreme court
held that a lessee, who had the right to buy the leased premises at the
"best bona fide offer" the lessor might be willing to accept, was not entitled to recover the amount of a real estate broker's commission which
was included in the price the lessor communicated to the lessee and the
lessee paid to the lessor. The contract did not call for communication of
the best "net" offer.
In Pullen Motors v. Thompson" the defendant's auto was repossessed
by the motor company and sold for part cash and a traded-in auto. The
trade-in was sold at auction. The motor company sued for the deficiency
after deducting the cash sale prices of both cars. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's holding that the language of the chattel mortgage requiring net proceeds of the "money arising from the sale""' to
be applied on the defendant's debt permitted only a cash sale of the
repossessed car.
The case of Moddelmog v. Cook'" involved the right of a purchaser
of real estate to recover his down payment when the vendor could not deliver title "free and clear of all taxes, liens and encumbrances" with certain stated exceptions. The alleged encumbrance was a right-of-way and
easement for an irrigation ditch over the property. The ditch was visible,
seen and discussed by the purchasers before the contract was signed. The
vendors had secured dismissal of the complaint following a decree of the
trial court that the contract be reformed by inserting the following: "conveyance to be subject to lateral ditch across said property." In reversing
the trial court and permitting the purchasers to rescind and recover their
deposit the supreme court declared that under the rule of Eriksen v.
Whitescarver!5 a covenant to convey free and clear of liens and encumbrances applies not only to unknown, but, in the absence of a showing
to the contrary, to known encumbrances. The contract was complete and
10Ames, Novation, in Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts
(1932).
"1331 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1958).
"2331 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1958).
13 Id. at 1103.
15330
P.2d 1113
14).
I5 57 Colo.
409, 1Colo.
142 Pac.19413 (1914).

(19311;

Restatement, Contracts

§

424
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unambiguous. The supreme court held that reformation is to be allowed
only where a "mutual mistake is proved,"' " but that this was not a case of
such mistake.
The case of Nolan v. Colorado Mortgage Co."7 is noteworthy in
that the court referred to "gross negligence" of an escrow agent as having been proved and as being the basis for holding the agent responsible
for damages arising out of its nonperformance of duties as escrowee.
The defendant for valuable consideration undertook to disburse $9,200
of escrowed funds to a building contractor under a contract, between the
plaintiff and the contractor, requiring payment in proportion to work
accomplished on the proposed structure. The work was stopped when
only about one-third done and when only about twenty-six dollars remained in escrow. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
was reversed. The facts and reasoning of the supreme court clearly
demonstrate a breach of the escrowee's contract duties. However, nothing is gained by the reference to "gross negligence," especially since
previous cases have held that Colorado does not recognize degrees of
negligence," and this is neither a tort case, nor a case involving a
gratuitous bailee for the sole benefit of the bailor.
INTEREST As

DAMAGES

FOR FRAUDULENTLY

INDUCING

CONTRACT

The language of two cases, Moreland v. Austin"° and Doenges-Long
Motors, Inc. v. Gillen,' may appear to be in conflict. In the former case
the supreme court expressly states, "interest is not recoverable in an action
for damages occasioned by fraud and deceit."' 1 In that case the defendant fraudulently represented that cattle and land he was selling to the
plaintiff were free from disease. In Doenges, a minor fraudulently misrepresented his age to induce the motor company to sell him a car. The
supreme court allowed the defrauded motor company to recover, among
other damages, an amount equal to the interest, at the legal rate, on
the reasonable value of the automobile the infant had purchased. The
interest ran only during the time the infant retained the automobile.
The cases can be reconciled because in the first case interest on the
damages occasioned by the fraud was denied, in the second case interest
was used only to calculate the principal amount of the damages to be
awarded for detention of the automobile.
INTEREST, ATTORNEYS'

FEES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

In Weitzel v. Alles" the contract of purchase and sale of real property provided that if it was cancelled by the vendor for breach by the
purchaser, "all payments that shall have been theretofore made . . .
shall be retained by the vendor . . . in full liquidation of all damages

sustained by the vendor."" The purchaser had given a note for $2,000
payable April 1, 1956. The contract was declared terminated July 28,
1955. The note was specifically "subject to" the purchase contract and
1e330 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1958).
17322 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1958).
18 Adams v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 49 Colo. 475, 478, 113 Pac. 1010, 1012 (1911). "Degrees of negligence
are not recognized In this jurisdiction.' But cf. Pettlngell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 496, 271 P.2d 1038, 1044
(1954) where our court uses the phrase "some higher degree" referring to negligence and after eliminating
simplenegligence as sufficient to support an action under our guest statute.
ie 330 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1958).
20328 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1958).
91 330 P.2d 136, 138 (Colo. 1958).
22322 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1958).
23

Id at 700

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

was not a down payment on the property. The supreme court held that
under the contract only actual payments made prior to cancellation
could be retained as liquidated damages. The note was held to be
"but an incident" of the contract and no right to recover thereon
existed after the forfeiture and cancellation of the contract.
In Weaver v. First Nat'l Bank" damages for breach of warranty
included attorneys fees. The purchaser of cattle from the proprietor of
a Colorado licensed livestock ring sued the proprietor, on a third party
complaint, for breach of warranty of title to the cattle. The proprietor
filed additional third party complaints against the person who delivered
the stolen cattle to the ring, the state brand inspector and the bank on
which the proprietor drew his check to pay for the stolen cattle. The
purchaser secured judgment against the proprietor. All other third
party complaints were dismissed. In hearing the writ of error brought
by the proprietor the Colorado Supreme Court held: (1) The proprietor,
under the licensing statute"' warranted title to the cattle, (2) damages
for breach of this warranty include the purchase price paid, attorneys
fees for the purchaser's attorney and interest from the date of judgment
only,' (3) the brand inspector is liable to the proprietor for certifying
title to the cattle without referring to his book of registered and recorded
brands'" to determine their ownership. The third party defendant banks
were held not liable since there was no evidence showing that the proprietor delivered his check to a person who represented himslf to be the
agent of a fictitious payee. A full discussion of the so-called impostor or
fictitious payee rule and its limitations is stated in this case.
The case of Kepler v. Burns" should be of more than "passing interest" to all attorneys. Burns bought certain property from Kepler who
was executor of an estate. In inviting bids on the property Kepler required 15 per cent in cash to accompany the bid and stated terms of
sale as, "cash upon delivery to purchaser of an executor's deed .. ""
Much later a demand was made for payment of the balance of the price
in cash. Burns paid his cash balance by the required date. Kepler, having been later surcharged for failing to collect interest for the period of
more than one year between payment of the 15 per cent and payment
of the balance of the purchase price, sued Burns for this interest. The
supreme court affirmed a dismissal of Kepler's complaint on the ground
that by the terms of the offer, no payment was due from Burns until
the deed was tendered. This is in accord with generally accepted principles."
INFANTS' CONTRACTS

The Doenges case'" must be considered at greater length because
it extends previous decisions and settles many elements of damages to
be considered in cases involving disaffirmance of a contract by a minor."
In this case, Gillen, shortly before his twenty-first birthday, bought an
automobile from the motor company, traded in his old car, made a cash
" 330 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1958).
"Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 8-11-1to 17 (1953).
eColo. Rev. Stat.
73-1-2 (1953) does not provide interest for breach of warranty.
"Coo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-8 (1953).
2324 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1958).
2" Id. at 786.
Contracts § 267 (c) (1932).
"0 Restatement,
3 1328 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1958) see note 20. supra.
"An excellent and detailed casecomment on the Doenges case appears in 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 102 (1958).
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payment and financed the balance due. When he became twenty-one
he promptly rescinded the contract, returned the new car and demanded
return of his cash payment and of his trade-in, which had already been
sold. The motor company counterclaimed for damages arising out of
Gillen's fraudulent misrepresentation of his age and alleged that the
misrepresentation estopped Gillen from rescinding. The supreme court
held: (1) the right of an infant to disaffirm his contract is an absolute
right whether he has or has not misrepresented his age and thereby induced another to contract with him; (2) on disaffirmance the contract
is void ab initio; 0 (3) Gillen's recovery should be return of the money
he paid plus reasonable value of his old car and interest from date of
delivery (the agreed trade-in value could not be used since the contract
was void ab initio) ; and (4) Gillen is liable for all damages resulting
directly and proximately from his tort of deceit and these damages
consist of the difference between the reasonable value of the purchased
car on the date of its delivery and its reasonable value on the date of its
return, with interest for the period it was withheld.
CONTRACTS INVOLVING MECHANICS' LIENS

In this period of continued expansion of building it is of value to
consider the case of Bishop v. Moore.3" In this case the supreme court
affirmed dismissal of a. suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien stating: "A
prime requisite to the establishment of a valid mechanic's lien is that
an indebtedness exists in favor of the claimant for labor or materials.
Where the labor or materials furnished are in breach of the contract
and so unsatisfactory as to require that either or both be redone at
equal or greater expense, clearly they are without value to the property
owner and do not constitute an indebtedness. .

.

. Indebtedness is a

prerequisite to any mechanic's lien.
In Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Santa Fe Land & Improvement
Co." the plaintiff subcontractor constructed and paved a roadway partly
over the land of the defendant land company and partly over the land
of others. After the roadway was completed it was dedicated to the
public. The land company had contracted for the construction and had
partly paid the principal contractor. The principal contractor went
bankrupt without paying the subcontractor. 7 In allowing a lien against
33328 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 1958).
34 323 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958).
25 Id. at 899, the court quoting Trustee Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311, 203 P.2d 499 (1949).
"0332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958).
87 Some
of the above facts were derived from an exomination of the court file.
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the land company's land, proportionate only to the amount of roadway
adjacent to the land company's land, the trial court concluded: (1) that
the statute 8 only permits a lien upon property to the extent of the value
of labor performed and materials furnished upon the property, and (2)
that the Colorado mechanic's lien statute " does not impose personal
liability on a landowner for the entire amount of the contract when
no lien attaches, nor even when it does unless there is privity of contract
between the contractor and the owner. Here there was no such privity
between Brannan and the land company. Some readers may have run
into the situation of the Denver building and engineering departments
requiring that a developer of land improve land outside the development area by installing curb, gutter and street over a dedicated road
as a condition precedent to permitting installation of such improvements adjacent to the developed land. On the basis of Brannan and
another case ,0 it appears that the unfortunate developer, caught in such
a predicament, cannot expect to secure a lien on the land he involuntarily improves. Improvements to a previously dedicated roadway, on
public land, will not support a mechanic's lien against the land adjacent
to the road.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

As inferred above, some of the preceding cases could be considered
under this heading; however, the most important case in this field is
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3-1 (1953).
.. Colo. Rev.Stat.§ 86-3-17(1953).
40Johnson v. Bennett, 6 Colo. App. 342, 40 Pac. 847 (1895).
"
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Myrick v. Garcia." In Myrick the trial court refused to permit the
plaintiff, an endorsee, to place a promissory note of the defendant in
evidence without proof of both the execution and endorsement of the
note to the plaintiff. The supreme court reversed and remanded for
a new trial holding that if three applicable sections of the statutes" are
read together the person having possession of a promissory note which
bears the payee's endorsement is prima facie the owner of the note and
entitled to have it placed in evidence. If the defendant then challenges
this prima facie title the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence
to rebut the challenge to his ownership. Two earlier Colorado cases"
had required that if the execution and/or endorsement are denied in
the answer, the note could not be admitted in evidence until the endorsee offers evidence of the validity of the endorsement by the payee,
and if denied, of the execution of the note. The Myrick case expressly
overrules the two earlier decisions insofar as they are inconsistent with
its result.
In Civic Finance Co. v. Meintzer" the supreme court in a very restrained opinion reverses the trial court's judgment which incorrectly
refused to permit a holder in due course for value to recover from an
accommodation maker of the note.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES

In Walker v. Nelson" the supreme court defines the nature and obligations of an agistment contract and distinguishes the agistment contract from a lease of pasture land.
The case of Wysowatcky v. Lyons" should be of interest in the field
of contracts and quasi-contracts for a reminder, in a concurring opinion,
that where the value of things or services furnished is common knowledge
the trier of the facts "may determine the question of value from its own
knowledge without the aid of opinion evidence.""
The plaintiff in School District v. Brenton" had achieved "stable
and continuous tenure" under the Colorado Teacher Tenure Act,' as
principal and a teacher of a high school in the defendant district. The
defendant, without reducing the number of teachers, abolished the position of principal and continued the plaintiff as a teacher at reduced
salary. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the salary reduction. Under the Teacher Tenure
Act" the defendant could not cancel the plaintiff's contract or reduce
his salary except in accord with the act.
"1 332 P.2d 900 (Colo. 19581.
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. I§ 95-1-63, 31, 59 (1953)
which to the extent here pertinent read as follows: "A person
placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor shall be deemed to be
an endorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
The endorsement must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto. The signature of
the endorser, without additional words, is a sufficient endorsement.- (emphasis supplied) *'Every holder is
deemed prima facieto be a holder in due course."
43Marks v. Munson, 59 Colo. 440, 149 Pac. 440 (1915) and Middlesex Co. v. Jacobs, 87 Colo. 445, 290
Pac. 784 (1930), both cited in Myrick.
"4328 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1958).
"5327 P.2d 285 (Colo. 1958).
ue 328 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1958)'
4' In re Hartle's Estate, 236 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Mo. App. 1951) (cited in instant cael.
4323 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1958).
":Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 123-8-1 (1953).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 123-8-7 (1953) provides for cancellation of an employment contract of a teatie on
continuous tenure . . . for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, justifiable decrease
in the number of teacher positions, or other good and just cause .... ""None of the grounds were present.
The alleged reason for cancellation of the contract was to conserve finances of the district, but actually one
or two new teachers were employed.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIP,
AND AGENCY
By

ERNEST W.

LOHF

Partnerin the Denver firm of Keller, Bloomenthal and Lohf

A. CORPORATIONS
1. Application of the Securities Act of 1933 to Banking Activities
Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Robinson,1 raised important questions under the Securities Act of 1933. The action was against the
bank and other defendants to recover, pursuant to' the Securities Act
and The Colorado Securities Law,' the consideration paid for "participation certificates" each representing a 1/48 interest in a 3 per cent
overriding mineral royalty. The opinion indicates that the action was
predicated only on the alleged violation of the registration provisions of
the Securities Act' and not on its anti-fraud provisions." The bank
alone appealed, contending that the trial court, in granting plaintiff's
motions for summary judgment, improperly had attempted to decide
material issues of fact and had decided them erroneously,
The pleadings and affidavits showed that the bank agreed to act as
trustee and in that capacity acquired title to the 3 per cent royalty. The
bank prepared, signed and issued forty-eight participation certificates,
each for 1/16 of 1 per cent royalty, and sent the certificates through the
mails to Colorado purchasers designated by the other defendants. The
purchasers signed receipts for the certificates, m.ailed the receipts to the
bank in envelopes furnished by the bank and paid the purchase price.
The certificates were not registered under the Securities Act of 1933.
The Colorado Supreme Court first approved a finding that the
bank had offered and sold securities as contemplated by the Securities
Act, stating that the banK's actions "in making up, signing and delivering" the certificates violated the Act.' In this connection, presumably
'326 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1958).
'48 Slat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77, as amended (Supp. IV, 1957).
Colo. Rev. Slat. §§ 125-1-1 to -19 (Supp. 1957). The opinion does not discuss any questions arising
under the Colorado Securities Law.
4 Section 12 of the Securities Act, 48 Slat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771, as amended, (Supp. IV,
shall be liable to
1957) provides: -Any person who (I) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 5 ..
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at low or in equity in any court of come.
the amount of
thereon,
less
with
interest
tent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
or for damages if he no longer owns the
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security,
77
1957),
provides In
(Supp.
IV.
as
amended,
§
e,
security." Section 5, 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C,
part: "(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall' be unlawful for any person,
in intercommunication
or
to make use of any means or instruments of transportation
directly or indirectly -(I)
state commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use of any prospectus or otherwise; or (2)
to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of
transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale."
(2) offers or
5 Section 12 of the Securities Act (see note 3 suprol also provides: "Any person who .
sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter.
state commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a fact necessary in order to make the statements in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
shall have the same civil remedies
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.."
quoted in note 3 supro.
6326 P.2d at 85.
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there was no use of the federal jurisdictional means in "making up" and
"signing" the certificates. The means were used only for their delivery.
The opinion does not make clear, however, whether such delivery occurred before or after the time when the purchase price was paid or
agreed to be paid, i.e., before or after sale (in the ordinary commercial
sense) of the securities. If after, the case is probably the first squarely
to litigate the question whether delivery of securities constitutes a "sale"
thereof within the meaning of section 12 (1) .' Section 12 (1) creates a
civil cause of action against any person who "offers or sells" in violation
of section 5, which in turn distinguishes between offers, sales and deliveries, each of which is subject to registration. 8 The question arises,
therefore, whether a delivery of securities in violation of section 5 in
itself gives rights to any civil remedy under section 12 (1). The same
question can be stated in other ways: Does section 12 (1) extend to all
acts made unlawful by section 5 or to only some of them? Or, does the
term "sells" in section 12 (1) have a Wifferent meaning than the term
"sells" in section 5? In this connection, although section 2 (3) defines
"sell" to "include" any "disposition" of a security for value, the definition is subject to the introductory clause, "unless the context otherwise
requires .. ." The basic policy of the Act would appear to be best satisfied by a holding that the word "sells" in section 12 (1) covers all acts
made unlawful by section 5."° The supreme court adopted that view,
relying, however, not on the policy considerations but on the holding of
Schillner v. H. Vaughn Clarke and Co." that delivery of a stock certificate constitutes "sale" of a security within the meaning of section 12 (2),
which relates only to fraudulent sales and not to sales in violation of
section 5."

The supreme court next held that a finding that the bank had made
or participated in a public offering of securities was erroneous and,
reversing the judgment below, remanded with directions to permit the
bank to answer the complaint, stating that the bank could escape liability
by proof that the offering was not public." The opinion points out that
the only fact pertinent to this issue which could be considered on motion
for summary judgment was that the certificates had been sold to fortyeight purchasers. The court rejected any rule that existence of a public
offering within the meaning of section 4 (1) " could be determined
mechanically solely on the basis of number of offerees or purchasers and,
relying on SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., " stated: "The real test is" See Loss, Securities Regulation 993 11951 with 1955 Supp.).
8 See note 3 supra.
948 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b13), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1957).
10 See Loss, Securities Regulation 993 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
11 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
12With respect to the section 12(2) question, there is a square split between the Second Circuit view,
expressed in the Schillner case, and the view of the Seventh Circuit, expressed in Kemmper v. Lohnes, 173
F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949). The Fifth Circuit adopts the Schillner view. Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th
Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954). See also Loss, Securities Regulation 1001-03 (1951), 361-62
(1955 Supp.).
13 it is not altogether clear from the opinion that the public offering question was properly before the
trial court on the motion for summary judgment. Whether or not a public offering was involved is relevant only
to availability to the bank of an exemption under the second clause of § 4(1) of the Act, 48 Stat. 77, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1957), exempting "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering."

As is stoted

in the opinion, the burden of claiming and proving on exemption

under § 4(1) is upon the claimant. SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938); see also
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). In an action under § 12(1) existence o the exemption
would be a matter of affirmative defense. Loss, Securities Regulation 990 (1951 with 1955 Supp.). The bank
in the instant case had not answered, and the opinion does not state that the exemption had been claimed in
the affidavits and admissions or arguments of counsel considered in connection with the motion for summary
judgment. If not, it would appear that the question was not before the court on the motion for summary
judgment. See 6 Moore, Federal Practice
56.17(4) (1953).
1448 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1957).
15346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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whether the particular class of persons affected need the information
made available by registration.' "
The court also approved a possible finding by the trial court that
the bank participated in the sale of securities in a manner other than
performing "ministerial and custodial duties," stating that the bank's
admitted participation, "whether performing only ministerial or custodial duties, came within the inhibitions of the Act."" An eminent writer
has advanced the view that there are "various kinds of mechanical activity

. .

. which quite clearly do not come within the ban of the statute,"

listing as an example "the mere distribution of prospectuses and securities by an agent or employee of the seller."1 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, relying on the foregoing statement, held that a Philadelphia
bank was not a "seller" of collateral notes within the meaning of section
12 (2) because the bank's functions were limited to such "mechanical
activity."" The Philadelphia bank's activities consisted of acceptance
of the note and accompanying negotiable warehouse receipts from a
customer, issuance to the customer of a safekeeping receipt, the forwarding for collection of a draft drawn by the customer on the purchaser of
the note, and the giving of immediate credit to the customer in the
amount of the draft prior to actual collection. The Philadelphia bank,
like the bank in the instant case, thus would appear to have acquired
title to the securities sold. " Unlike the bank in the instant case, however, the Philadelphia bank did not create or issue the security. On the
basis of the two cases, the question of when a bank is a "seller" for
Securities Act purposes remains a complicated question of fact and law.
The Colorado court further approved a finding that the bank was
an issuer, underwriter or dealer, stating merely that "it's conduct comes
squarely within the term issuer . . ."" and quoting the first clause of

the Securities Act definition of "issuer" ("The term issuer means every
person who issues or proposes to issue any security .

2).

This hold-

ing, however, poses a further question which is not discussed in the
opinion and which perhaps was not raised by counsel. If the securities
involved are considered to have been issued by the bank, they are just
as "squarely" within the exemption provided by section 3(a)(2) of the
Act, which exempts "any security issued . . . by any banking institution
organized under the laws of any State. . . ...

the business of which is

substantially confined to banking and is supervised by the State ..
banking commission or similar official. .... ,- If so, the judgment below
should have been reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint."
2. Voting Agreements among Stockholders
Reilly v. Korholz" raised interesting questions relating to internal
affairs of corporations and among stockholders, but the questions were

disposed of mainly on principles other than those of corporation law.
1e 326
17

"I

P.2d at 87.
Id. at 88.

Loss, Securities Regulation 341

(1951),

158 11955 Sup.].

1e First Trust & Savings Bank v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 214 F.2d 320, (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 856 (1954).
20 The Court of Appeals stated that, under Pennsylvania law, any such credit was revocable, that the bank
was not purely a "mechanical"
forwarder or a seller (in the commercial law sense) or a broker. First Trust &
Savings Bank v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., supra note 19, at 324,

11 326 P.2d.at 88.
22 48 Stat. 74, as amended,

15 U.S.C.

§

77b(4), as amended,

(Supp.

2348 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2), as amended (Supp.
24 But see also note 12 supra.

25 320 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1958),

IV,

1957).

IV, 1957).
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The action was to set aside stock transfers, assignments, and resignations
and to restore the plaintiffs to their prior positions as stockholders and
officers and directors, or, alternatively, to recover damages.
The most significant portion of the decision from a corporation law
standpoint involved a contract in connection with which defendant A
advanced $3,500 to the corporation to enable it to meet its payroil.
In the contract, defendant A agreed with plaintiff B that at A's option,
A would provide $100,000 in additional financing. B agreed to transfer certain shares to A in return for the advance and the financing and,
in the event A exercised the option, to vote his stock or otherw'se to
cause election of A as a director. The contract was executed in New
York. A New York statute provides that "A stockholder shall not sell
his vote or issue a proxy to vote for any sum of money or anything of
value."" The opinion does not disclose the state of incorporation.
On appeal, B contended that the entire contract was void and unenforceable. The supreme court stated: "By no stretch of the imagination can that law be construed to cover a situation . . .where Korholz,
at Reilly's request, seeking to save other corporations from bankruptcy,
wishes to be assured of authority to act to protect his own investment,
protection of which necessarily inures to the benefit of all of the stockholders. Even if this portion of the agreement is contrary to public
policy, it is severable and does not render the balance of the agreement
void or contrary to public policy. Clearly the considerations are severable, and the valid portions of the agreement are enforceable.""
The quoted language indicates the basic holding of the case is that
the contractual provisions were severable and not that the agreement was
partially invalid. The opinion does not cite People v. Burke,"8 the leading Colorado case on voting agreements, which held that a contract
granting an irrevocable proxy, unlimited in duration, to a rival corporation was void upon its face and contrary to public policy. 2'
3. Foreign CorporationsDoing Business Under Assumed Name
Admiral Corporationv. Trio Television Sales & Service, Inc.," 8 presented the following situation: A foreign corporation sued the maker
of a check. The trial court dismissed the action on account of noncompliance by the corporation with the Colorado trade name statute. 1 The
statute provides that "Any corporation existing under the laws of this
state" may transact business under an assumed name upon filing an
Id. at 760.
11,Ibid.
72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837 (1923).
20 'It
Is not In violation of any rule or principle of law nor contrary to public policy for stockholders
who own a majority of the stock of a corporation to cause its affairs to be managed In such way as they may
think best calculated to further the ends of the corporation, and it is not against public policy or unlawful
per se for stockholders to agree or combine for the election of directors or other officers, so as to secure or
retain control of the corporation, at least where the object is to carry out a particular policy with a view to
promote the best interests of all stockholders, and the agreement Is fair to all stockholders alike, and to the
corporation." S Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. 249-252 (1952 with 1958 Cum. Supp.). The Supreme Court in the Burke
it is unnecessary to determine whether all separations of voting power from beneficiol
case also stated: -..
ownership, all irrevocable powers of attorney for the voting of stock, or all voting trust agreements, ore
invalid." People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 501, 212 Pac. 837, 843 (1923).
80330 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1958).
82 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 141-2.1 and .2 (19531.
20
8
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appropriate affidavit of assumed name."' The corporation thereafter
filed such affidavit and brought a second action on the same claim. The
trial court dismissed the second action also, holding the first judgment
was res judicata.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
trial. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Moore states that the failure
to file the affidavit served only to abate the action until an appropriate
affidavit had been filed, and that the trial court erroneously concluded
that the first trial was on the merits. Mr. Justice Hall concurred in the
result, without opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Holland dissented, stating
that the rule of res judicata was applicable by virtue of Rule 41 (b)
of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure." Mr. Justice Frantz dissented,
with opinion, on the ground that the statute permitted only domestic
corporations to use an assumed name.
Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion of Justice
Frantz comes to grips with the procedural point raised by Chief Justice
Holland. The skirmish between the majority and Justice Frantz centers
principally around the meaning of the term "existing" in the trade name
statute, a somewhat metaphysical inquiry which, according to the majority, was not suggested to the trial court or in the appellate briefs.
The majority points to the provisions of the pre-1959 Colorado general
corporation statute which limit "corporate existence" of a foreign corporation of like character," and to the provisions which subject foreign
corporations to all the liabilities, restrictions and duties of domestic
corporations. The majority reasons to two conclusions: (a) that the
Colorado general corporation statute specifically recognizes that a complying foreign corporation has a "corporate existence" in Colorado, and
(b) that the Colorado legislature therefore clearly did not intend to
permit only domestic corporations to use an assumed name. Justice
Frantz emphasizes that the "existence" of a corporation is confined to
the state of its incorporation and is something quite distinct from its
authorization to do business in a foreign state. He concludes that the
statute permits only domestic corporations to use trade names and that
the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
In the opinion of this author, Justice Frantz has the better of the
argument in this bit of judicial logomachy, policy considerations aside.
There is no obvious reason of policy, however, for legislative discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations in use of trade names.
Consequently, the unfortunate wording of the trade name statute appears more to represent a drafting "bug" than an intentional limitation
of the privileges of foreign corporations.
4. Foreign Corporations "Doing Business" as a Basis of Jurisdiction
Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. District Court" is the latest
Colorado addition to the myriad cases dealing with the quantum of
"doing business" necessary to render a non-qualifying foreign corporation amenable to service of process. The defendant's activities in Colorado, which admittedly had been substantially curtailed at the time of
"Id. § 141-2-1(2).
" Rule 411b] provides: "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
thissubdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule. other than a dismissal for lock of jurisdiction
or failure to file a complaint under rule 3, operates as on adjudication upon the merits.
"Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-10.8 (1953).
" Id. § 31-10-2.
88332 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1958).
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the action, consisted of selling its products through salesmen, at one time
as many as five, over a period of fifty years with gross sales in the state
approximating $200,000 annually. The plaintiff was a salesman of the
defendant, suing to recover sales commissions. The supreme court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the
defendant was subject to service."
B. PARTNERSHIP
None of the 1958 Colorado cases arose under either the Colorado
Uniform Partnership Law3" or the Colorado Uniform Limited Partner0
ship Law,3" but one case, Lindsay v. Marcus,"
involved joint adventurers.
The supreme court affirmed a decree that certain real estate purchased
by the defendant was held by him as constructive trustee for the benefit
of the plaintiffs, the purchase having been made pursuant to a joint
venture agreement among the plaintiffs and the defendant having as
its object subdivision, promotion and development of the land. To a
great extent, the questions raised relate to evidentiary matters not relevant here (such as whether execution of the agreement was procured by
fraud and whether the venture had terminated through mutual consent).
Otherwise, the case reaffirms well-settled principles of the law of joint
ventures: joint adventurers stand to each other in the relation of partners and fiduciaries and are accountable as such; and title to property
acquired in connection with a joint venture in the name of one of the
parties is acquired as trustee of his associates.
C. AGENCY
1. Master-Servant Relation and Scope of Employment
Milner Hotels, Inc., v. Spangler" raised the questions whether a
plumber was the defendant's servant and, if so, whether he acted within
the scope of his employment. The opinion affirmed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff without reviewing the evidence and, consequently, will
not be further discussed.
Miller v. Denver Post" involved a newspaper carrier boy who, after
folding his papers preparatory to departing on his route, was injured
while pursuing other carrier boys who had taken a radio aerial from
his bicycle. The supreme court affirmed a finding of the Colorado Industrial Commission that, assuming the boy was an "employee" of the
newspaper within the meaning of the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act,'" the claimant " 'stepped outside the scope of his employment
and that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.' "" The Commission had also found that the radio aerial
played no part in the newspaper delivery service and that there was no
"causal connection" between the plaintiff's services and the incident in
which he was injured.
Mr. Justice Frantz, dissenting, aptly poses the following question:
"Does the employment of a number of boys create a condition in which
a See also !wotaoat
e! Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 LIS. 310 (19451;
ties, 116 Colo. 455, 182 P.2d 142 (1947).
" colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 104-1-1 eI seq. (1953).
30 Id. §§ 104-2-1et seq.
40325 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1958).
41321 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1958).
12 322 P.2d 661 (Colo. 19581.
"aColo. Rev. Stat.§ 81-2-7 (1953).
4 322 P.2d at 662.

Rogers v. Mor'-tain States Royal-

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

the propensities for fun-making become an incident of the employment?"" He concludes that the Commission "should have first determined whether the relationship within the terms of the Act existed, and
if it found the relationship did exist, should then have made findings
and determination as to whether the skylarking was under the law an
incident of the employment.""
2. Implied Authority of Attorney of Record
In Schleiger v. Schleiger,'" a divorce action, it was urged on appeal'
that the trial court had erred in going to trial without a court reporter, s
the appellant claiming that her former attorney had acquiesced in such
procedure without her consent. In affirming judgment, the supreme
court relied on the established rule that an attorney of record has implied
general authority to act as he deems necessary in connection with matters relating to procedure, as distinguished from matters relating to the
cause of action itself, and that his client is bound thereby.
3. Auctioneer as Agent of Vendor of Property Sold
In Weaver v. First Nat'l Bank,4" an action to replevy stolen cattle,
the operator of the livestock sales ring at which the defendant had
purchased the cattle was joined as a third party defendant. The defendant claimed that the operator was liable for breach of warranty of title.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's holding that the operator
was so liable, stating that the general rule that "a person employed as
auctioneer at a sale of property is primarily the agent of the owner or
vendor"" is inapplicable to the operator of a livestock sales ring. Such
operator is "a creature recognized by and licensed under the statutes of
this state," (Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, sections 8-11-1 to 17) , and
he "must accept the limitations, duties, and responsibilities which the
statutory law imposes."'" The court interpreted section 8-11-14 " as unequivocally requiring the licensed operator to warrant title to the livestock sold by him, with the operator also being statutorily liable to the
"rightful owner" of the livestock for, the net proceeds of the sale.
Id. at 666.
46 Id. at 667.
4 324 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
48 See Coo. R. Civ. P., Rule 80(o).
49 330 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1958).
50 330 P.2d at 146.
5 Ibid.
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953).
45
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
In the field of criminal law, the Colorado Supreme Court during
19581 decided about the usual number of cases-some twenty.five. The
Colorado Case of the Year,' which will doubtless prove to be the Colorado Criminal Case of the Decade because of its wide-spread impact
upon what has theretofore been considered settled law, is one which
has important effects both as to the substantive and as to the procedural
aspects of criminal law.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE

CRIMINAL LAW

Municipal Violations as Crimes
There are a number of proceedings, often related to criminal matters, which are somewhat akin to criminal proceedings but which are
commonly considered non-criminal (i.e., civil) or at the most only quasicriminal: habeas corpus proceedings (even when brought by an imprisoned convict);e juvenile delinquency proceedings;' proceedings to
recover statutory money penalties from wrongdoers; proceedings, in
connection with criminal prosecutions, to determine insanity subsequent
to the crime;' and proceedings for violations of municipal penal ordinances.' The Merris case ' strikes many Colorado municipal violationsup to 1958 uniformly held to be civil wrongs, not crimes-from the foregoing list. Henceforth, a municipal penal ordinance of a home rule
city is a crime if (1) there exists a counterpart state statute punishing
the same conduct or (2) the ordinance authorizes imprisonment as
punishment.' The problem of whether the violation of the municipal
ordinance of a non-home rule city is a crime under the same two circumstances is not decided by the Merris case and must await further word
from the supreme court.'
1 Because of time limitations imposed by the editors of DICTA for the submission of this annual review,
the cases discussed herein are those found in 319 P.2d through 332 P.2d no. 2, the latter containing Colorado
cases decided on Nov. 24, 1958. No Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. presently issued contains Colorado cases decided
'after Nov. 24, 1958.
2Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958), which contains two important holdings: (1) making
manv municipal violations crimes; (21 limiting municipal power to enact penal ordinances.
I E.g., McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958); Riley v- Denver, 324 P. 2d 790 (Colo. 1958)-both
noted infra of notes 60, 64 and text. Habeas corpus is also available to others than imprisoned convictse.g., infants in custody cases, aliens in deportation cases, and persons committed to mental institutions for
reasons other than alleged criminal conduct.
4 Kohm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928). The principle type of juvenile delinquency is the
commission by a juvenile of what would be a crime if committed by on adult. Cola. Rev. Stat. § 22.-81 (19531.
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6 (1953) (insanity at the time of criminal trial, or of criminal judgment, or of
execution of the death penalty for crime).
6 The majority view in the United States is that municipal ordinance violations are civil wrongs against
the municipality, even when the violation is punishable by imprisonment, and even when the state criminal
low prohibits the same conduct which the ordinance forbids. 9 McQuillin, 'Municipal Corporations § 27.06
(3d ed. 1950).
7 See note 2 supra. The case involved a home rule city municipal ordinance punishing, by fine or imprisonment, driving under the influence of liquor. A counterpart state statute also forbids the same conduct,
thou-h the authorized punishment is somewhat greater.
Though the Merris case was somewhat vague as to item (2) above, the later case of Geer v. Alaniz,
makes it clear that a municipal ordinance is a crime if imprisonment is authorized, even
326 P.2d 71 (1958),
though there is no counterpart state statute; as well as a crime if there is a counterpart state statute, even
thouah only a fire Is authorized.
urging that
Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267, 279 (1958,
'See
there is a counterpart state criminal statute or (2) imprisonthese violations also should be crimes if (1)
ment is an authorized penalty.
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The principal effect of this holding of the Merris case-that many
municipal violations, formerly held to be civil wrongs, are crimes-has
been procedural: the municipal courts which try municipal violators
must henceforth afford defendants those procedural rights to which
defendants are entitled in comparable state criminal trials. These will
be considered under the topic "Criminal Procedure" below.
Power to Create Municipal Crimes
Besides turning many a municipal violation from a mere civil
wrong into a crime, the Merris case severely limits the power of home
rule municipalities to enact penal ordinances. Before Merris, Colorado
followed the rule of most states to the effect that the state and the
home rule city possess concurrent power to enact laws punishing
identical conduct which is of both state-wide and local concern, so long
as the city ordinance does not conflict with the state statute."° One of
the holdings of the Merris case, however, is that, when a state criminal
statute punishes conduct of state-wide concern, the home rule city has
no power to enact a penal ordinance punishing the same conduct (and
conversely, that where a home rule city has enacted a penal ordinance
punishing conduct of local concern, a state statute punishing the same
conduct is inapplicable to such conduct committed within the municipal
territorial limits) . Questions as to what are matters of state-wide concern
(other than drunken driving, the specific matter involved in Merris)
as distinguished from matters of local concern; 1 as to what is the power
of a home rule municipality to enact an ordinance punishing conduct of
state-wide concern in the absence of state law on the subject; as to
whether the Merris case limits the municipal power of non-home rule
cities to an equal degree; and as to whether certain Colorado statutory
provisions delegating ordinance power concerning specific matters to
"local authorities" and "cities and towns" permits concurrent power in
spite of Merris-all such questions, not specifically raised by the Merris
case, must await further answers by the supreme court."' It may be that
some of the questions concerning municipal power to enact penal ordinances will be soon settled by legislation."
Drunk-Driving Death Statute
An important Colorado criminal statute, poorly worded, makes it
a felony, with a maximum punishment of fourteen years' imprisonment,
10 Colorado: Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Poc. 50 (1885) (punishment by state no bar to punishment by city); Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Coto. 302 29 Pac. 516 (18921 (some); People v. Graham, 107 Colo.
202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941) (recognizing concurrent power as to traffic matters). Other statesi 6 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations c. 23 (3d ed. 1950).
"I The difficulty which will be encountered in classifying matters into one or the other of the two
categories-matters of state-wide concern, matters of local concern-is that so often a matter really concerns both the state and the locality. Driving under the influence, held by Merris to be a stote-wide matter,
is surely also a matter of local concern-actually of special concern to the people of the locality where the
driver does his driving.
12 See Scott, supra note 9, at 270-75, for some speculation concerning the answers to these questions.
13 The Colorado Municipal League has prepared a bill, to be offered in the 1959 legislative session, to
amend Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-33-1 (1953) so as to enlarge municipal power beyond the narrow limits imposed
by the Merris case. The bill provides for concurrent state and municipal power (of home rule and non-home
rule municipalities) concerning matters of both state and local concern, unless the state statute on the sublect expressly preempts the field to the exclusion of municipol power. It further provides that, when both
state and municipality punish the same conduct, prosecution by the state bars prosecution by the city and
vice versa. The League proposes no legislation to change the other holding of the Merris case; that municipal
violations are generally crimes, which must be prosecuted according to the laws relating to criminal procedure.
The proposed legislation, insofar as it enlarges the power of home rule cities, may have difficulty withstanding attack on the basis of its constitutionality, since the IMerris case holding as to the municipal
ordinance power of home rule cities relied primarily upon the provision of Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (the
home rule amendment), that a home rule ordinance on a focal matter -supersedes- a state statute on the
sublect; the supreme court in Merris concluded from this that the converse must follow: a state statute on a
state-wide matter necessarily excludes municipal power.
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for one, while under the influence of liquor or drugs, to cause the death
of another by driving an automobile "in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, or with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or
safety."" The difficulty concerns the degree of negligence which the
statute requires: will ordinary (tort) negligence do, as the words "careless" and "negligent" imply, or is some greater degree of negligence required, as the words "reckless" and "wanton or reckless disregard"
indicate? In view of the statute's use of the disjunctive "or," it might
seem that ordinary negligence, the lowest common denominator of the
various alternative terms, would be sufficient.15 Goodell v. People,"
however, holds that a greater negligence-called "criminal negligence"is necessary to satisfy the statute. The court reasoned that, since the
crime of involuntary manslaughter, a mere misdemeanor, requires this
higher degree of negligence, 7 a fortiori the drunk-driving-death crime,
a serious felony, should require as high a degree of negligence.
"Ordinary negligence" requires, in cases of tort liability for death,
that the defendant's conduct, under all the circumstances, create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, though the actor need not be aware
that his conduct creates such a risk. "Criminal negligence" requires
something more. But what is this something extra which criminal negligence needs but ordinary negligence does not? There are three possibilities: (I) a higher degree of risk than simply an unreasonable risk, 8
or (2) a subjective awareness by the defendant of the risk which his
conduct creates, or (3) both a greater risk and an awareness of the risk.
Though different jurisdictions give different answers, Colorado's answer seems to be the second of the above three: no greater risk is required for criminal negligence than for ordinary negligence, but (unlike
the requirements for ordinary negligence) the defendant must be aware
of the unreasonable risk which his conduct creates. 9 When, acting
riskily and knowing he is doing so, he yet goes ahead with his conduct,
14 Colo.

Rev, Stat.

as a felony, with a

§ 40-2-10 (1953).

maximum

A companion statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-11

punishment of

five years,

the

same conduct which

(1953),

causes bodily

punishes

injury instead

of death.
15 This is the view apparently adopted by the earlier case of Rinehart v. People 105 Colo. 123, 95
P.2d 10 (1939), purportedly distinguished in, but actually overruled by Goodell v. People, 327 P.2d 279
(Colo. 1958).
16 327 P.2d 279 (Colo. 1958), noted in 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 104 (1958).
'7 Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956),
noted in 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 409 (1956).
18When the criminal negligence issue concerns liability for involuntary manslaughter or drunk-drivingdeath, risk means risk of death or serious bodily injury; when criminal liability for battery or drunk-drivinginjury is the issue, it means risk of bodily injury.
1' See note, Criminal Low-The Negligence Requirement for Involuntary Manslaughter, 28 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 409 11956), reaching this conclusion on the basis of the Colorado cases, which are riot, however, as
clear as they might be.
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he is an eligible candidate for a manslaughter (of the negligence type)
or for a drunk-driving-death prosecution if death results.
The Goodell opinion puts its stamp of approval on the following
instruction to the jury explaining the meaning of criminal negligence
in a drunk-driving-death prosecution:
"Criminal negligence is such a failure to observe the standard of conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person
under the conditions and circumstances, that the actor's conduct
partakes of a reckless disregard of life and a willful disregard of
the safety of others; such conduct is the equivalent of the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that substantial harm
will result and with a wanton and reckless disregard of the
probable consequences of said act.""0
With due respect, this is an almost meaningless string of words which
cannot serve as a proper guide for the jury. If the actor conducts himself in such a way as to endanger others, but is serenely unaware of the
danger, is he criminally negligent under this instruction? Though by
hypothesis he is not conscious of the risk created by his conduct, does
his conduct "partake" of a disregard of safety; is his conduct "the equivalent of" intentionally doing an act with knowledge of its riskiness? The
trouble lies in such words as "partake" and "is the equivalent of," which
seem to invite one to pretend that something exists (here, an awareness
of risk) which does not actually exist. It would seem much clearer to
instruct the jury, in manslaughter and drunk-driving-death prosecutions,
somewhat along these lines:
Criminal negligence requires (1) such a failure to observe the
standard of conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person
under the conditions and circumstances, that the actor's conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury
to another or to others; and, in addition, (2) that the actor be
conscious that his conduct creates such a risk.2
Confidence Game
When one obtains money or property from another in exchange for
his check which later "bounces," there is often the troublesome problem
20 327 P.2d at 283.
2' Perhaps "unreasonable risk" would require some further explanation to the jury. Taking a certain risksay speeding through an intersection-may be reasonable ifdone for a socially useful reason (e.g., to speed
a sickperson to the hospital), or unreasonable if no such reason exists (e.g.,to enioy the thrill of fast
driving)

MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORES
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Main Store-2606 E. Colfax
FR. 7-2764
Open Evenings and Sundays 10:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M.

TV Service Center-3539 E. Colfax
DE. 3-1595
Lawn Mowers Sharpened and Repaired
Bring your Radio and TV to us for repair-90-Day Guarantee

DICTA

INSTITUTE

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

PLANNING
ESTATE AND
FEDERAL TAXATION

On F

Practical Problems
Recent Developments
Tax-Saving Techniques
Nationally Recognized Authorities
1. Gifts and Sales Within the Family
and Their Tax Consequences.
2.

Use of the Short-Term and Controlled Trusts in Estate Planning and
Their Income Tax Consequences.

3. Gifts and Estate Tax Consequences
of Inter Vivos Trusts.
4. How to Make Charitable Gifts and
Bequests and the Use of the Charitable Foundation in Estate Planning.
5. Special Problems for the Owner of
Oil and Gas Properties in Estate
Planning.
6. S p a c i a I Problems Affecting the

Owners of Community
Estatc Planning.

Property in

How to Use Personal Life Insurance
in Estate Planning.
How to Use Business Life Insurance
in Estate Planning.
Current Problems
ning.

of Estate

Plan-

Techniques in Drafting Wills
Trusts to Avoid Tax Pitfalls.

and

Estate Planning
Partnerships.

and

for Partners

Estate Planning for the
Held Corporation.

Closely-

Sponsored By:
THE SAN ANTONIO BAR ASSOCIATION AND
ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Registration fee $50.00
Send checks to:
THE LAW INSTITUTE AND RESEARCH F U N D, ST. MARY'S
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
112 COLLEGE ST., SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

HILTON HOTEL
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
MARCH 5-6, 1959

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

of whether he has violated the short-check (misdemeanor) " or no-ac-

count-check (felony, five years maximum) statutes," or that punishing
obtaining property by false pretenses" (felony, ten years maximum, if over
$50 obtained) ; or the confidence game (felony, twenty years maximum)
statute." Bevins v. People" discloses some of the outer limits of the
nebulous crime of confidence game. First, the crime requires more from
the defendant than a promise, even a false promise (i.e., one the defendant intends, at the time he makes it, not to keep) ." Secondly, it
requires something in the way of the defendant's worming his way into
the victim's confidence, a requirement not satisfied when his confidence
is obtained through a course of regular business dealings conducted by
persons on an equal footing-admittedly a somewhat vague distinction.
Miscellaneous

Other Colorado cases concerned rather routine matters concerning
the substantive law of larceny" and burglary." Another case construed
various Colorado statutes to mean that robbery, when committed by a
youth over the age of juvenile delinquency but under twenty-one when
convicted, is a felony rather than a misdemeanor."° Another upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on habitual criminals."

A 1958 murder of a Boulder, Colorado, policeman raises the interesting question of the meaning of the vague phrase "in the perpetration"
found in the Colorado statute making it first degree murder for one to
murder another "in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary."" Here hoodlums robbed a storekeeper in Lyons, then fled by car to Boulder, some fifteen miles away,
arriving there half an hour after the robbery. Boulder policemen,
alerted to watch for the robbers, stopped their car. One of the robbers

shot and killed a policeman. "In the perpetration" is a matter of time,
place and causal connection between the felony in question, here robbery, and the killing. Here the time element is half an hour; the place,
fifteen miles away; the causal connection, the shooting was done to
avoid capture. Doubtless the Colorado Supreme Court will have to
decide the matter in the next year or two if the robbers, who have been
captured, are convicted of first degree murder on the theory of a killing
in the perpetration of the robbery.
Colo. Rev. Star.§ 40-14-10 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-14-10 (Supp. 1957).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-14-2 ISupp. 1957).
2' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10-1 (1953) (punishing one who obtains money or property "by means of . . .
any false or bogus checks.
...
)
"6 330 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1958). Here defendant obtained $20 from a store-owner by giving him his check
for $20, asking him not to present the check to the bank but to hold it until a stated future date when defendant would return and repay the $20. The defendant and the storekeeper had entered into exactly the
same transaction a half dozen times before, and the former had always appeared on the appointed day with
the money. In this instance, the evening before the appointed day the defendant was arrested and (ailed
for a traffic violation. He then had on his person $26, from which he intended to repay the $20 he owed.
Because he failed to keep the appointment, the storekeeper presented the check to the bank.
rhe
check "bounced." Defendant was convicted of the crime of confidence game and sentenced to eight to
fifteen years in the penitentiary. The supreme court reversed and ordered his discharge, because on the evidence he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
2" A false promise will not do for false pretenses, which requires a falserepresentation as to an existing or post fact. People v. Orris, 52 Colo. 244. 121 Pac. 163 (1912). If a false promise is insufficient for
false pretenses, a fortiori it should be insufficient for the more serious crime of confidence game. Cf. Goodell
v. People, 327 P.2d 279 (Colo. 19581 (since involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence, a fortiori
the drunk-driving-death offense does).
28 Lee v. People, 326 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1958) (the fair market value of a gun stolen from a retail storenot its wholesale price or its retail price-is used to determine the issue of grand larceny v. petit larceny).
"' McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958) (in Colorado, burglary may be committed by entering
.ithout breaking); Panion v. People, 331 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1958) (same).
30 Bartell v. People, 324 P.2d 378 (Cola. 1958).
"' Vigil v. People, 322 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1958).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 11953).
2

2
2
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Municipal Violations
As indicated above, one Merris" case holding-that municipal violations in home rule cities are crimes if there is a counterpart state
criminal statute or if imprisonment is an authorized punishment-has its
principal impact upon the procedure to be employed in municipal
courts of home rule cities. Doubtless the many rules of criminal procedure, constitutional, statutory and case law, applicable to comparable
state criminal prosecutions must now be employed in municipal prosecutions. As to constitutional requirements: trial in municipal courts must
be speedy, public, impartial and local; the defendant has a right to be
present; he has a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses." Though he
has a right to have employed counsel represent him, he probably has no
right to appointed counsel if indigent, since no such right is afforded
defendants in minor state criminal prosecutions. Probably the accusation
must be more specific than heretofore. The defendant need not take the
stand in his own defense (an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination) and so cannot be questioned against his will by the municipal
judge. There can no longer be prosecution both by the city and by the
state on account of a single wrongful act (an abpect of double jeopardy).
He is entitled to a jury trial if he requests one because justice courts
afford trial by jury on request in comparable state criminal trials."
The non-constitutional procedural requirements of the Merris case
would seem to include: the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than by a mere preponderance; the trial judge
may not direct a jury to find the defendant guilty; the rules of evidence
applicable in comparable state criminal proceedings must be followed;
the court may, in its discretion, suspend the sentence and place the
violator on probation; among other things."
Jurisdiction Over the Defendant
One who has, before his apprehension, committed both a federal
and a state crime, may afterwards be arrested and held by the one sovereign or the other, and the one which first assumes control over the defendant has jurisdiction over him to the exclusion of the other. But
that one may voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction to the other, and the
defendant cannot complain. So when the defendant, who has been
arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the federal
government, is handed over by the federal government, during the period of his imprisonment, for trial in the Colorado state courts, there is
no obstacle to the defendant's trial for his Colorado crime. 7
'3 Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958)
(commented on in note 2 supra, as further explained
by Geer v. Alaniz, note 8 supra).
34 No doubt all these rights existed before Merris.
35 It would seem that trial by jury in justice courts is, however, not a constitutional right but one granted
by statute, so that the legislature could, if it wished, abolish trial by jury in justice and municipal courts.
Municipal courts of home rule cities, however, seem to have made, since Merris, a quick adjustment to the
trial-by-jury requirements imposed by that case, affording
a jury trial
to municipal defendants who ask for it.
3e For a more complete discussion of the procedural consequences of Merris, see Scott, supro note 9,
at 279-82.
7 Gonzales v. Horan, 332 P.2d 205 (Colo. 19581 (state court issued writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directed to the federal warden, who, pursuant to regulation of the attorney neneral, voluntarily.
produced his prisoner In the state court). The court also held that when the Colorado district judge earlier
quashed a capias for the defendant's arrest, this did not operate to dismiss the information previously
filed against the defendant.
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Jurisdiction Over the Offense

The Colorado county courts have jurisdiction to try cases of wilful
non-support of wife and minor children," though the crime of non-support is a felony. A Colorado case held that the county court has power to
suspend sentence on condition the defendant pay $18,000, in installments,
for the support of his family, though in other matters the jurisdiction of
the county court is limited to matters involving less than $2,000."
Writ of Prohibition

Colorado defense attorneys in 1958 rediscovered the ancient prerogative writ of prohibition, a useful pre-trial maneuver to prevent the
threatened trial of a criminal defendant, available in limited circumstances of somewhat uncertain dimensions but related to a lack of
"
"jurisdiction" in the criminal trial court. In Bustamante v. District Court
the trial court had erroneously refused to quash the indictment, though
the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. In Markiewicz
v. Black" the trial court had wrongly refused to dismiss a prosecution
that was barred by the fact that the defendant had already been once iii
jeopardy for the same offense. In each case the petitioner, the threatened
criminal defendant, filed his petition for the writ in the supreme court,
seeking to restrain the respondent trial court from proceeding to trial.
After issuing an order to the respondent to show cause why the writ
should not be granted, the rule to show cause was made absolute and
respondent thus restrained.
In the Bustamante case the supreme court said that although the
writ "cannot be used for appealing cases on the installment plan," yet it
can be used in cases where the trial court, having no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the person of the petitioner, still threatens to
try him. To say that the trial court thus lacks jurisdiction because the
oftense is barred by the statute of limitations is surely to use the word
"jurisdiction" in a pretty loose sense.
In the Markiewicz case the court merely said that if prohibition is
proper when a threatened prosecution is barred by a mere statute, a
fortiori it is available for a thireatened prosecution barred by a provision
of the constitution. While thus giving pre-trial prohibition a rather
broad scope, the supreme court continues to limit narrowly the scope of
another (a post-conviction) prerogative writ, that of habeas corpus.'"
How far the court will go with prohibition to restrain trial courts which
have improperly ruled in other situations-e.g., improperly ruled there
is venue, or wrongly refused to quash a fatally defective indictment or
information, or perhaps even improperly failed to appoint counsel for
the defendant-remains to be developed by future cases.
Statute of Limitations

The Bustamante case, noted immediately above, also dealt with the
problem of the validity of a criminal accusation which on its face disthat the period of the statute of limitations has run and which does
. closes
not allege
facts (e.g., that the defendant fled from justice) taking the
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43-1-4 (1953) (-All courts of record").
30 Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 319 P.2d 983 (1957, adhered to on rehearing 1958).
40 329 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1958).
"u 330 t'.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
42 In dealing with habeas corpus the Colorado courts refuse to allow the writ to release convicted persons unless the trial courtlacked *'urisdiction" in a much more limited sense than that word was used in
Bustamente. See, for instance, Lewis v. Tinsley, 330 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1958) (court has "jurisdiction" though
defendant is not represented by effective counsel, is insane when arraigned, is coerced into pleading guilty).
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prosecution out of the statute of limitations.' Prior Colorado cases had
held that the accusation is not to be quashed because it alleges dates
which show the prosecution is barred in the absence of an exception;
the defendant should show that no exception exists." These cases were
accordingly overruled by Bustainante. There is a conflict of opinion on
the matter in other jurisdictions." It would seem that it is important to
have a definite rule one way or the other, but it does not matter greatly
which rule is adopted.
The difficulties involved in successfully convicting Bustamante point
up the fact that embezzlement, including embezzlement by public officers
of public funds, should be treated differently from other crimes by the
statute of limitations. Often the actual embezzlement is followed by a
long period of successful juggling of the books by the embezzler, who
stays on the job (without "fleeing from justice") to prevent discovery.
He often succeeds for a long enough period for the statute to run. It is
often difficult too for the prosecution to tell when the embezzled moneys
were taken; often it knows only that they were taken sometime between
the times when the defendant began his employment and when his
wrongdoings were discovered. Some other jurisdictions sensibly have
adopted a special rule for this particular crime."
Miscellaneous Pre-Trial Matters
Colorado procedure requires that the names of the prosecution
witnesses be endorsed upon the accusation. In one case the trial court
properly exercised its discretion to allow the prosecution to call a witness not so endorsed, where the defendant did not, as he might have done,
ask for a continuance if surprised."
The same case upheld minor amendments to a larceny information
before and during trial, in order to make the proof conform to the
allegations concerning the description of the stolen property, since no
prejudice to the defendant resulted from these amendments.
Another case emphasized the discretion of the trial court ruling oil
a challenge for cause on voir dire."
Evidence at the Trial
Some of the Colorado criminal cases of 1958 involved problems of
evidence, '" but as these matters are treated in a separate article," they
are not discussed here.
4SThe indictment alleged that defendant, a public officer (county clerk), between May 24, 1953, and
October 19, 1954,. embezzled $1689 of public money. The offense being a misdemeanor, Bustamante v. People,
133 Colo. 497, 297 P.2d 538 (1956), subject to the eighteen months statute of limitations, and the indictment not having been returned until Feb. 28, 1955, twenty-one months after May 1953, prosecution was held
barred by the statute of limitations.
4 E.g., Packer v. People, 26 Colo. 306, 57 Poc. 1087 (1899).
(statute of limitation cannot be
'5 Compare People v. Kaplan, 143 Misc. 91, 256 N.Y. Supp. 874 (1932)
raised by demurrer to the indictment but only by plea of not guilty) with People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d
611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934) (statute of limitations is "jurisdictional" rather than a matter of affirmative defense and may be raised at any time, before or after judgment).

4eE.g., Wis. Crim Code § 939.74 (1955) (extension of time to one year after discovery of loss if less
than five years from the embezzlement); see Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code § 1.07 (3)(a) and (b) (extension of time to one year after discovery if no more than three years

47 Gorum v. People, 320 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1958).
48 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674
opinion concerning
instructions).

defendant's guilt but can

put it

(1958)

aside and

longer than ordinary statute period).

(prospective

juror states he has formed

be governed by the evidence

an

and the courts

"WE.g., Leick v. People, supra note 45 (confessions of co-conspirators; admissions of defendant; confession not coerced though confessor not advised of right to counsel or warned that confession might be used
against him; one need not be doctor to give an opinion as to sanity; burden of proof in

criminal insanity

cases); Gorum v. People, 320 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1958) (evidence of similar offenses); Mitchell v. People, 320
P.2d 342 (Colo. 1958) (prior convictions to impeach defendant who takes the stand; the prior convictions
were alleged for habitual criminal purposes); Davis v. People, 321 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1958) (defendant's recent
possession of goods obtained by burglary sufficient to sustain conviction for burglary).
en See One Year Review of Evidence, infra page 53.
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Other Trial Matters
One case held that although the prosecution may have introduced
insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the alleged crime by
the defendant, so that a motion for directed verdict at the close of the
prosecution's case should have been granted, yet the defendant, when
presenting his case, may fill the gap in the prosecution's proof, thus
curing the defect, so that a motion for the directed verdict should no
longer be granted."1
In most states the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged
crime is raised by a not-guilty plea. A minority of states, including Colorado, require a special plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." Colorado is one of two states which make provision for a trial on the insanity
issue alone separate from the trial on all other issues. The Leick case5"
upheld the Colorado procedure splitting the trial into two parts, but it
held that although the trial is composed of two parts, it is only one trial,
leading to one judgment, so that there cannot be an immediate appellate
review of the insanity part before the trial on the other issues is had.
The Leick case also held that it is not reversible error for the district attorney in closing argument to read from the reporter's transcript
concerning testimony at the trial, so long as he does not say he is doing so
or, if the fact is known, so long as the court tells the jury that what
the witnesses had said is not necessarily true just because reduced to
writing.
:I Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 319 P.2d 983 (1957, adhered to on rehearing 1958).
e2 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 11958).

SThrow a line around your
TITLE and ABSTRACT Problems

Yes indeed! Whatever your title or abstract needs in Colorado, Title Guaranty Company and its affiliated companies
will provide complete service ... and promptly!

The TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY
1711 CALIFORNIA STREET

KEystone 4-1251

JEFFERSON COUNTY ABSTRACT CO.
ARAPAHOE COUNTY ABSTRACT & TITLE CO.
LANDON ABSTRACT CO.

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

A plea of guilty to an accusation containing, in addition to a count
charging the substantive offense, other counts charging prior offenses
for habitual criminal purposes, obviates the necessity of proof of the
prior offenses. "
Appellate Review
In a 1957 case' the supreme court recognized the binding effect of
the United States Supreme Court's Griffin case"6 upon Colorado law;
Colorado is required to furnish at state expense a free transcript of trial
proceedings at the indigent defendant's request, in order to equalize
justice as between the rich and the poor. A 1958 Colorado case" adds a
limitation to this rule: the trial court need not order such a transcript
if it would be "a vain and useless thing"-meaning doubtless that the
trial court is certain that no reviewable reversible error occurred which
could serve as the basis of an appellate review.
The general rule, that there will be no appellate review of trial
errors unless objected to at the trial and later urged upon a motion for
new trial, was held in the same case to apply to a defendant who elects
to act as his own attorney. 7
Double Jeopardy
In Markiewicz v. Black5" defendant was charged with assault with
intent to rob X and pleaded guilty. In connection with the sentence the
district attorney, who had several robbery cases to prosecute, got confused
as to which defendants had robbed whom, and so he brought Y to court
instead of X; thereupon the trial judge dismissed the case. A new prosecution for assault to rob X was then begun. Without passing upon the
correctness of the trial court's dismissal,"9 the supreme court held that,
since the trial court had dismissed the prosecution once begun, the defendant had been in jeopardy, and a new prosecution would violate his
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. In a non-jury case jeopardy
attaches as soon as the accused, on arraignment, has pleaded, the court
states. It would seem that the same rule would apply in a case where the
plea was not guilty but a jury was waived. In a jury trial on a not-guilty
plea jeopardy attaches when the jury is impanelled and sworn."0
Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis
The supreme court considered several habeas corpus cases in 1958.

Although recognizing that for most purposes habeas corpus proceedings
are considered to be civil rather than criminal proceedings, even when

brought by prisoners convicted of crime, the court held that habeas
corpus may not be brought as a class action by some prisoners in behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated;6" and also that the court
which finds that a prisoner is entitled to release in habeas corpus proceedings cannot properly stay the execution of its order for release
5a Vigil v. People, 322 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1958).
54 In re Patterson, 136 Colo. 401, 317 P.2d 1041 (1957).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
56 Kirkendoll v. People, 331 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1958) (defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rape and
received a stiff sentence; the severity of sentence is not reviewable).
67 Apparently defendant either could afford counsel or refused apoinlted counsel.
But if one must act
as his own attorney because he is indigent and no counsel is offered him, this rule seems too harsh.
A 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
69 It would seem that the trial judge should have continued the case until X could appear to testify that
the defendant had tried to rob him.
662 King, Colorado Practice Methods § 2389 (1955).
el Riley v. Denver, 324 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1958) (an aftermath of the Merris case; habeas corpus was
brought on behalf of those imprisoned as a result of municipal court trials in violation of the principles of
thatcase).
65
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pending a determination on appellate review of the correctness of the
order to discharge." As it turned out, on review, in the case where the
stay was requested, the order was incorrect, " but, as the court pointed
out, little would be left of the writ of habeas corpus if the prisoner, held
to be entitled to discharge, could yet be held "during all the weary
process of an appeal begun without leave and languidly continued.""
On the other hand the court disapproved of a trial court practice of
appointing counsel to represent a prisoner during habeas corpus proceedings, on the ground that the proceedings are civil rather than
criminal."
As to grounds for habeas corpus, Colorado takes a very narrow
view,"0 limiting the writ's scope to situations where the convicting court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense or over the defendant or gave a
sentence beyond the limits provided by the statute; and by "jurisdiction"
in habeas corpus matters the court seems to mean jurisdiction in the
Geer v. Alaniz, 326 P.2d 71 (1958) (alsoan aftermath of the Merris case).
Geer v. Alaniz, 331 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1958). Here petitioners convicted at municipal court trials conducted procedurally on the assumption that the trials were for civil wrongs, and sentenced to imprisonment,
were not entitled to habeas corpus, since by failing to object they waived their constitutional rights. But
aside from the waiver, the Colorado view is that violations of constitutional rights (e.g., to jury trial, to
counsel, not to incriminate one's self) are not grounds for habeas corpus. See Lewis v. Tinsley, 330 P.2d 532
(Colo. 1958), discussed below at note 67 and accompanying text.
64 A quotation from Chief Justice Cardozo, in People ex rel.Sabotino v. Jennings, 246 N.Y. 258,
158
N.E. 613, 614 (1927).
65 McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958).
60 Freeman v. Tinsley, 135 Colo. 62, 308 P.2d 220 (1957), cert.denied, 355 U.S. 843 (1958), discussed in
Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Low and Procedure, 35 DICTA 26, 28, 34-35 (1958).
62
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narrow sense of power to hear and decide." The 1958 case of Lewis v.
Tinsley" continued this narrow viewpoint, holding that petitioner's
allegations that he was unrepresented by effective counsel, was insane
when arraigned, and was coerced into pleading guilty to robbery and
assault with intent to murder-these allegations alleged no grounds for
habeas corpus. This follows because there was no allegation of lack ot
jurisdiction or sentence beyond statutory limits and because the petitioner after conviction never applied for a writ of error.
It is quite clear that the Lewis allegations if true, as they should be
assumed to be on a petition for habeas corpus,' disclose violations of
constitutional rights under both the federal and state constitutions. It
is also quite clear that as a practical matter the conviction was not effectively, appealable. An insane person can hardly appeal. Even a sane
man without adequate counsel cannot effectively obtain appellate review,
and the coercion which produces a guilty plea generally continues long
enough to prevent appeal."0 In other words, the matter which violates
the constitution may also effectively prevent appellate review. Furthermore, on writ of error it is generally not possible to review matters not
in the record, and the insanity of the defendant and the coercion of the
guilty plea would not normally appear there.
There is therefore a serious gap in Colorado's scheme of justice in
cases of criminal convictions which are not effectively appealable obtained in violation of state or federal constitutional rights. Habeas
corpus, if limited to jurisdictional matters, is too narrow to'be of much
help. The gap must be filled, it would seem, by that other postconviction remedy of uncertain scope-the writ of error coram nobis
(perhaps today called "motion to vacate judgment of conviction") which should in Colorado be as broad as habeas corpus is narrow. The
three writs-the writ of error, the writ of habeas corpus, and the writ of
error coram nobis-must in combination afford adequate remedies for
relief against constitutional violations if the administration of justice
in Colorado is to measure up to the high standards which Colorado
defendants deserve.
'7 Compare the word "jurisdiction" in prohibition cases, e.g., Bustamante v. District Court, 329 P.2d 1013
(Colo. 1958) (no jurisdiction over a prosecution barred by the statute of limitations).
"8330 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1958).
S Very likely they were not actually true but the truth may be determined at a hearing when the
writ is granted. No such hearing was, of course, ordered here, since the writ was denied.
70 In Colorado a supreme court rule provides that a writ of error must be brought within six months
after judgment.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
INTRODUCTION

As is commonly true in Colorado, the cases dealing with domestic
relations during the year 1958 were few in number and generally of
no more than local interest. The chief development was accomplished
by the Forty-First General Assembly in enacting a new statute on divorce
and separate maintenance.' Detailed discussion of this statute is outside
the scope of this article, but it will be mentioned in connection with the
cases to which it is relevant.
DIVORCE AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

In last year's review the writer risked the opinion that the Colorado
Supreme Court, in Carroll v. Carroll,"had adopted a liberal definition
of cruelty. This statement was made without sufficient attention to the
supreme court's penchant for reversing itself sub silentio. This year, in
Reed v. Reed,' the court held that evidence substantially similar to that
I Colo. Lows 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, 38.
2 135 Cola.
379, 311 P.2d 709 (1957), discussed in Clark, One Year Review of Domestic Relations, 35
DICTA 36 (19581.
3 329 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1958).
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in the Carroll case did not amount to cruelty. The evidence outlined
by the court was that the defendant, the wife, had criticized the plaintiff's parents and his job, and that they had quarreled over their sex relationship. There was evidence of two acts of physical violence. In short,
the activities revealed in the Reed case were very much like those in
the Carroll case, with the apparent difference that the plaintiff in the
Reed case did not testify that his wife's conduct affected his well-being,
health or peace of mind. Although the Reed opinion is anything but
enlightening on the point, it was this failure that seems to have persuaded the court that cruelty had not been proved. The Carroll case had
specifically stated that inferences may be allowed, but it now appears
that the court has repented of its more liberal view, although its failure
to cite Carroll leaves some doubts.
The chief authority for the Reed opinion is a quotation from Corpus
Juris Secundum' which in part follows the language of Evans v. Evans,'
the leading ecclesiastical case defining cruelty for eighteenth century
English practice. Aside from the question whether present conditions
in Colorado are such that an eighteenth century ecclesiastical authority
should govern our divorce law, this choice of authority can only increase
the hypocrisy which is already so distasteful a feature of divorce practice.' Divorce plaintiffs who are well advised must now go through the
empty ritual of testifying that their peace ol mind, health or well-being
were affected by the defendant's cruelty.
One other case this year suggested in a dictum that entering a
bigamous marriage would not necessarily amount to cruelty, at least if
the defendant had acted in good faith.7 The negative inference might
then exist that entering into a bigamous marriage in bad faith is cruelty.
This is of little importance in any event, since entering into a bigamous
marriage would necessarily involve adultery, another ground for divorce.'
The year also produced a group of cases involving the financial side
of divorce. In addition to reiterating the established rule that allowances
of alimony are within the discretion of the trial court, not to be upset
in the absence of arbitrary or unreasonable action,' the supreme court
had to pass on the effect of an alimony decree where installments were
not paid. In Jenner v. Jenner e it was held that each installment becomes a judgment debt as it matures, and that the trial court may at
any time enter a total judgment for the unpaid arrears without further
notice to the husband. If the court's reasoning is correct, it would seem
to follow that the wife could get execution at any time for the unpaid
amount, without going through the formality of getting a judgment
entered for the total. The Jenner case also held that although the wife's
4'27 C.J.S. Divorce § 28 (19411 to the effect that "mere rudeness of language, neglect, indifference,
petulance of manner, austerity of temper, or an occasional sallyof passion or act of ill treatment which
does not injure the health of the complaining party does not constitute cruelty . ..61 Hagg. Con. 35, 38, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 467 (1790):"Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners,
rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if
they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty."
e Any practitioner who has listened to divorce cases being tried must concede that the list of things
which Corpus Juris Secundum says do not amount to cruelty are exactly the things for which divorces are
granted every day in trial courts of Colorado and other states. To unnounce in appellate opinions that
this sort of thing is not cruelty cannot help but increase the disrespect in which many laymen hold courts,
lawyers and the law itself, It is no wonder that many successful and respected leaders of The bar look upon
divorce practice as beneath them.
* Schleiger v. Schteiger, 324 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
* Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 2.
* Fitchett v. Fitchett, 320 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1958); Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324 P,2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
But see Vines v. Vines, 326 P.2d 662 (Cola. 1958) (supreme court reduced an award of alimony from $833.33
per month to $700 per month).
y0 330 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1958).

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

laches might give the husband a defense to a contempt proceeding, it
does not prevent her from enforcing the judgment for the arrears.
In Rodgers v. Rodgers," a case commented on last year, 2 the supreme court held that awards of alimony and a property division could
be made after the divorce decree had become final, where both parties
had agreed in advance of decree that this should be done, and had intended at all times to submit the property questions to the court. This
case raised but did not decide the question whether the property and
alimony questions might be foreclosed from later consideration if the
parties had not explicitly agreed that they should be decided after the
divorce was final. This question seems now to be answered by the new
divorce statute, which authorizes alimony to be awarded "at all times
after the filing of a complaint, whether before or after the issuance of a
divorce decree,"' 3 and authorizes property to be divided "at the time of
the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reasonable time thereafter.""
"Decree" here means a final decree, since the new statute abolishes the
interlocutory decree."
The court this year also described the circumstances under which
a wife may be awarded part of her husband's property. Where she is
asking a divorce, and can show that she contributed either funds or
services beyond the usual duties of a homemaker, she is entitled to an
equitable award." Presumably this would hold true also under the new
divorce statute. Such awards resemble alimony more than property, and
give evidence that the court is influenced by the same considerations
which led to the adoption of community property laws in other states.
Where the wife is asking not a divorce, but separate maintenance,
the court has adopted other criteria. Vines v. Vines" held that the wife
in separate maintenance is only entitled to a share of her husband's
property where that is essential to assure her of support. In that case
the trial court had given the wife half of her husband's property in addition to a substantial monthly sum for support. The supreme court
said that the wife who seeks separate maintenance is entitled to maintenance and no more, so that as long as she is adequately supported, title
to her husband's property cannot be ordered transferred to her. The
court construed the separate maintenance statute, which authorized a
division of property "in a proper case,"" to mean that such a proper
case would not exist unless the division were necessary to secure support
for the wife.
The problem immediately arises whether this view of separate maintenance is to prevail under the new statute. That statute allows the
court to divide the property of the parties "as the circumstances of the
case may warrant," "in such proportions as may be fair and equitable."'"
This is very little more specific than the statute under which Vines v.
Vines was decided.
The new statute does remove one ground of the Vines case, however,
by providing that if a property division is ordered, neither party may
11323

P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958).
See Clork, One Year Review of Domestic Relalions, 35 DICTA 36, 37 (1958).
13 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 6, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-15 (1953).
14 Ibid.
" Colo. Laws Ist Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 8.
16 Britt v. Britt, 328 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1958).
"7 326 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1958).
"IColo. Rev. Stat. § 46-2-4 (1953).
19 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 38, § 2.
1"
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thereafter share in the estate of the other except by a will subsequently
executed. This provision makes it clear that property rights can be
decided, with finality, and that the wife has no chance of later receiving
a further benefit when her husband dies, unless he expressly provides for
her in his will. This makes separate maintenance bear a closer resemblance to divorce, and supports the conclusion that the new separate
maintenance statute should be so construed as to allow a property division under the same circumstances in which it would be allowed in a
divorce case.
The doubts and problems which arise over the nature and effect of
separate maintenance underline the equivocal nature of the action and
its undesirable social consequences, the worst of which is that it leaves
the parties neither married nor single. This evil is not redeemed by the
slight possibility that the parties might be reconciled and resume marital
life.
One further problem arose during the year, the procedural question
of the extent of review of a divorce case where no transcript of the evidence is made in the trial court. The supreme court said2" that under
these circumstances the findings of the trial court will be presumed to
be supported by the evidence. The supreme court's willingness substantially to forego review of a divorce case where, under Rule 80 (a) ,
no transcript is made contrasts with its requirement in adoption cases
that a reporter must be present and a transcript made." The solution
would seem to be a revision of Rule 80 (a) to require a transcript in all
courts of record.
CUSTODY, ADOPTION AND DEPENDENCY

The supreme court has always been more willing to re-examine the
decisions of trial courts on matters relating to children than to review
factual determinations in other types of cases. This year was no exception. The case which goes the farthest in this direction is Crites v.
Crites," where the supreme court overturned an award of custody in a
divorce case on the ground that it was "conceived in aggravation and
not based on any evidence," even though no reporter had been present
in the lower court, no transcript was made, and therefore it was impossible to tell whether there was evidence to support the decree or not.
On the remand no requirement was made that the evidence should be
reported. This of course is inconsistent with the Schlieger case2" holding that in the absence of a transcript the trial court's decision will be
presumed to be supported by the evidence.
A still different approach was taken in Clerkin v. Geisendorfer,"
an adoption case in which abandonment by the child's father was in
issue. The trial court granted the adoption and the supreme court reversed, remanding the case with instructions that a reporter be present
at the trial and a transcript of the evidence made. This rule was made
to apply to all contested adoption cases. If the court is correct in its
reasoning that a transcript is required because of the state's interest in
the child's welfare, then a transcript should also be required in all chil20
21

Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
Colo.
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22 See Clerkin v. Geisendorfer, 323 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1958), discussed in text at note 25, infra.
2 322 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1958).
24 Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324
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dren's cases, whether adoption, dependency, divorce or relinquishment,
since the state's interest is equally great in all such actions. As indicated above," the proper solution is a complete revision of Rule 80 (a),
and not a piecemeal revision via decisions in individual cases.
Another case involving children dealt with a conflict of jurisdiction
between the district court and the Denver Juvenile Court. In Johnson
v. Black"' the mother of a child had custody under a Colorado divorce
decree. She left the child with her parents, the child's maternal grandparents, for about four years, and at the time of the suit was living in
California. The grandparents filed a petition for adoption in the Denver Juvenile Court," whereupon the mother filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Denver District Court," asking that she be given custody
of the child. The grandparents then asked an original writ of prohibition from the supreme court, to prevent the district court from hearing
the habeas corpus action. The supreme court refused the writ, holding
that the district court had jurisdiction in habeas corpus to determine
whether the child was wrongfully restrained of his liberty, and that there
was no conflict between the decision as to custody by the district court
and the decision of the juvenile court on the adoption petition. The
supreme court did not discuss the question of just how the juvenile court
could enforce its adoption decree if the child's mother should be given
custody in the habeas corpus action and she should then take the child
to California.
Allowing the district court to go ahead with the habeas corpus
proceeding thus enabled the mother to frustrate any decree of adoption
which the juvenile court might give. The proper disposition of the
controversy would have been to order the district court to stay the
habeas corpus case pending the outcome of the adoption proceeding. If
the adoption were granted, then the mother would not be entitled to
custody. If the adoption were denied, then the distrct court could grant
habeas corpus and see that the mother obtained custody of her child.
The supreme court seems unable to look at children's cases other than
as mechanical applications of the rules of jurisdiction. It never seems
to occur to the court that at times a jurisdiction which clearly exists
should not be exercised. This is certainly a case where the district court
should have been made to stay its hand. Of course the other explanation for the case is the supreme court's long-standing hostility to decrees
of the juvenile courts.
The same hostility can be seen in what was perhaps the most warmly
discussed domestic relations case of the year, Diernfeld v. People.' This
was a dependency case filed by the Colorado Springs probation officer
in the El Paso County Court. The child was illegitimate and had been
left by its mother with its maternal grandmother. The mother was serving her second term in the Colorado penitentiary and therefore was not
supporting the child. So far as appears, the child was well cared for by
its grandmother. The supreme court reversed a finding of dependency.
The basic difference between trial court and supreme court was on the
question whether a parent in Colorado may transfer the guardianship
of his child to whom he pleases, without court approval. The supreme
note 22, supro.
28 See text following
27 322 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1958).
2SUnder Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-1-2 and
' The applicable statute is Colo. Rev.
00 323 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1958).

37-9-2 (1953).
Stat. § 65-1-2 (1953).
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court held that he may, saying, "Clearly it is not the law that before a
child can be placed by a parent in temporary custody of a relative permission must be first obtained from the court."'" The trial court had
ruled that the sole question in a dependency action was whether the
parents were properly caring for the child, and that it did not matter
that some other person was performing the parent's duties so long as
the parent was not performing them. Regardless of what one may think
about the wisdom of allowing a parent to transfer his child to others as
he might transfer a chattel, the supreme court's decision does not take
account of the applicable statute. The definition which the legislature
has adopted applies the term "dependent child" to any child under
eighteen:
"who has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who, in
the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care by its
parent or parents, where it appears that the parent or parents
are failing or refusing to support or care for said child ....
"
From the literal reading of the statute it therefore seems obvious that
the trial court's position was the correct one. A solution of this particular litigation which might be satisfactory would place temporary custody of the child in some agency, 3 perhaps leaving it with the grandmother, providing there was some chance that the child's mother might
be able to care for it upon discharge from prison. If the chance that
the mother would be able to care for it were slight or non-existent, then
some permanent arrangement for care of the child should be made, and
if the child were adoptable as the trial court thought, then adoption
would appear the best solution. As a result of the supreme court's decision, however, the child's status remains in doubt at least until the
mother's release, and perhaps after that if the mother provides no.better
care than she has in the past. Another dependency action appears probable before this unfortunate child's status can be settled.
31 323 P 2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1958).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-1 (1953), defining a "dependent child." The supreme court has refused to
apply this definition in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421, 283 P.2d 162 (1955).
33 The dependency statute does not now specifically authorize a temporary order for protective custody,
but Cola. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-6 (1953) might well authorize such an order if liberally construed.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By

VANCE

R.

DirrMAN, JR.

Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law

The purpose of this review is to point out those decisions and
statutes relating to the law of evidence which have become effective
during the calendar year of 1958 and which have enunciated or adopted
new principles, not heretofore clearly established in Colorado and thus
are important to the profession. No attempt has been made to cite cases
which apply principles already established and which would be merely
repetitive. The review covers decisions rendered prior to the latest
possible date before this review goes to press.
The year has seen the adoption of no statutes relating to this field.
In the opinion of the author, there are but three cases decided by the
supreme court which should be included as being within the scope of
this review as stated above.
In the case of Davis v. People' the defendant had been convicted of
burglary and the question presented was whether the trial court had
committed reversible error in admitting into evidence two stocking
masks, a hammer and a flashlight, identified as belonging to the defendant. The testimony showed that when the defendant was arrested a mask
fell from his person and that when he was taken to his car the police
found there another mask, the hammer and the flashlight. It should
be noted that the defendant denied the commission of the offense and
that there was nothing in the record to show that the burglar had worn
a mask or that he had been equipped with a hammer or a flashlight.
Hence this evidence could not directly identify the defendant as the
culprit. Pointing out that there were no applicable Colorado decisions,
the supreme court determined that no error had been committed. It
relied upon decisions from other jurisdictions which permit the admission of such evidence under one of two theories: (1) that possession of
burglary tools shortly after the commission of the offense tends to
establish the charge, or (2) that such devices are admissible as part of
the history of the arrest, and that the evidence here was tied directly to
the defendant's apprehension. The first theory rests upon a principle
similar to that applied in admitting evidence of other offenses to show
a scheme or plan, motive, identity or other fact from which an inference
of guilt of the offense charged may be drawn. The relevancy or materiality of the evidence is not so clear under the second theory, since in the
instant case it was not shown how the history of the arrest had anything

to do with the defendant's guilt except as such facts connected with the
arrest might also constitute circumstantial evidence under the first
theory. The court might have made it clearer why such evidence could
be deemed to be helpful.
O'Brien v. Wallace' involved the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony upon the issue of sanity. The record showed clearly that the
expert's opinion was based solely upon other evidence admitted at the
trial and that such evidence was conflicting. The supreme court held that
the testimony of the expert was not admissible under these circumstances
'321 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1958).
2 324 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1958).
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and pointed out that in order for testimony of this nature to be admissible the expert must have heard the evidence admitted at the trial, there
must be no material conflict in the evidence, the witness must assume it
to be true, the evidence must have been properly admitted under the
hearsay rule and have been material and the witness' opinion must not
be predicated, in whole or in part, upon the opinions of others. This
decision clarifies the rule applicable to a procedure which is, at best, an
unsatisfactory one. It should indicate to trial attorneys that opinion
testimony based upon actual knowledge of the facts by the witness, ol
upon hypothetical questions, is much to be preferred.
The third case, Weiss v. Axler,' involved error assigned to the instruction given on the law of res ipsa loquitur and in the exclusion of
testimony concerning custom and usage in connection with the defendant's acts, where such customs and usage were contrary to and inconsistent with specific directions furnished by the manufacturer for the
use of a permanent wave solution, the injuries having resulted from such
use.
Taking first the problem arising out of the trial court's exclusion
of testimony regarding custom and usage, the supreme court clearly
stated the rule to be applied in situations of this sort. It said that custom
and usage may not be resorted to as a test of due care where not in
compliance with the directions of the manufacturer of a product whose
use may be dangerous if the directions given are not followed, and that
a failure to follow such instructions constitutes negligence. It is clear,
of course, that the court did not decide that such evidence cannot be admitted where the use of a product contrary to express directions is not
shown to be dangerous. The case is not authority, one way or the other,
for that problem.
The decision of the court on the instruction relating to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is, it is submitted, not clear, but troublesome and
unsatisfactory. It is believed that there is considerable room for doubt
as to exactly what this aspect of the case stands for, and for that reason
the author of this review sets forth below what he believes the court held.
It appears to the writer that the court decided the following propositions relating to res ipsa loquitur:
(1) The circumstances establishing a basis for the aplication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur give rise to a
presumption of negligence.
(2) The determina tion that the facts establish such presumption involves the exercise of a judicial function and that
the court then resolves that the occurrence, unexplained, indicates negligence and establishes a prima facie case against the
defendant.
(3) This is a true presumption of law and rules out any
inference of negligence. The presumption is conclusive as a
matter of law unless the evidence given by the defendant to
explain the circumstances destroys the presumption.
(4) This presumption is a compulsive presumption of
negligence which continues to exist until the defendant has
satisfied the fact finder (the jury), by a preponderance of evi3328 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1958), noted in 3.5 DICTA 307 (1958).
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dence, that he was not negligent and if he thus satisfies the fact
finder he has destroyed the presumption. The sole question in a
res ipsa case is whether or not the defendant has overcome the
prima facie case of negligence against him by establishing by
evidence satisfactory to the jury that he was not negligent.
(5) It is the province of the jury to consider the explanation factually, and from the standpoint of the credibility of
witnesses, and if they are not believed the presumption remains.
(6) That a presumption of negligence arose in the instant
case from the plaintiff's evidence, making a prima facie case,
establishing res ipsa, and requiring the defendants to prove
exculpation from their presumed negligence.
If this analysis of the case is correct it would seem that a number
of conclusions might properly be drawn from it.
It has now been established in Colorado that res ipsa gives rise
to a presumption of negligence. This clarifies, the ambiguous decisions
heretofore found in the Colorado reports which treated res ipsa both
as though it were a presumption and as though it gave rise to an inference only. The permissive inference theory has now been discarded.
That the strength of this presumption is so great that it actually
shifts the burden of proof of the issue of negligence in such a way that
it becomes the duty of the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is not negligent also seems to be clear from the wording
of the decision. This appears to disregard the fundamental distinction
between the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion,
and the burden of going forward with the evidence, which rests upon a
defendant when the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. If that is
the true import of the decision it constitutes a rather startling position,
in view of the general rule that the burden of proof is fixed by the
pleadings in the case and does not shift thereafter.
The jury is left to determine whether or not the evidence offered
by the defendant is sufficient to show his freedom from negligence and
if they determine that it is sufficient the presumption of negligence
disappears from the case and the verdict should be favorable to the
defendant.
In considering the evidence offered by the defendant to show his
freedom from negligence, the credibility of the defendant's witnesses is
one of the facts to be weighed by the jury, and their lack of credibility,
in the opinion of the jury, will result in the presumption's remaining
in the case, since then the defendant will not have proved freedom from
the negligence which has been presumed to exist.
Since the court had before it no motion of the plaintiff for a directed
verdict, the question of the propriety of directing a verdict in favor of
a legal presumption was not resolved. This question would have been
squarely presented had such a motion been made and ruled upon by
the trial court. In those cases where the basic fact upon which the presumption rests is not conceded by the parties in their pleadings or by
stipulation, or where it is not properly the subject of judicial notice, it
can be established only by evidence. In such cases it is difficult to determine whether the court can decide such facts on the evidence submitted
without improperly encroaching on the function of the jury as the fact
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finder. The rule appears to be that if the evidence is such that no
reasonable trier of fact could fail to find the existence of the basic fact,
the judge may direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. If the evidence
is not so conclusive, the existence of the basic fact must be established
by the jury or other fact finder.'
It is hoped that this question can be resolved by the court in a
proper case, in order that this troublesome problem may be settled for
the benefit of Colorado practitioners. As to the points which were raised
and which should have been decided, it is unfortunate that Weiss, by
a decision which is lacking in clarity, left the law in a state of uncertainty.
4 See e.g. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Clenmner, 79 F.2d 724
court clearly and incisively discussed many of the points raised in Weiss.

(4th Cir.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF REAL PROPERTY
By JOHN E. BUSH
Associate in the Denver firm of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard
The Supreme Court of Colorado, during 1958, ruled on a number
of cases in the real property field; the most far reaching concern mineral
law. The cases which are worthy of comment are discussed in this
article and are classified under broad topic headings for organizational
purposes.'
OPTION AGREEMENTS'

The parties to the action in Moddelmog v. Cook ' entered into an
option for the sale of real property. Approximately a month after execution of the option, the buyer notified the seller that the property was
subject to an easement for an irrigation ditch, and demanded the return of the down payment. The option was silent as to the easement.
The seller refused to return the down payment.
The supreme court reversed the decree of the trial court reforming
the option, holding that a contract may only be reformed when there
is a mutual mistake and that in this case there was no evidence of a
mutual mistake. The fact that the buyer knew of the existence of the
ditch before signing the contract, the court said, was no indication that
the buyer intended to vary the terms of the written contract, or to
accept a title subject to encumbrances other than those enumerated
therein.'
FORECLOSURE'

Weber v. Williams' involved foreclosure and quiet title actions. In
1 Some of the opinions herein discussed are not final under Colo. R. Civ. P. 118 (c].The discussion of
such decisions will be limited to a statement of the case, in particular the Radke and Corlett cases.
2The court decided another case which is pertinent to this topic which is here noted. In Rhodes v.
Haberstitch, 326 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1958) the buyer brought an action to recover a down payment made under
an option, on the basis that the agreement was void for lack of mutuality. Directed verdict for the buyer.
The allegation of lack of mutuality was based on a provision which provided that if the sellers were
willing and able to perform and the buyer refused, the deposit would be retained as liquidated damages,
but, if the sellers refused to perform and the buyer was willing, the deposit would be returned. The buyer
contended that under this provision he was bound and the sellers were not; therefore, there was lack of
mutuality.
The court, reversing the judgment, held, in construing the agreement in its entirety, that the return
of the down payment upon the sellers' refusal or failure was not an exclusive remedy and that sellers could
not make a naked refusal and be relieved from all obligations. Therefore, since this provision constituted
mulual promises, there was good consideration. This case should cause no concern as to the validity of
the standard options since they are usually null and void only if the seller is unable to perform as distinguished from unwilling.
0330 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1958).
4See also, Erikson v. Whitescarver, 57 Colo. 409, 411, 142 Pac. 413, 414 (1914). These cases are in
conformity with the weight of authority as to the situation where the easement interferes with the intended
use of the property; see, 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 263 (19461; American Law of Property §
1 .49(b) (1952);Annot.,57 A.L.R. 1441 (1928).
5 Three other 1958 cases primarily concern foreclasure. Although not worthy of comment as to foreclosure,
they are noted here for other points considered. The first is Bishop v. Moore, 323 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958),
which involved foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. An employee of the principal contractor brought an action
to establish and foreclose a mechanic's lien against the property of the owner for unpaid wages. The trial
court, finding that the work of the employen was not completed and that which had been done was
worthless, denied the lien. The court, in affirming, held that the prime requisite in establishing a valid
mechanic's lien is that an indebtedness exist in favor of the claimant. The court distinguished the case, as
to the subcontractor's rightto a lien, from the problem presented in Jarvis v. State Bank, 22 Colo. 309, 45
Pac. 505 (1896) and Rice v. Rhone, 49 Colo. 41, 111 Pac. 585 (1910) where the contractor defaulted and
the subcontractor's work was of value. These cases also set out the amount which the subcontractor can
claim in the latter situation. In Richie v. Philfebaum, 324 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1958), the court held that payments in principal received by the mortgagee from an obligor of the mortgagor may be applied against
the principal indebtedness as opposed to current installments, at the election of the mortgagee, in absence
of agreement between the parties or direction of the mortgagor. Nolon y. Colorado Mortgage Co., 322
P.2d 98 (Colo. 1958) is a reminder that when a financial institution undertakes to pay out funds, as work
progresses, to the contractor of the borrower, it has a duty to the borrower to determine that the contractor actually performs the work thai the lender pays him for. The case holds that the lender is liable
for any loss suffered by the borrower because of the contractor's failure to perform the work it receives
payment for, at least if the lender is grossly negligent.
2324 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1958).
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the foreclosure action the plaintiffs, Williams and Taber, filed an action
alleging that they were the legal and equitable owners of certain property, and one of the plaintiffs, Taber, sought foreclosure of a deed of
trust which he held against the same property. The usual motion under
Rule 4 was filed for publication of service which stated that the defendants' address was unknown. The foreclosure action culminated in
sheriff's deed issuing to Taber. Presumably, Taber conveyed part of the
property to Williams.
Approximately a year and a half later, the same plaintiffs brought
a quiet title action against the same defendants. Again, their attorney
signed and verified a motion for an order for service by publication
using the usual language under Rule 4 and stating that the last known
address was the Colorado address given in the deed of trust. Several
years later the defendants filed a motion in both actions to have the
decrees vacated. The plaintiff, Williams, testified at the hearing on the
motions that at all times subsequent to a certain date, which date was
prior to the bringing of the foreclosure action, he knew the address of
the defendant which was in Chicago and that his attorney at no time
questioned him about the address of the defendants. The supreme
court reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to vacate
the foreclosure and quiet title decrees and to grant the defendant a
reasonable time to answer, holding that one may not be deprived of his
property except by due process of law. Due process under applicable
rules requires notice by actual or substituted service of process. Notice
to the plaintiffs is notice to their attorney, and the failure to disclose the
known address to the court was gross fraud on the court. Therefore, the
judgment is void and subject to collateral or direct attack at any time.
In so holding, the court quoted from a Colorado case' as follows:
"a judgment rendered without service . . . is . . . void, and that all
sales, or other proceedings had thereunder, as to all persons, irrespective
"'
of notice or bona fides, are . . . absolute nullities ..
Weller v; Bank of Vernal' involved a foreclosure action against property owned by a person who had since died. The mortgagee filed a claim
in the estate based on the note. After letters had issued in the mortgagor's estate, the mortgagee, in a foreclosure action, sought and obtained a deficiency judgment against the estate. The supreme court
vacated the deficiency judgment against the estate, holding that the
county court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the liability of the
estate for the deficiency."
By way of dictum, Denning v. A. D. Wilson & Co.1 serves as a
warning that the usual charges and costs paid by the borrower in connection with a real estate loan might be considered interest under the
1913 Money Lenders Act."
ADVERSE

POSSESSION

In Fallon v. Davidson" the plaintiff brought an action to determine
the ownership of certain land. He asserted a one-fourth interest as a
7Great West Min. Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co., 12 Colo. 46, 53-54, 20 Pac. 771, 775 (1888).
AThere was no showing st a m-ritorious defense by the plaintiff nor a discussion of the necessity
of such a showing. This case appears to keep Colorado squarely in line with the minority view that such
a showing is nor a condition precedent to bringing this type of action. Annots., 39 A.L.R. 414 (19251, 118

A.L.R. 1958 (1939k;

' 321 P.2d 216 lColo. 1958).
10The case follows Koon v. Bormettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 713 (1956)
no action has been commenced in another court before letters have issued.
11 326 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1958).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 73-3-1 to 11 11953).
"a320 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1958).

as to the situation where
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tenant in common. In 1931, the defendant had received a sheriff's deed
as a result of a sheriff's sale against the plaintiff's co-tenant, owner of
a three-fourths interest. The sheriff's deed purported to convey the
whole interest in the land. The plaintiff's action was commenced more
than eighteen years after the deed issued and defendant took possession
under the deed. The defendant had not recorded his deed until approximately five months before commencement of the action. The court
affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In so doing,-the court
noted that there is a division of authority as to whether a voluntary
conveyance by a co-tenant purportedly conveying the whole estate to a
grantee, who takes possession under the deed, constitutes an ouster."
The court held that the judgment debtor did no act inconsistent
with the rights of the co-tenants in permitting the sheriff's deed to issue;
therefore, there was no ouster." As a result, no adverse possessory right
accrued to the defendant and his possession was possession of all the
co-tenants. The court also held that the seven year statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the deed relied upon as "color of title," has
been recorded," assuming, without deciding, that a sheriff's deed is
color of title. 7
EMINENT DOMAIN"'

In Town of Glendale v. Denver,9 Denver filed a petition to acquire
by condemnation a right-of-way for a sewer line through the streets of
Glendale. The lower court denied Glendale's motion for a temporary
injunction and granted Denver temporary possession. Glendale by
writ of error sought reversal of both orders.' The court held that an
injunction will not lie to enjoin condemnation proceedings for the
reasons that there is no injury to the property because of the filing of
the complaint and that the grounds relied upon for an injunction may
be urged in defense to the action.
Secondly, the court held that Denver can acquire a right-of-way for
its utilities by condemnation without the consent of the municipality
through which the right-of-way passes under the authority of the Colorado Constitution,' which grant cannot be limited by statute."
14 The authorities are apparently unaware of the conflict. See e.g., American Low of Property, § 6.13,
note 8 (1952);Annot.,32 A.L.R.2d1216 (1953).
15 For a good discussion of this case see 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 370 (1958). The writer points out that
the clear weight of authority holds that an involuntary conveyance constitutes an ouster. See also Annots.,
27 A.L.R. 17 (1923f, 32 AL.R.2d 1222 (1953).
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 118-7-8 (1953). contains no such express requirement. The cases cited by the
court were based on a prior statute peculiar to tax deeds. See Col.. Rev. Stat. § 137-11-1 (1953), for the
present statutory provision.
17 There seems to be no doubt that it is in other jurisdictions, see I Am. Jur. Adverse Possession § 199
(1936).
10 The city did not fare as well in People ex rel. Denver v. County Court, 326 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1958)
as it did in the Glendale case. In this case, the County of Arapohoe brought an action to seek a decree
declaring void an ordinance of the City and County of Denver annexing certain property to the City.
Denver attacked the jurisdiction of the Arapahoe County Court. From an adverse ruling, Denver sought relief in an original proceeding under Rule 106. Affirming the trial court, the court held that Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 139-11-6 (1953), which provides that "any person aggrieved by any annexation proceedings had
under this Article may apply . . . (within time limit specified) . . . to the county court in which his land
is situated for . . . relief," means that the proper forum is the county court of which the land was a part
beforeannexation.
10322 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1958).
2o The court held that an order granting temporary possession is interlocutory and not a final judgment;
and, therefore, it is not reviewoble by writ of error. The proper procedure is under Rule 106. Potashnik v.
Public Service Co., 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
which
21 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 1. The city was relying on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-52-2(2) (1953),
provides in part "but no sewerage facilities shall be operated in whole or in part in any other municipality
unless the approval of such other municipality in the territory in which the facilities will be located is
obtained."
22 The court qualified the holding as follows: "the municipality traversed could withhold its consent
'.. " 322 P.2d at 1057.
unless proper, safe and healthful construction methods were followed .
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In Town of Sheridan v. Valley Sanitation District,23 the district
sought to condemn a right-of-way across two public streets in the town
of Sheridan. The town withheld its consent. Again, the court had occasion to construe the same statute. 2'
A construction of the above statute giving the city an absolute veto
power would be irreconcilable with the statutory grant to the district of
the eminent domain power." The legislature merely intended to "recognize the inherent power of a municipality to exercise its police power
reasonably to protect its inhabitants."" The court then went on to
state that the record amply established that Sheridan was not concerned
with the health, welfare or safety of the inhabitants of Sheridan in
withholding its consent but its only desire was to "horse trade" with
the district."
2

CONSTRUCTION OF INTERESTS RESERVED OR CONVEYED "

2

In Radke v. Union Pacific Railroad Company the plaintiff brought
a quiet title suit to remove a cloud from his title, created by a reservation in a deed from the U.P. to the plaintiff's predecessor in the chain of
title, which read as follows:
"Reserving, however, to the said Union Pacific Railroad Company the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other minerals
within and underlying said lands, and to mine for and remove
the same if found, and for this purpose it shall have right-ofway over and across said land and space necessary for the conduct of said business thereon without charge or liability for
damage therefor."
The action was brought some sixty years after the date of the U.P. deed.
The supreme court reversed the decree of the trial court in favor of
the railroad, adopting the view of the eleven page brief filed by amici
curiae. The railroad had been assessed and had paid taxes on the
mineral interest since 1920. The plaintiff had also been assessed and
had paid taxes on the entire value of the land including the minerals.
The plaintiff's tax notice did not reveal that a third party was being
assessed and paying taxes on this mineral interest.
The court held that the railroad, by paying the taxes, was a mere
volunteer, and no equity arose, nor did the payments work an estoppel
23324 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1958).

24 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-52-2(2) (1953). The court referred to the Glendale case as follows: "We held
that this section, if construed to authorize a veto of a constitutional grant of power to the City and
County of Denver, would be of doubtful validity. We then gave force and effect to the language by limiting
the vetoing power of a municipality to a reasonable exercise thereof consistent with the police powers
25

... at 1041.
324 P.2d
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 89-5-2, 13 (1953.

In defining the police power, the
P.2d 1038, 1042, referring to Colo. Rev. Slot. § 139-52-2(2).
court said, at page 1041, a city "may require reasonable, safe, and healthful construction methods, and can
withhold its consent unless given insurance that injury to users of its streets will not result, or that its own
sewer and water lines and water wells in the municipality will not be destroyed or contaminated."
27 A third attempt was made to attack the power of eminent domain in Greenwood Village v. District
Court, 332 P.2d 210 (Colo. 1958), in which case the city attacked the power of the State Highway Department and Arapahoe County to condemn property within its corporate limits. The city contended that its
consent was required under a different statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-13-35(10) (1953). The court held that
this section was only optional and that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-3-17 (1953), granted the highway department
ample authority and held that the latter statute does not offend Colo. Const. art. V, § 25 (prohibition
requiring
against special lows). The city contended that that part of Colo. Rev. Slat. § 120-3-17 (1953),
the city to maintain the highway buitt on the condemned property offends Colo. Const. art. X, § 7 (prohibition against legislative imposed tax on city). The court held that the subject port of § 120-3-17 has
been superseded by Colo. Rev. Slat. § 120-13-3 (1953), but, apart from that, a duty imposed by the legislature upon a city is not a tax.
28 See also North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Knifton, 320 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1958). In this case the landowner sought to bar the district from asserting a fee simple title to a hundred foot strip of ground conveyed by a predecessor in the landowner's chain of title to the district for an irrigation ditch right-of-way.
The court, in holding that the deed conveyed only an easement, pointed out that the instrument was deover, across
nominated a "Right of Way Deed" and conveyed "a strip of ground for the inlet canal . ..
"
and upon ...
20 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 80 (Oct. 27, 1958) (subject to possible rehearing at this writing).
28324
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against the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not guilty of laches
since that doctrine can only be invoked by one in possession against one
out of possession. The court concluded that the interest reserved was
a "license . . . viz, an incorporeal hereditament"" which "cannot be

used after the statutory eighteen year period without the consent of the
landowner.""
In Corlett v. Mark T. Cox III," the plaintiff brought an action to

quiet title to certain land, which in effect was an action to determine
the nature of a reservation by a predecessor in the plaintiff's chain of
title. The reservation read as follows:
"It is however further agreed and distinctly understood that
Carl A. Holcomb hereby reserves six and one-quarter percent
(6 ) of all gas, oil and minerals that may be produced on any
or all the above mentioned land, or in other words reserves
one-half (1/2) of the usual 8 royalty." "

The trial court held that the defendant was the owner in fee simple
of 1/16th of the mineral fee which judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. The plaintiff asserted that the reservation created a perpetual not-participating royalty interest, and that the court should
overrule Simson v. Langhof." Instead, the court chose to follow the
Simson case. In addition, the court characterized the opinion in the
West Virginia case of Toothiman v. Courtney" as a well reasoned case
"decisive of the present inquiry." In that case the grantor reserved "all
the oil rental." The court quoted Toothman:
" 'Though he did not reserve by name the oil in place or any
part of it, his reservation of all the rental or royalty to be derived from it compels the court to hold, by construction of the
instrument, that it vests in him the title to that thing, the beneficial use whereof has been reserved. . . . If there had been no

lease on the land, I would be of the same opinion, for a reservation of all possible benefit of the oil is tantamount to a
reservation of the corpus thereof.' ""
WATER RIGHTS

Means v. Pratt" concerned an action initiated by the petitioner to
change the point of diversion of his adjudicated water right. The trial
court dismissed the petition, which holding was reversed by the supreme
court. The facts clearly showed that the petitioner or his predecessors
had used the decreed water rights continuously for at least forty years.
During this time, the petitioner used three different diversion points.
The trial court's conclusion of abandonment, based on the fact that
the diversion point as specified in the petitioner's adjudication decree
could not possibly be utilized as a diversion point for the land of the
petitioner, was erroneous." The court held that non-use, coupled with
intent not to repossess, constitutes abandoment," and that one does not
30

Id. at 85.

Id. at 87.
Cola. Sup. Ct. #18109 (Dec.. 15, 1958) (subject to possible rehearing at this writing).
33 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
'4 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956).
"562 W. Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907).
"3 Colo. Sup. Ct. #18109 at 9 (Dec. 15, 1958).
3911 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 87 (Oct. 27, 1958).
3"Corey v. Long, 111 Colo. 146, 138 P.2d 930 (1943).
" Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo. 316, 157 Pac. 206 (1916).
"
"2
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lose his water right by utilizing a diversion point other than the one
decreed to him."
The trial court's conclusion that the petitioner did not establish
prima facie title because one of the deeds in his chain of title did not
specifically mention the adjudicated water rights, was also incorrect
since appurtenant water rights pass under a deed without specific mention if the facts, as here, clearly show that such was the intention of the
grantor.
Finally, the court held that even if the protestants might be injured'1 by the proposed change in the diversion point, the court has
authority under the statutes to propose conditions to prevent such
possible injury." In fact, it is mandatory for the trial court, if the evidence shows that the change cannot be made without injury, to "find
that such injury cannot be prevented by the imposition of terms and
conditions.""
MINERAL DISCOVERY

The next case, Dallas v. Fitzsimmons" involves an ejectment action
by the plaintiff, who held a mineral lease from the state, against parties
who claimed a valid mineral location on a part of the property covered
by the lease. The lease was obtained subsequent to the location by the
defendants. The defendants staked their claim and posted the required
notice first in accordance with federal law, but, after discovering that the
locations were on state land, they amended their claims. They then
attempted to file their location certificates with the state board which
had already granted the lease to the plaintiffs and therefore refused to
accept the certificates. The assessment work was done within the required time. Geiger counter readings indicated the presence of uranium
on each of the claims, but an assay which showed mineralization was
40 See also Pouchaulou v. Heath, 137 Colo. 462, 326 P.2d 656 (1958).
41

The court held

that

the record

showed

the

respondent's claim of

injury was

without

foundation.

42Col. Rev. Stot. § 147-9-25 (1953).
4" 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 87, 90 lOct. 27, 1958). This principle is well settled in Colorado. See,
e.g., Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952).
4323 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1958).
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made of rock from only one claim. The supreme court upheld the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendants. In so holding, the
court stated:
"Where as here the assay samples come from at least one of the
claims, and all the claims are contiguous, and where the trial
court could and did conclude from the evidence that the nonassayed claims lie in similar ground, it is not unrealistic to
hold that competent radiometric reactions supported by a chemical assay as to a part of the claims, clearly show the presence
of uranium on the adjacent claimed locations, showing the
same or similar radiometric readings. The latter are then valid
'discoveries'. . . . Such other 'discoveries' however must be
capable of competent radiometric delineation in similar rock
in place or along the same vein or lode.""
The court also held that the location statutes must be liberally
construed in favor of bona fide locations and that the leasing powers
of the state are subject to the implied limitation that it cannot lease
lands in possession under mining laws."e
45 Id. at 279.
4e Mr. Justice Hall dissented on the basis that the evidence showed that the assayed rock came from
only one of the claims, that a geiger counter does not indicate mineralized rock in place or in float or in
wash, and that discovery based on the geiger counter reading, "is to substitute for a proof of a discovery
of mineral in place a mere possibility, probability or conjecture of mineral in place, and thus judicially
legislates that there need not be an actual and proven discovery to have a valid claim." 323 P.2d at 280.
For a good discussion of this case, see 35 DICTA 208 (1958). Also compare the dictum in Smaller v. Leach,
136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (1957), as to discovery of uranium by geiger counter, and see 30 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 224 (1958) for a discussion of the Smaller case, and for a fuller discussion of both cases, see
Waldeck, Recent Developments in Mineral Discovery Requirements, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 33 (1958).

Plan to cttend-

INSTITUTE
on

Defending Criminal Cases
FRIDAY

-

1:00 to 4:30 p.m.

March 13 and 20,1959
FEE: None

PLACE: College of Low
University of Denver

Sponsored by Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education

of
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER SCHOOL OF LAW

DICTA

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By KENNETH N. KRIPKE
Member of the Denver firm of Kripke and McLean
Following upon the heels of a banner year in the development of
tort law in 1957, one might have expected 1958 to be anti-climatic. Not
so. The Colorado Supreme Court has rendered some further opinions
of great importance in 1958. And, in fact, with the issues of the constitutionality of the automobile guest statute, a decision on the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to tort cases and other
important issues still pending and undecided, there is promise of an even
greater abundance of crucial opinions in 1959.
Without doubt, the decision in Weiss v. Axler' must be conceded
to be the most important tort case of the year, not only because it
made new law on res ipsa loquitur but also because it did such a fine
job of clarifying and defining the old.
FALL

CASES

Slip and fall cases came in for considerable attention in the court
this year.'
One of them, Crosby v. Kroeger' exemplifies the value of persistence.
As the opinion was first written judgment was affirmed for the plaintiff
with a single dissent.' As rewritten after rehearing, the judgment was
unanimously reversed, with three justices not participating. The plaintiff was an invitee making a call upon the defendant's tenant. He was
in the hall when the lights suddenly went out leaving him in total
darkness. After waiting awhile he proceeded slowly down the hall with
his hands in front of him expecting to find the door to the apartment
he was visiting. Instead, he pitched down a staircase. Defense counsel
relied heavily on Miller-DuPont, Inc. v. Service' which seemed to place
Colorado in the category of those states which hold that the landlord
owes no duty to provide light and is not liable for its absence.' However,
an important distinguishing feature which takes this case out of the
Miller-DuPont category is the landlord's assumption of a duty to keep
the hallway lighted and his negligence in failing to perform the duty
once assumed.' Although there was obviously substantial evidence of
probative value upon which the plaintiff's verdict could be based,
nevertheless the case was reversed and returned to the trial court because the verdict may well have been based solely upon an erroneous
instruction on the Denver building code.
The Crosby case is comforting to those plaintiff's attorneys who in
the excitement of victory forget to ask the court to include interest in
the judgment, because of its further holding that if there is a request for
interest in the complaint, then amendment of a personal injury judgment
328 P.2d 88, 35 DICTA 307 (Colo.

1958)

(to

be discussed

later in this article).

There were four such cases decided this year: Colorado Springs v. Ochschlager, 322 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1958);
Mathias v. Denver Union Terminal Railway, 323 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1958); Harvey v. Braden, 324 P.2d
1043 (Colo. 1958); and Crosby v. Kroeger, 330 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1958):330 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1958110 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 356 (1958).
S120 Colo. 131,208 P.2d 87 (1949).
'Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 496, 500 (1952).
7 Id. at 505.
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to include interest from the date of filing is merely a mandatory, ministerial duty on the part of the trial judge.
AUTOMOBILE

CASES

The tired parties in City of Pueblo v. Ratliff' finally came to the
end of almost six years of litigation in a four to three decision. The
three-justice dissent seems almost bitter. The plaintiff drove into an
unguarded excavation which had been (lug in a Pueblo street twenty-one
davs earlier. The jury found in the plaintiff's favor against both the
city and the excavator. The supreme court affirmed as against the excavator but reversed as to the city and it was this latter action which
brought about the dissent. The majority opinion by Justice Sutton
reasoned that the proof of actual or constructive notice to the city was
insufficient. Justice Frantz, writing for the dissenters, charged that the
effect of the decision is to,
"discard the efficacious rule that where the evidence is
conflicting, or where the facts and circumstances from which
the jury may reasonably draw an inference of negligence are
shown, or when the determination of the question of negligence
depends upon the inference to be drawn from a variety of facts
and circumstances in the consideration of which there is room
for substantial difference of opinion, the question of negligence
'
should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions."
The plaintiff's verdict was for $37,500. His physician testified
that he was suffering from a herniated disc but that testimony was disputed by the defendant's medical experts. Evidently there was no
pathology observable on x-ray. The plaintiff was 44 years old, and a
watchmaker, an occupation for which his injuries totally disabled him.
All seven justices agreed that the award was not excessive under the
evidence.
The defendants contended that the plaintiff's thirty per cent government disability pension should have been deducted from the award.
There was no showing of a relationship between the war-incufred
disability and the injuries for which suit was brought. Said the court:
"Even damages paid by insurance companies to an injured party, to
which the wrongdoer does not contribute, could not diminish an
award. '" 1"
Artz v. Herrera" was a head-on collision case. The trial court
refused to instruct the jury that there is a presumption of negligence
against the driver who was on the wrong side of the road. The supreme
court affirmed saying:
"The presumption of negligence is not conclusive, and
might well be overcome by proof that the plaintiff, by reason of
defendant's unlawful conduct, was blinded and took all reasonable steps to slow or stop his car in his own lane of traffic and,
a327 P.2d 270 (Colo. 1958).
Id..
at 275.
0 Id. at 274. In Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 229 P.2d 659 (1951), the court held that defendant could
not properly introduce into evidence for the purpose of mitigating damages benefits paid by the Railroad
Retirement Board. In Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78, 114 P.2d 278 (1941), the defendant was not permitted to take advantage of monies paid to the plaintiff under a telephone company benefit plan. Said the
court: -In such case a tortfeasor may not plead his victim's prudence and foresight to relieve him from
the consequences of his own wrong." Id. at 84, ff4 P.2d at 281.
11325 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1958).
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though unsuccessful in his efforts due to defendant's negligence,
was not answerable for being on the wrong side of the road.""
Behr v. McCoy" was a rear-end collision. The plaintiff testified
that she intended to make a left turn and that she approached the intersection at a moderate rate of speed making a proper signal and pulling
to the portion of the road way nearest tile center. She said that she
was stopped for thirty seconds or more waiting for opposing traffic to
clear when she was struck from behind by defendant's truck. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff darted around him and then applied
her brakes and that he tried but was unable to stop. The plaintiff
tendered an instruction based upon the doctrine of Ridenour v. Diffee"
recently reiterated in Union Pacific Railroad v. Cogburn," to the effect
that a driver on a public highway must keep a vigilant watch ahead and
take proper steps to avert danger even if he must stop in order to do
so. The court observed that this instruction was consistent with a
specific allegation contained in the plaintiff's complaint and with the
evidence, and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to this instruction
as a part of her theory. Note that while the trial court did not give the
specific instruction tendered by the plaintiff, nevertheless the trial court
did tell the jury that if one vehicle runs into the rear of another in
daylight this may create an inference, "for the reason that this is rarely
capable of an explanation."'
However, in Artz the court qualified the doctrine of Ridenour v.
Diffee when it stated: "The rule that one must drive at such speed as to
be able to stop within the distance that objects ahead are visible can
have no application to approaching objects whether the objects be a
car with blinding lights, a deer or a pheasant."'"
The Artz case provides a distinct exception to what had been
repeatedly stated as an absolute duty to stop.
Nelson v. District Court" destroys the widely held illusion that it
is virtually impossible to obtain good service of process under Colorado's
so-called "long-arm statute."" The court takes the common sense approach towards statutory interpretation in holding that despite what
appears to be pathetically restrictive language in the statute, it is all
right for the plaintiff's attorney to act as the alter ego of the plaintiff
in completing service and in preparing and dispatching the affidavit of
compliance.
The court says:
"Just who licks the stamp and who deposits the letter is
quite immaterial. Under counsel's contentions, a year-old
child would be without recourse because of lack of ability to
prepare the letter, lick the stamp, and drop it into the mail box;
a corporation would be without recourse because it can act only
through its agents and attorneys.""0
Ie

Id at 931. In Schumacher v. Bedford Truck Lines, 314 P.2d 485 [Cal.App. 1957), the California court
decided that a defendant's negligence could be predicated upon his failure to yield and take the shoulder
of the road to avoid being hitby a vehicle in which plaintiff is riding as a passenger, which is approaching from the opposite direction on the wrong side of t!heroad.
"3330 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1958).
14133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 1956).
"136 Colo. 184. 315 P.2d 209 (19571.
"330 P.2d 535,537 (Colo. 1958).
"1325 P.2d 927, 930 (Colo. 1958).
1" 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 11958).
"9Colo. Rev. Stat. H 13-8-1 to 4 (1053).
30 136 Colo. 467, 479, 320 P.2d 959, 966 (1958).
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More important is that part of the decision which discusses the
object of a motion to quash the summons, service or return. On this
subject the court says:
"Illegality, apparent from matters of record, should be
pointed out in the motion. In case defendant, moving to quash,
relies upon facts dehors the record, then those facts should be
set forth in the motion, and as evidence of good faith, and that
the motion is not filed frivolously or for the sole purpose of
delay, the facts relied upon should be verified by affidavit, the
defendant thereby indicating his belief that, on hearing, he
can prove the facts alleged and relied upon.""
Does not the same logic apply to motions to dismiss and to other
motions routinely filed on behalf of defendants? Is it not time in the
face of crowded court dockets and a restless public for lawyers to face
up to the fact that it is their duty as officers of the courts to proceed
with dispatch on both sides of the table to bring cases to issue and not
to file such motions unless they are able to set forth the grounds upon
which they rely?
The dcfendant in Snedden v. Summer " was traveling sixty miles
per hour on a highway. When he was about 400 feet from the point
of impact he attempted to pass an unidentified vehicle which, he said,
swerved to the left. Defendant stated that he applied his brakes, pulled
to the left, laid down 130 feet of skid marks, went into a borrow pit
on the left, travelled 110 feet there, returned to the highway and struck
the plaintiff's car which was proceeding in the same direction, then
veered to the left again and travelled ninety feet more before stopping.
He testified that he applied his brakes when his car was some 484 feet
from the point of impact. The undisputed' evidence placed plaintiff
on her own side of the road driving at forty miles per hour in a
careful manner. A highway patrolman estimated that the defendant
must have been travelling at least seventy-five miles per hour. In the
face of this evidence, the trial court refused to direct a verdict for the
plaintiff but allowed the jury to decide whether there was a "sudden
emergency" caused by the unknown car. In one of those unbelievable
results, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The supreme
court reversed and remanded the case with instructions to try the
issue of damages only, holding that the fact showed negligence as a
matter of law. In the court's understatement of the year, it was observed that the sudden emergency defense was "not convincing.""2
SUITS AGAINST ESTATES OF DECEASED TORTFEASORS

It is hard to imagine the trial of a modern personal injury lawsuit
without benefit of pleadings, and, indeed, without benefit of a lawtrained judge. But this is the prospect faced by plaintiffs bringing suit
against the estates of deceased tortfeasors. In Koon v. Barmettler" the
court observed that under Colorado statutes"2 the county court has
exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, and, therefore, claims against

deceased tortfeasors must be decided in that court.
11Id.

at 475, 320 P.2d at 964.
22 330 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1958).
2
11d. at 531.
- 134 Colo. 221,301 P.2d 713 (1956).
2 Colo. Rev. Star. § 152-1-3
(1953).See also Colo. Coast.art.VI, § 23.

In Me'yers .v.
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Williams"° the plaintiffs were the children of a woman who died in
the same occurrence which killed the tortfeasor. The defendant was the
executor of the latter. The plaintiffs, after first filing a timely, proper
claim in the county court probate proceeding, obtained judgment in
the district court for $8,000 under the old $10,000 death limit. The
defendant did not challenge the district court's jurisdiction and, in
fact, stipulated that the cause could be tried there. Nevertheless, the
supreme court held that jurisdiction cannot be conferred even by
consent of the parties and that only the county court can determine
the claim."7
Koon v. Barmettler and Meyers v. Williams are replete with traps

for plaintiffs. For instance, does not this holding in effect create a
six-month statute of limitations? Let us assume the hypothetical situation (not too far fetched) that the deceased tortfeasor was fully
insured. Let us further assume that the plaintiff is a minor child and
that the estate is without assets. What if the insurance company, immediately after the tort, proceeds with dispatch to open and close the
estate? If this can be done before the plaintiff "gets wise," is the plaintiff
completely and forevermore without a remedy against the insurance
policy of the deceased tortfeasor? We take strenuous exception to what
appears to be the opinion of the supreme court that an insured tort by
a deceased tortfeasor is a matter to be handled under the probate
jurisdiction of the county court.
EMPLOYER'S

LIABILITY

ACr

CASES

A deplorable legislative lag is exposed in Bein Farms, Inc. v. Dale'"
where the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, recovered a judgment
of $28,000 in a jury trial for injuries found to result from the defendant's negligence. Again, as in the case of Jacobson v. Doan21 our court

ruled that despite the fact that no reference was made by the parties
or by the trial court to the Employer's Liability Act"0, nevertheless, the
statute was applicable. The shpreme court modified this judgment by
reducing it to $10,000. In the Jacobson case a jury verdict of $30,000
was reduced to $10,000. The injustice of the existing law is obvious,
for under the Employer's Liability Act the plaintiff must prove negligence and yet his maximum recovery may be even less than the pittance
which would be allotted to him under workmen's compensation. One
wonders when the employees of this state will rise to complain in the
legislature of this $10,000 maximum.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

It is difficult to reconcile two 1958 workmen's compensation
decisions.
In Miller v. Denver Post" a newspaper carrier had folded his papers
and was about to depart on his deliveries when other newsboys took a
radio aerial from his bicycle and ran with it. While chasing after the
boys in an attempt to retrieve his aerial he received injuries. The
6324 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1958).
27 As a happy sequel

the writer has learned

where a $10,000 judgment *was obtained.
28326 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1958).
20 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957).
0
C
Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 80-6-1 to 5 (1953).
31 322 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1958).

that

this case

was

subsequently

tried

in the county court
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commission did not pause to determine whether the relationship of
employer-employee existed between the claimant and The Denver Post
but assumed the point without deciding it and quickly passed to the
question of whether the accident arose out of the claimant's employment. This they decided in the negative. The supreme court affirmed
the commisison's position that there was no causal relationship between
the claimant's work and his injury." In a dissenting opinion by Justice
Frantz the point is made that the question of the employment relationship should have been determined first. Thus, if indeed there had been
no such relationship, then there would have been an utter failure of
jurisdiction under the workmen's compensation act and the claimant
would have been free to employ whatever common-law remedies he
might have had. If, however, there was in truth an employment it was
Justice Frantz's opinion that the risk of skylarking fellow carriers could
well have been a part of the working environment. Persuasive is the
argument of Justice Frantz that, "the majority opinion may result in a
denial of any remedy to Miller for his serious injury.""
Now compare Lyttle v. State Compensation Insurance Fund" where

a non-salaried employee of the state was held to come within the terms
of Colorado's workmen's compensation act. The claimant was in Denver
to attend a meeting the following day in connection with his duties.
He had dinner with a fellow employee for the purpose of discussing
state business and after leaving the restaurant was crossing the street
when he was struck by an automobile. The court affirmed the position
it had taken in Alexandel Film Co. v. Industrial Commission" that while

a claimant is away from home a hazard such as this is a normal and
necessary incident of his employment. This holding is certainly most
logical, but isn't it equally logical that the hazard to which the newspaper boy was exposed was also a normal and necessary incident of
his employment?
RES

IPSA

LOQUITUR

Now we come to Weiss v. Axler ' which undoubtedly is destined to
become a landmark case in the development of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. There the plaintiff received a permanent wave in the defendant's shop. In this waving process a certain chemical preparation was
used. The beauty operator failed to follow the manufacturer's written
instructions regarding pre-testing procedures. A few days later the
plaintiff's hair began to fall out and she returned to the defendant,
who, according to the plaintiff's testimony, advised her that the operator might have left the solution on too long or that the solution might
have been too strong, or both. The defendant undertook to give the
plaintiff remedial treatment which proved unsuccessful. The trial court
instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur and refused to admit testimony
concerning custom and usage in applying the preparation by a method
at variance with the manufacturer's directions.
The opinion here restores simplicity and meaning to a doctrine
which had become confusion thrice confounded in an astounding
But see the long annotation lollowing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-13-2 (1953).
33322 P.2d 661, 666 (Colo. 1958).
34 322 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1958).
"5 136 Colo. 486,319 P.2d 1074 (1957).
3 3 2 8 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1958).
32
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number of Colorado cases, all of which are discussed and analyzed by
Justice Frantz, writing for the court. In affirming the trial court, our
supreme court held that the facts called for application of the doctrine
and thus required the defendant to prove exculpation from negligence.
The court tells us that once the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into
play then the defendant must satisfy the court or jury that he was
not negligent. It is the province of the fact finder to consider the defendant's explanation and to determine the credibility of the defendant's
witnesses.
Further, the court observed that custom and usage of a dangerous
product may not be resorted to as a test of due care where not in compliance with the manufacturer's directions. Failure to follow those
directions is negligence. Additionally, the court held that attempts by
the plaintiff to allege and to prove specific negligence do not preclude
reliance on res ipsa loquitur.
One must look far to find a case which takes a more dynamic
approach to the problem of adjusting law to a rapidly advancing civilization. The court, speaking through Justice Frantz, declared:
"It seems a proper sequitur to say that the more we are
removed from 'the horse and buggy days,' the more intensified
and diversified our industrialism, mechanics and science become, and the more technology and automation advance, the
more the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should take on a stellar
role in the law of negligence. The necessity to remove existing
confusion and to state a formulary for the use of the doctrine
thus appears obvious. Laws should march abreast of a highly
mechanized and science-developed economy.""
The court then discussed the warning by the California Supreme
Court that as an alternative to a widening use of res ipsa loquitur courts
may be forced to resort to the imposition of liability without fault to
avoid gross injustice. "It may not be amiss to heed the prognosis of
Mark Shain in his work, Res Ipsa Loquitur,-wherein he said at page 264:
'The very interests which these unreasoned decisions seem to serveownership and management-may ultimately realize that the true
doctrine res ipsa loquitur and its burden-shifting presumption is, in
reality, their friend and refuge.'

"".

CONCLUSION

Although in this paper the reader will find criticism of some 1958
tort decisions, nevertheless it must be conceded that the court this year
has done a commendable job in spite of its burdensome and evergrowing backlog of cases. No case better exemplifies the court's painstaking care to work conscientiously in the face of great obstacles than
does the case of Canon City v. Merris." Coloradoans may point with
pride and comfort to their supreme court in knowledge that seven men
have been painstaking in protecting the legal rights of those they
serve.
37 Id.

ot 91.
Ibid.
39323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1956).
.8
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL
Partner in the Denver firm of Holland and Hart
Instructor, University of Denver College of Law

A landmark trust decision' highlighted the case law developments in
the field of wills, estates and trusts in 1958. At the same time, several
other cases of interest etched in new guidelines and provided further
clarification for practitioners.
Denver National Bank v. Von Brecht' attracted wide interest" and
has answered questions of the first importance in Colorado. Gustavus
Adolphus Von Brecht entered into a trust agreement on July 15, 1946,
under which he retained substantial powers, including powers to revoke, modify, amend, and to veto proposed investments in excess of
one thousand dollars. He also retained the income, and created a remainder in favor of siblings and their descendants. The attack on the
trust was four pronged, but the only issue before the supreme court was
whether the aggregate retained rights and powers were so substantial as
to render the settlor the owner of the trust assets so that the trust violated the statute of wills, since it had not been executed with the formalities required for a will.' In answering this question in the negative
the court has written valuable and significant black letter law for
Colorado practitioners, placing itself firmly behind the liberal, or
"Massachusetts rule" announced in National Shawmut Bank v. Joy.'
As a result, it is now clear that reservations of income, powers to alter,
amend or revoke, and certain types of control over investments will not
invalidate living trusts in Colorado as abortive testamentary dispositions.
The case clearly charters the many dispositive schemes now extant in
the state which rely on a revocable living trust with retained income
rights as the backbone of the plan, and to that extent, confirms practices in Colorado which have wide approval elsewhere.' While the case
goes no further than its own facts on the question of retained powers
over investments, most settlors should be satisfied with a power limited
to investments involving assets valued at one thousand dollars or more,
like the VonBrecht power, so that even here, the draftsman can easily
stay within the letter of the decision.
Three cases' involved procedure on the hearing of claims against
estates and each squarely followed the holding in Koon v. Barmettler7
I

Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 332 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1958).
8322 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1958). Four grounds had been set forth in the plaintilff's claim for relief. The plaintiff had obtained summary judgment below on her first ground:-that the trust instrument was a will and void
because it was unwitnessed. This summary judgment was the subject of the instant appeal to the supreme
court. The court reversed the summary judgment order and remanded the case to the trial court with direction
to hear and determine the other issues pr4sknted by the pleadings. (1) that the instument was void because
e ecuted as a result of undue influence upon the settlor; (2) That the settlor lacked the mental capacity to
enter into a trust agreement; and (3) That the settlor had made a binding agreement to revoke the trust and
had failed to do so. Petition for rehearing on the summary judgment Issue In the supreme court was denied
'on March. 31, 1958.
835 DICTA 146 (1958).
'Colo. Rev. Stat. J 152-5-3 (1953).
e6315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944).
a Cf. Cosner, Estate Planning 62 ff' (2d ed. 1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook § 13
ff. (2d ed. 1953).
'Weller v. Bank of Vernal, 321 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1958); Film Enterprises v. Wolfberg, 321 P.2d 218 (Colo.
1958); Meyers v. Williams, 324 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1958).
' 134 Colo. 221. 201 P.2d 713 (1956).
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which established that the filing of a claim against an estate in a county
court confers on that court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim so that no action involving the same claim can be filed in
any other court. In Weller v. Bank of Vernal,9 this resulted in dismissal
of a district court action against the administratrix of an estate where

a claim had been filed on a note in the county court having jurisdiction,
followed by commencement of a district court foreclosure action on the
same subject matter.
Film Enterprises v. Wolfberg'0 involved a situation in which an

action against the decedent was pending in district court at his death.
The plaintiff filed a claim against the estate based on the same subject
matter involved in the district court case. On the hearing of this claim,
the executrix having moved its disallowance, the county court held that

it lacked jurisdiction to determine the claim on its merits, because exclusive jurisdiction lay in the district court. However, the county court
further held that the claim could remain on file as notice until a final
determination of the district court proceeding pending in the supreme
court. On appeal, the supreme court held that the county court order
was not a final judgment from which a writ of error would lie. Thus,
the county court was held to have retained jurisdiction over the claim
and not to have rendered a final determination as to its validity, even
though that court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim on its merits.
Meyers v. Williams" involved a wrongful death action against a
decedent. A timely claim on the wrongful death issue was filed in county
court, but nine months after issuance of letters a district court action
involving the same subject matter was filed, naming decedent's executor
as a party defendant. The county court claim remained on file and undetermined at the time of the supreme court hearing, which was on a
writ of error by the defendant-executor after an adverse judgment in
the district court suit. Record objection to jurisdiction in the district
court was raised by the executor for the first time in the supreme court.

The court followed its Koon v. Barmettler holding and stated again that
the county court was the sole and exclusive forum for determination of
the issues involved, and reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the district court action.
Counsel for caveators to wills should have advance and secure fee
arrangements in view of Proudfit v. Koons." Here a caveat was success-

ful as to one of two wills, but unsuccessful as to the other. An application
was made to the county court for allowance of attorney's fees from the
estate to caveators' counsel on the theory of benefit rendered to the
estate and the parties in interest as a result of the successful caveat to
one of the wills. The application relied on earlier holdings awarding
allowances when ambiguous wills had required construction proceedings. The supreme court denied any allowance, holding that none was
authorized by statute, and that none should be allowed where services
were for the sole benefit of certain interested parties in a purely personal and adversary action.
9 321 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1958).
1o Id. at 218.
"1324 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1958).
12325 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1958).
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Kepler v. Burns" involved the interesting question succinctly
phrased by the trial court as follows:
"Is an executor of an estate entitled to interest on land sold
through probate court immediately upon order of court confirming the sale when the vendee is in possession but in the
absence of an overt tender of the deed by the executor and in
the absence of demand for interest when the deed and abstract
were finally tendered and payment made?' ""
The negative answer given to this question by the trial court was affirmed by the supreme court. It appeared that no tender of a deed
had been made for nearly fifteen months after the sale, and that the
interest was being sought as a result of a surcharge of the executor at the
request of certain beneficiaries of the estate. The supreme court's holding barred the executor from charging the interest back to the vendees
under the sales, since they had fully complied with the executor's demands, and their non-payment of the balance of the purchase price resulted only from the executor's non-tender of the deeds.
A constructive trust in land was decreed as a means of restoring a
breach by one of several joint venturers under a written joint venture
agreement in Lindsay v. Marcus." The joint venturers had agreed to purchase the land, and also agreed that one of their number should hold
title for the others, without disclosure. After the purchase was completed,
the nominee-venturer claimed to hold the property for his own account.
In decreeing the trust, the supreme court carefully reviewed the authorities and identified the nominee-venturer as a fiduciary for the others.
It affirmed the trial court's determination that there had been a sufficient breach of the existing fiduciary obligation to require the remedy
of the constructive trust.
The question of whether or not dispositive language used by a
,lawyer in his own will created a trust was before the court in Gately V.
El Paso County Bar Association." The deceased McAllister had left

his library to the defendant bar association, and plaintiff contended
that the language used was not that of absolute gift but such as to create
certain rights in him as one who came within the ambit of a trust. It was
held that no trust had been created and that the gift was absolute, so
that the bar association was acting within its rights in excluding nonmembers, including plaintiff, from use of the library. In reaching its
construction of the will, the court emphasized McAllister's standing at
the bar, and his omission of any use of the word "trust" in the will, as
indicative of the absence of intent to create a trust in the bequest to the
association. It also pointed out that there was no other specific language
from which any severance of the legal and equitable estates could be
established.
13 324 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1958).
" Id. at 787.
15 325 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1958).
'a 328 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1958).
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PSYCHIATRY AND COLORADO CRIMINAL LAW
By JOHN M. MACDONALD, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Colorado School of
Medicine, Assistant Medical Director, Colorado Psychopathic Hospital.
"Law and legal procedures have always been a mystery to
the uninitiated, a snare to the unwary and a red rag to the
unhappy man possessed of reforming zeal."-Lord Buckmaster

The incidence of serious crime, a matter of profound public concern,
shows the need for searching inquiry in many areas including the
adequacy of present criminal legislation. When the crime is that of
murder and when the defendant's guilt is not in doubt, a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity is almost inevitable. Equally inevitable is
the battle of psychiatric witnesses whenever the state psychiatrists find
the accused to be legally sane. The public is puzzled by this disagreement
within the medical profession. Opinions differ; some persons believe
that the offender must be crazy to commit such a brutal crime; others
are alarmed at the possible abuse of the insanity plea and demand the
death penalty, while reformers insist on the need for revision of the tests
of criminal responsibility and elimination of the death penalty. The
important problem of prevention of homicide tends to be overlooked in
the midst of all this clamor. The sociopathic criminal, the prevention
of serious crime, tests of criminal responsibility and the death penalty
will be reviewed briefly from a psychiatric viewpoint.
THE SOCIOPATHIC OFFENDER

Sociopaths are social misfits who fail to conform to accepted social
customs. The manifestations of their lawlessness are protean; alcholism, drug addiction, sexual perversions, theft, assault and even homicide
may be seen. They seem unable to profit from experience or punishment
and tend to continue their criminal behavior on release from prison.
Under our "cash register" system of punishment, the convicted sociopath
is sent to a penitentiary for a varying number of years depending on the
number of citizens he has assaulted. Short sentences do not change his
pattern of behavior. Harsh punitive sentences serve only to increase his
resentment toward society. Rarely his incarceration may lead to his
rehabilitation; more often, however, it serves only to complete any deficiencies in his knowledge of safecracking, assault or other forms of
crime. He may acquire for the first time the habit of taking drugs, which,
the writer understands from criminal acquaintances, are often available
within prison walls.
Detention alone for a stated period of time means all too often that
dangerous persons are released to continue their criminal behavior. From
their ranks come a significant percentage of the murderer population.
A recent study of 588 cases of criminal homicide in Philadelphia
showed that 64 per cent of the murderers had previous arrest records,
that of these, 66 per cent had a record of offenses against the person,
and that of these, 73 per cent had a record of aggravated assault. Many
of the persons previously arrested were convicted but given relatively
light sentences and probably little constructive atetntion. That two out
*Published at the request of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
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of three of these murderers had previous arrest records shows the need to
recognize early and treat more carefully the potential homicide offenders.'
This study did not report on the incidence of sociopathy but local experience suggests a high incidence of this disorder among murderers with
previous arrest records.
Unfortunately our society makes little provision for treatment of the
aggressive sociopath. The inadequacy or deviation or failure to adjust to
ordinary social life is not a mere wilfulness or badness which can be
threatened or thrashed out of the individual but constitutes a true illness
which should be treated." The relatives of a sociopath may recognize the
need for treatment and attempt to secure commitment to a mental hospital. Involuntary commitment is often essential as the sociopath seldom
seeks help, unless he is facing a prison sentence. Under Colorado Civil
Law, he is eligible for commitment "for his own welfare or for the
welfare or safety of others." Medical commissions, however, rarely commit the sociopath as he is not psychotic. Yet the commitment laws make
no reference to clinical diagnosis and there is no provision in the law
restricting commitment to persons suffering from psychosis. The reluctance of medical commissions to commit the sociopath (unless he is also
a chronic alcoholic) is perhaps understandable in view of the overcrowding and shortage of psychiatrists in our state mental hospital. This
problem might be remedied by construction of another hospital in Denver and by increasing the salaries of physicians to levels offered by other
states.
A partial solution to the problem of recidivism and the sociopathic
offender would be the introduction of an "indeterminate sentence" law
in Colorado. Many states have enacted indeterminate sentence laws
under which the sentence imposed by the court is for an indeterminate
period and the exact time of the defendant's release is decided upon
later by an administrative board. The principal argument in favor of
indeterminate sentence laws is that it is not desirable to decide at the
outset how long a person should remain in confinement, but that it is
advantageous to watch the development of his personality, his adaptability to training, and his desire and will to become rehabilitated, and
to reach a decision as to when his release date should come on the basis
of the progress of events.' An indeterminate sentence law to be effective
1 Wolfgang,
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must offer something more than punishment. The offender should
be sent to prison as punishment and not for punishment. While he is in
custody every effort should be made to modify his pattern of antisocial
behavior.
Under the indeterminate sentence law in California, the Adult Authority, a seven member board appointed by the Governor, has the responsibility for setting sentence, fixing terms and paroling inmates of
Department of Corrections institutions. The penal code requires that the
Department of Corrections provide "a scientific study of each prisoner,
his career and life history, the cause of his criminal acts and recommendations for his care, training and employment with a view to his reformation and the protection of society."
The average length of time required for a clinical case study ranges
from six to ten weeks. During this time each inmate undergoes an extensive period of psychological testing in a reception-guidance center.
Inmates with serious behavioral or emotional problems are examined by
a psychiatrist. On completion of the study, each inmate is transferred to
an appropriate institution in the department. The findings of the
reception-guidance center are used by the institution to which the inmate
is assigned in understanding the man and his problems and helping him
to participate in a program that will help to correct his deficiencies.
The Department of Corrections includes among its institutions the
"California Medical Facility" which has as its primary purpose the confinement, treatment and care of inmates who are mentally abnormal
including sociopathic offenders. The Medical Facility differs from the
usual prison in that the superintendent is a physician and that special
emphasis is given to psychological treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists. The mainstay of the program is group psychotherapy.
The Patuxent Institution in Maryland has as its aim the treatment
and rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Offenders who have shown
persistent antisocial or criminal behavior and who, on examination
after conviction of a crime, are found to be sociopaths are committed to
this institution. The prisoner is confined and treated under an indeterminate sentence and the length of time he stays is determined not so much
by what crime was committed but by his readiness to rejoin society.
Inmates who do not respond to treatment may be transferred to a
penitentiary. The director is a psychiatrist and the professional staff
includes psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers.
The first combined penal and psychiatric facility of this type was
established near Copenhagen in 1935. The medical superintendent
claims that 50 per cent of the detainees return to normal life in the
community.
It is hoped that Colorado will follow the lead set by California and
Maryland. An experimental center could be set up within the Colorado
State Penitentiary to provide for psychiatric treatment of a small number
of sociopathic offenders. A major advantage of such a treatment center
would be the valuable experience gained by prison guards assigned to
the center. In time, the lessons learned within the center would have a
beneficial influence on the prison as a whole. This has been the experience in California.
The Childrens' Diagnostic Center established at the University of
Colorado Medical Center by an act of the legislature in 1955, provides
for psychiatric examination of juvenile delinquents and emotionally
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disturbed children upon the order of the county judge. Specialized psychiatric treatment may be indicated but is not always available within
the state due to a lack of trained staff and suitable facilities. The
center does, however, perform a valuable service by providing expert
guidance for the courts and by contributing to the early treatment of
potential sociopathic offenders.
TESTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

In almost all of the states the tests of criminal responsibility are
based on the M'Naghten rules formulated in England in 1843. These
rules state in essence, that in order to establish a defense of insanity, it
must be shown that the accused "was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong." In Colorado and some other states, the
"right-wrong test" has been supplemented by the "irresistible impulse"
test and the "ability to adhere to the right and refrain from doing the
wrong" test.
The Colorado rules may be criticized on four grounds. Firstly,
many psychiatrists object because they are required to make a moral
decision in applying the tests. That the determination of criminal responsibility is a moral decision is freely acknowledged by the courts. The
psychiatrist would prefer to give a medical opinion and leave the moral
decision entirely to the jury. The medical opinion would involve a review of the findings of a thorough psychiatric examination in terms which
would be within the understanding of a jury of lay persons.
A second objection to Colorado procedure is that the psychiatrist in
forming his opinion is not permitted to consider hearsay material. This
means that he is not permitted to consider information obtained frin
relatives or from previous medical records of the accused. Guttmacher
comments that the courts of Colorado are notorious for their extreme
position in this matter. There are many jurisdictions that have far
more liberal and enlightened procedural rules. The Colorado procedure
inflicts a particular burden on psychiatrists who appear as witnesses for
the State as they are required to testify according to the strict letter of
the law. The courts, however, sometimes relax the rule when psychiatrists testify upon behalf of the defendant.
The third major defect of the Colorado rules is that a person who is
found not guilty by reason of insanity may be released from the hospital
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within a short period even though there may have been no significant
change in his mental condition. Thus a person who pleads insanity may
be found sane by the psychiatrists at the Pueblo State Hospital. If the
jury rejects their finding, the accused is committed to the Pueblo State
Hospital. When his lawyer requests his release the Pueblo psychiatrists
must certify that he is sane. Yet the person though legally sane by
medical standards may be a menace to society by reason of mental disease which does not amount to legal insanity. Thus after less than a
year in custody following a serious crime he may be set free to continue
his criminal activities.
The fourth defect arises from the fact that a person may be found
not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the State Hospital in
the absence of his conviction of the crime charged. The possibility
exists that an innocent person may be held responsible for a crime and
that the guilty person may escape detection because further police action
is prevented.
An escapee from a mental hospital in another state was arrested on
a charge of murder and over his strenuous objections his attorney entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. During his hospital stay
he was steadfast in maintaining his innocence. In this case, the murder
charge was later withdrawn and the possibility of wrongful commitment
on the basis of an insanity plea was avoided.
In contrast to the Colorado rules stands the Durham decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Under this
decision an accused is not held criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. "Disease" is
defined as a condition which is capable of either improving or deteriorating, and "defect" as a condition which is not considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital,
or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental
disease.
Roche believes that the product question can only be answered
affirmatively or not at all. "The psychiatrist can do no more than say
that a causal connection invariably exists, for no other reason than that
in his experience and within his psychological model he has never encountered a case where outward behavior was unrelated to inward
mental life-at best the product question can only remain within the
realm of moral definitions." He submits that if the product question is
withheld from the expert and confined to the jury, psychiatry can
function properly.!
Some psychiatrists mistakenly believe that the Durham rule frees the
psychiatrist from having to answer questions based on the "right-wrong,"
"irresistible impulse" and "the ability to adhere to the right and refrain
from doing the wrong" tests. This is not correct as expert witnesses are
liable under the Durham rule to examination and cross examination on
these points. However, the physician in giving his opinion, and the jury
in reaching their verdict are not restricted within the confines of these
criteria.
Premature release from hospital is prevented by a law requiring that
anyone acquitted by reason of insanity be committed to a mental hospital
4 Roche, The Criminal Mind (1958).
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until the superintendent certifies that the person has recovered his
sanity and that he is no longer a danger to the community. Release is
subject to approval by the court.
The Durham rule has been criticized because it does not provide a
precise definition of insanity, but as Sobeloff emphasizes, what we ought
to fear is not the absence of a definition but a false definition. The
medical profession would be baffled if asked to write into the legal code
universally valid criteria for the diagnosis of the many types of psychotic
illness which may seriously disturb a person's responsibility and even if
this were attempted, the diagnostic criteria would have to be rewritten
from time to time with the progress of psychiatric knowledge.'
The fear has been expressed that juries will abuse the discretion
granted to them and acquit persons who should probably be punished.
Statistics from the District of Columbia show that from 1952 to 1955,
the three-year period before the Durham rule became effective, 0.8 per
cent of felony trials resulted in verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In a similar period since the rule has become effective, the percentage
has increased to 1.6 per cent. Such an increase, as Guttmacher points out,
is not sufficiently momentous to lead to the conclusion that the Durham
rule threatens to undermine the criminal law, or that it inspires the
susceptible to become felons.'
The advantages of the Durham rule have been stated by Mr. Justice
Douglas. "The Durham rule aids the jury in a solution of the problem
by letting the psychiatrist talk, unfettered by arbitrary legal formulae.
The psychiatrist will be free to present his testimony about the mental
condition of the accused in concepts that are familiar to him and medically realistic. The psychiatrist merely expounds on the theoretical and
clinical aspects of the problem. The jury evaluates his testimony, as it
does the evidence on every other factual issue. That is the correct disposition, for the question whether society should assess punishment for
criminal conduct is, in the last analysis, a moral judgment. The jury,
being of the community, reflects its attitudes and speaks for it."7
THE DEATH PENALTY

Advocates of the death penalty draw attention to the Old Testament
teaching of a life for a life, argue that death is more humane than long
imprisonment and claim that if the deterrent effect of the death penalty
were removed more murders would be committed.
Opponents of the death penalty refer to a later text in the Old
Testament (Ezekiel 33:11. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no
pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his
way and live.") and also emphasize the New Testament teaGhing which
forbids the taking of life by way of retribution. Capital punishment,
according to Gardiner, surrounds trials for murder with an atmosphere
of morbid press sensationalism which panders to the sadistic impulses of
mankind, and itself lessens public respect for the sanctity of human life.
A deep reverence for human life is worth more than a thousand executions in the prevention of murder; it is, in fact, the great security of
5 Whitehorn, Report to the Governor's Conmission on Legal Psychiatry, Maryland.
'Guttmacher, Guilty or Insane? A New Test. Nation, 186:229 (1958).
7 Douglas, Law and Psychiatry (1956).
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human life. The law of capital punishment, whilst pretending to support this reverence does in fact tend to destroy it.'
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment after studying
statistics from many countries including the United States concluded
that there is no clear evidence that the abolition of capital punishment
has led to an increase in the homicide rate or that its re-introduction has
led to a fall. That the public is not generally in favor of the death
penalty is shown by the infrequency with which juries impose the death
penalty. Curiously enough more murderers commit suicide than are put
to death by legal execution.'
Gowers is doubtless correct in his assumption that emotion rather
than reason will decide the issue of the death penalty.*
8Bright,

J., cited by Gardiner, Capitol Punishment as a Deterrent
9 See note 1, supra.

(London 1956).
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Gowers, A Life for a Life (1956).
3Guttmacher, Book review, J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 126:492 (1958).
* Mocdonald, Psychiatry and the Criminal (1958).
5 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report, London (1953).
* Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 1955).

Plan to , htend-

INSTITUTE
on

Defending Criminal Cases
FRIDAY

-

1:00 to 4:30 p.m.

March 13 and 20,1959
FEE: None

PLACE: College of Law
University of Denver

Sponsored by Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education

of
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER SCHOOL OF LAW

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1959

DICTA

LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT
By PHILIP S. HABERMANN
Director, State Bar of Wisconsin
This is an attempt to impress upon you a few basic concepts about
law office management. These broad concepts are the really important
things. The details can always be studied from the many books in this
field. A list is printed at the end of this article.
You all need and want to learn how to make your law offices more
efficient. Most lawyers are aware that we have not kept pace economically and recognize a need to do something about it. The world about us
has changed much more than our offices or methods, or even our willingness to accept new fields of practice. New legal problems and new fields
of law come into being each year. We face a problem like the grocerquoting what one grocer said'at a recent national convention:
"At last count we had 27 different brands of dog food on
hand," he exclaims. "A few years ago all the dog food you had
to have was a few meat scraps."
"And bird seed," he continues. "You've got to have eating
seed, song seed, cuttle bones and gravel. That's just for a canary.
You got to have something different for a parakeet and something else again for love birds. Ten years ago you had just one
kind of bird seed that made all the birds happy."
Law, too, is complicated today, and it is going to get more so. But
that is not our problem here. The improvement and updating of your
professional competency is something that you and your bar association
and your law schools are constantly working on. What you want to learn
is how to do the best-or make the most-with your present practice.
These categories are important in discussing law office management:
1. The form of organization
2. The office system
3. The time concept
4. Client relationships.
We should counsel ourselves on each of these problems in the same
impartial way we would counsel a cient. And please don't be like the
judge who cut off further argument, saying, "I've got my mind made
up now, and I don't want to be confused by the facts."
The facts are, too many lawyers are running their offices like popcorn stands!
Let's consider the facts about the basic concepts. Remember, space
prevents going into detail, but we'll consider a few important points.
One fact should be quite obvious, if you reflect on it a moment:
Any lawyer of reasonable intelligence can, with reasonable effort, make
a comfortable living practicing law today with a general practice. He
doesn't have to have clients like General Motors or Standard Oil. You
should be interested in how you can do better with the practice you
have. If by better office organization and management you can boost
your net income ten to twenty per cent, the effort would be extremely
worthwhile. That can be accomplished in many instances.
*Reprinted at the request of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
from 29 Wisconsin Bar Bulletin No. 3.
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Your law office is different from all the rest. In a sense, each office
has its own "personality," just as much as does each lawyer. Thus there
can be no standard pattern or plan of organization and operation that
can be handed to you as a cure-all, with a guarantee that you will make
more money. But there are numerous plans, techniques, systems and
methods that have been tried and proved, and which are adaptable, in
part at least, to every law office whether it is that of one lawyer alone
or twenty lawyers. You are the loser if you don't look about you and
take advantage of what you see.
As lawyers, we pride ourselves in being members of a profession, and
not tradesmen or businessmen. Nevertheless, we can learn much from
the successful methods businessmen are using in the organization and
operation of their offices.
There is nothing particularly original in what I am trying to tell
you. After looking over a great deal of material on the subject, I have
tried to emphasize those points that will produce the greatest results if
you heed them. Experts in the field such as Arch Cantrall and Paul
Carrington (from whom I have borrowed heavily) have suggested many
of the following ideas.
FORM OF ORGANIZATION

The first important concept is the form of organization for the
practice of law. Whether you are a sole practitioner or a member of
a partnership will very likely have a considerable influence on the
amount of money you earn. The facts and figures are rather amazing.
As you might suspect, more than one-half of the lawyers practice alone.
Yet according to surveys by the United States Department of Commerce
and the Survey of the Legal Profession by the American Bar Association,
the earnings of lawyers increase sharply after they organize into firms.
Lawyers having one partner made over one-third more than lawyers
practicing alone. Lawyers with two partners made more than twice as
much as sole practitioners. Lawyers with three partners averaged almost
three times as much as the lone practitioner; and lawyers in firms ot
between four and seven partners earned nearly four times as much.
Now don't think if you run out and get yourself six partners your
financial problems are solved. The point is that the figures do conclusively show that lawyers, in general, do better financially with a partner than without one. There are a number of sound reasons for this.
Moreover, partnership income is almost always more stable than that of
any one of its partners.
There are advantages other than financial in having at least one
partner. The ability to handle legal matters for clients more promptly
and in a more orderly fashion is very important. If you have two cases
in court, they are apt to be set on the same day in different courts. If
you have a number of things to do in the office and have a case in court,
the office work has to wait. Work can proceed more effectively during
the absence of one of the partners for vacations, illness, attendance at
bar meetings, and many other things.
More important is the advantage of being able to discuss the problems as they arise day to day with another man who is already interested
in the proper solution of every problem. Two heads are better than
one. Team work is always inspiring to the best efforts. The background
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of varying experiences and different attitudes and different approaches
to the same problem time and again demonstrates that.
This is an age of specialization. Even in the smallest of partnerships
a fair and equitable division of work often involves one man taking one
type of work and the other one taking another type of work. That is
all to the good, for the law is so complex. and has so many fields that
is is extremely difficult for one man to keep up in every field and be
available to advise his clients on any subject without research applicable
to that client. A partner who can handle all current problems of the
same type has the advantage over someone who does not do that from
the standpoint of efficiency, promptness and service to the client.
There are disadvantages, of course. There is a belief that every
lawyer is his own master, and a spirit that everyone wants to be completely independent. We have inherited a tradition under which lawyers
practiced law by themselves. Nevertheless, the poverty of independence
is a luxury few lawyers can afford if they do justice to themselves and to
their families. There is also some reluctance about having a partner
because of the feeling that perhaps the other fellow must on one occasion
or another get greater benefit out of the arrangement and that it will
not work out evenly. That has been a very strong deterrent to the organization of partnerships. But these objections can all be minimized
by a proper partnership agreement.
A division by partners is assumed by so many to be a fifty-fifty
arrangement. There are many alternative arrangements. There is no
reason at all why some arrangement may not be made between two men
by which, at the end of the year after each has taken a fair drawing account, they can look at what has happened and divide it on a fair and
equitable basis, knowing that the continuation of their arrangement depends upon the fairness of each to the other.
There are many alternative formulas available other than a division
in terms of percentage of the net income of the firm as of the end of
the year. You can agree what each partner shall take from a drawing
account, giving each a minimum. You will then divide the excess of the
income produced by the firm at the end of the year in accordance with
actual performance, based on records showing who did what.
All sorts of variations of these formulas are actually in use in one
form or another all over the country. Some other combination and a
fair minimum for each partner can easily be worked out. The thing to
emphasize is that the advantages of partnerships are real and the disadvantages can be greatly minimized by flexibility in your partnership
arrangement, carefully thought out and discussed and agreed upon to
fit the needs of the two or three or four men involved. Individualized
and personalized arrangements make sense.
It is amazing how many law partnerships are operating without
benefit of any written agreement. We would certainly never advise a
client of ours to operate on that basis, and there is no reason why we
should do so ourselves.
Another management problem which needs attention in a partnership is some method for promoting mutual assistance. Usually this takes
the form of the office conference. This may include informal daily discussions and exchanging experiences. Some firms have formal firm meet.
ings either weekly or less often or on call. You not only review the
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HOW MUCH PER HOUR?

Days in year ................................

(Compute
figure for
your firm)
365

365

Deduct:
Sunday

5 2 ...............

Half-Saturdays

26 .............

Holidays

9 ...............

Vacation

1 2 ...............

Miscellaneous

12 ...............
111

Fee earning days per year ..........................
Average number of fee days per month ........

254
21

Average number of fee hours per day** ..........

6

Average number of fee hours per month........

126

Average yearly business overhead, including salaries paid to
those not members of firm
(Do NOT include firm members' draws) ........ $
Enter total amount of income firm attorneys require
for all reasonable personal and family needs (Include taxes) ...............................................................

T otal ..................................................................
$
Divide total by 1512 (126x 12) .....................

$_

Result is $'s per hour all
firm members must produce.
The above result-$'s per hour-should be divided among the firm members
in proportion to their share of profit from the firm.
Example: Firm A. and B.
Firm's average overhead ......

$15,000.00

A's average draw ..................
............
...............
$12,000.00
B's average draw ..................

---..-..------------------..---6,000.00
18,000.00
$33,000.00

Divide $33,000 by 1512 (hours per year)

_....................
$21.16 per hour

A m ust average per hour (% )_............................................
14.11

B m ust average per hour (/a) --------------------------------................
7.05
**National surveys made among attorneys indicate that the attorney's average fee
earning day is only five to six hours. He spends the balance of his day reading mail.
advance sheets, conferring with office personnel, club, church and public service work.
charity and other miscellaneous antivities
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pending cases, but receive special research reports and a general discussion on specific problems or current difficulties. Such meetings mean
the teaming up of personnel on important or difficult matters, and the
avoidance of working at cross purposes or duplication of efforts.
THE OFFICE SYSTEM

The office system is very important. That includes your staff organization, your office quarters, your accounting system, your library,
your office equipment, your personnel plan, and all the rest of the things
surrounding the lawyer and which help him serve the client. Whole
books-such as Dwight McCarty's new one-have been written on law

office systems. You should read one in detail. Here only a few points
can be emphasized.
First, have an orderly system of some sort. Don't make it too

complicated, and let it be the means to an end, not the end itself. In
other words, don't be a slave to the system.
Second, remember that any really good system is based upon the
principle of intelligent laziness. This principle tells us to do a thing
once, to do it completely, and then not bother about it any more.

Lawyers have fallen far behind other professions and businessmen
in providing modern, clean, comfortable and efficient appearing offices.
Your client's first impression of you is gained from your office. It is not
essential that you have a fancy office, but it should be clean, dignified
and give the appearance of good management.
There is an increasing trend for lawyers to construct their own of.fice buildings. The experience of those who have done so in Wisconsin
indicates that it is an extremely worthwhile undertaking.
Lawyers are increasingly conscious of the size of their law libraries, of
the number of new law books urged upon them, and of the expense of
maintaining the library and space to house it. It seems obvious that we
are going to have to give more attention to joint libraries, perhaps to
some form of lending libraries, and to the modern systems of photographic or visual reproduction of law library materials. Probably you
have all seen demonstrations of Micro-film, Micro-card or Micro-lex.
These are ways of reducing photographically the contents of a law book
and making it available on film or cards that can be stored in a very
small space. Through the use of a magnifying reader, any page of a book
can be found in a hurry. These systems are new, but their use is growing
and I urge you to consider where such a system may, profitably be used in
your office. Of course, Ido not pretend to suggest that they will supplant
the printed law book.
Every law office should have an adequate accounting system. This
is especially true because of the trust accounts that a lawyer handles, and
the necessity of keeping accurate records for both the client's purposes
and the lawyer's own purposes. Yet you would be surprised to see the
inadequate systems, which are in most instances home-made systems, in
use by many lawyers. The accounting system should tie in with the
other office record system, and need be neither complicated nor time
consuming. Rather than try to set up your own system, retain the services
of a certified public accountant in establishing the proper system for your
particular office. A small investment for his advice will be money well
spent. It will pay big dividends to you in prompt collections and more
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adequate records for your income tax purposes. Furthermore, it will show
whether or not you are operating efficiently.
Even the office with only one stenographer should have a definite
personnel policy. Both the lawyers and the employees should know where
they stand. Have a definite schedule of office hours and a definite work
week. Establish a pay plan so that your employees will know what to
look forward to. Decide how you are going to handle overtime and
bonuses. You and your help should both have a definite understanding
as to vacations and holidays. Adopt a reasonable plan of payment for
time lost from illness. It is desirable to offer some sort of hospitalization
and surgical care, such as Blue Cross. Perhaps you should offer other
group insurance, such as a small group life policy. In the larger offices,
have someone work up an office manual so that the various employees
know what their duties are. You can't buck the tide, so permit a coffee
break.
In all of this, you are competing with the business world and with
employers who will provide these inducements if you don't.
The sales manager of a large manufacturer of office machinery said
recently that automation is going to hit the office before it hits the
factory. We are going to have to adapt the law offices to it, in whatever
form it appears. Meanwhile, we should make the most of the mechanical
devices available. For example, lawyers who have electric dictation equipment say that the equipment is the equivalent of an extra girl in the
office. Yet how many lawyers have refused to consider installing such
equipment? The electric typewriter is no longer a novelty. The postage
meter is a great convenience. It is almost unthinkable that any efficient
office would operate today without a copying machine of some sort
such as Thermofax or Verifax. All of these things are merely signs of
the times, and greatly increase the efficiency of your office. When you
consider the high cost of office help today, you cannot afford to operate
without the most modern and completely equipped office that you can
provide. Machines are cheaper than girls.
Space does not permit touching on filing systems at all. The books
are full of suggestions and that is a subject in itself.
Remember, what we are talking about is efficiency in the office. It
means better service to your clients. Better service to your clients is
what brings them back to you and brings in more clients, and makes them
willing to pay for your services.
To give better service to your clients, you have to have an efficient
office. And if you and your office are efficiently organized, you will not
only serve your clients better, but you will reduce your overhead and
make the most of every minute of your time.
THE TIME CONCEPT

One of the most important concepts is the time concept.
Time is the lawyer's capital. To make the most of your capital, you
must make the most of every hour and every minute,
We can't buy any more than the number of hours we are allotted
each day or the number of days of our years. Yet we have individual
choice in the matter of how we use our time-a choice that guides the
outcome of our lives. Business and industry have long known that the
secret of success lies in taking advantage of each unvarying minute.
One thing you can do is to make your office as efficient as possible.
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COST OF OPERATION OF LAW OFFICE
Period
Occupancy Expense
R ent . ...................................................

$____________________

H eat ................................................
Light ..............................................
Janitor and services ......................
Property taxes on own bldg .........
Depreciation

.

Repairs

.

.

Interest on investment

.

-.......

"

.......

".

.......

____________________

$____________________

Operating Expense
Salaries and bonuses .....................

$

Stenographic and clerical ..........
Legal (other than partners) ....
Telephone and telegraph .........
Postage and delivery ...............
Printing, paper and forms ............
Office supplies ...........................
Office equipment depreciation ......
Office furniture depreciation ........
Law library depreciation ...........
Law periodicals and services ........
Dues and donations .................
Interest on office personal
property investment ..................
Insurance

..........................................

Taxes on personalty ......................
Soc. Sec. and Unemployment tax..
Bad debts (if accrual system) ....
Other

$

..............................................

Total Expense .......................................................................

$

Gross income for period ....................................................

$

Less, total expenses

...........................................................

Total available to partners or self ................................
% of expenses to gross income ......

...-.................
----
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That means that you organize your staff to work for you. When I say
that I mean every one of you, whether your staff consists of one part-time
stenographer or a whole group of lawyers and secretaries. The lawyer
in a one-man office with only one stenographer faces the same time
problem as the lawyer in the large office. Each has only twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week, and fifty-two weeks a year.
The basic rule of law office efficiency is very simple. It is this:
You cannot afford to do yourself anything that you can hire a girl

to do for you. That extends to bookkeeping, indexing files, keeping time
records, opening mail, filing, buying office supplies, answering the telephone and a lot of other things. Even an eighteen year old high school
graduate will do a better job than you can of keeping your books and
your time records. She-can concentrate on*that work while you can't.
These things are fully as important for the lawyer who practices by
himself as for the firm of two or three or more lawyers. One way of looking at it is this: The sole practictioner cannot afford to keep his own
books, and he can't afford not to have good records. If he will have
these things done by his secretary, he will have more time to practice
law, and to keep up with his reading.
After all, he is a lawyer, not a bookkeeper or a file clerk. If he tries
to keep all these things in his head, he is taking a good bit of his attention away from the more important work of representing his clients.
If the one-man office is going to grow to be a two or three or four
man office, there is all the more need to start a good system as early as
possible, so that when the others come along, they will have the great
advantage of complete indexes, well-organized files, good records, and
the pleased clients that are attracted to the efficient office.
But remember, you have to have a system for the girl to follow. If
she has to come to you all the time for instructions you not only save
no time, but you waste more of it. So you must establish a system, and
you must stick to it yourself.
The greatest waste is the failure to keep accurate time records of
what you do and for whom, day to day. If you make that mistake, you
are throwing away the hours that should be reflected in statements to
your clients.
Your system must recognize the fact that very few lawyers can in a
year work more than fifteen or sixteen hundred productive hours that can
be billed to clients. To keep your office open, to take care of your family,
and possibly to lay something aside for your last years and for your family after you are gone, you have to make the most you can out of those
hours.
Keep daily time sheets, even if they are as simple as having a three
by five pad on your desk on which you jot down telephone calls and
conferences and put the slips in the client's folder. Try to get as much
detail as possible on the daily time sheets. The nature of the work done
is quite important. When a statement is to be made, or the fee justified
to the client, it is helpful to have a time record detailing the work done
each day, the questions discussed with the client or opposing counsel,
the instruments prepared, the persons you talked to, the questions on
which research work was done, and the other details.
When you start to keep an accurate record of the way you spend
your time, the results will surprise you. The monthly and yearly totals
will be a shock, unless you are an unusually hard worker.
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One advantage of this time recording system is this: At the end of a
day you may think you have worked all day on one matter, but your
daily time sheet will show that you spent a lot of time on various matters, and actually you only worked three hours on the big job you
thought you were working on.
The daily time sheet works both ways. It picks up the few minutes
on this job, and the few minutes on the other job, that you would overlook if you did not keep an accurate record. And at the same time it
charges no more than the actual time worked to any matter. It is accurate.
The greatest value comes at the end of a long continued matter, the
kind that runs several years, or at the end of an emergency matter on
which everyone in the office pitches in to get it done on time. If you do
not have an accurate time record, you are sure to overlook a lot when
statement time comes.
The lawyer practicing solo or in partnership, who does not keep
such a record, simply is missing one of the largest factors of public relations with reference to demonstrating to his clients the reason for his
charges. A client who believes that you picked the fee that you charged
him out of the air is, by and large, an unhappy client. Of course, there
are lots of exceptions. Let me emphasize I am not advocating that you
go on a flat time basis and charge so much a minute or so much an hour.
or any other standard applicable to every situation. But I am advocating
that there be a record of how many hours or, parts of hours were devoted
to the service on what days, so that the lawyer who fixes the fee will
know what he is talking about when he decides what fee shall be fixed.
Then he can demonstrate to the client what the service was from the
standpoint of that which the lawyer has chiefly to sell-time.
A further advantage of an adequate time and record system is that
it moves matters along. A successful lawyer insists on bringing matters
to a conclusion. It is one of the things most difficult to drill into the
younger lawyer. If you have a case, bring it on for trial and get rid of it.
If you are handling an estate close it as quickly as you know how. The
longer things wait the harder to finish they become. Until you can write
your client-"Dear Sir: Enclosed are the final papers which conclude this
matter, together with my statement for services"-the file is still open
and you are still unpaid. The unsuccessful lawyer's estates are always
unsettled, his cases drift along, with unheard motions for new trial pending or unsettled appeals delaying completion. Your own self-interest
should teach you, although it has failed to teach a large number of
practitioners, that until a matter is concluded you will not be paid for
your services.
And don't forget that principle of intelligent laziness: Do it once,
do it right, and don't bother about it any more.
A final word about time and efficiency. Consider your personal
efficiency as a reader. Much attention is being given today to training
people to read better. Lawyers work with printed materials probably
more than any other profession. Yet unless you are the exception, you
undoubtedly believe you are a much better reader than you actually are.
Upon taking a test you will be shocked to see how many bad reading
habits you have acquired.
A great deal is being done to help improve our reading ability.
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Watch for them, and most of you will have an opportunity to enroll in
a re-training course in reading through your school system. Certainly
if the average lawyer can double his reading speed and greatly improve
his comprehension, he will substantially increase his efficiency. That
much improvement is not at all out of reach for most of us.
How

TO SATISFY CLIENTS

The last concept is how to satisfy clients. Perhaps we should call it
the psychological angle. Probably more otherwise intelligent lawyers are
economic failures because of a lack of understanding of psychology than
for any other single reason. It is the crux of good lawyer-client relationship. Because most lawyers never had training in this field, it may be
helpful to paraphrase for you something that appeared some time ago in
Business Week, which points up the problems of handling clients
properly.
People-including your clients-do not act logically; they act psychologically. Thus to understand clients we must understand some of
the basic human motivation problems encountered by lawyers.
Lawyers will find it advantageous in attracting and keeping clients
to find out why people act or think the way they do. Only by finding
this out first can they take appropriate action. The difficulty is that
you will get the wrong answers by asking people directly.
We all know some lawyer who has lost an important case, but whose
client still thinks he is the greatest lawyer in the world. And we know
the other lawyer who wins the case, but whose client won't return. Why
is this? There is obviously "something else" at work besides ability and
personality.
This is not true of lawyers alone. It is true with doctors and
merchants as well. Ask women why they go to one store instead of the
other and you almost always get the same answer-price and quality of
merchandise. Yet in the same town there may be three or four stores
that have almost exactly the same prices and kinds of quality merchandise. But one store will attract fifty per cent more shoppers.
The point is, lawyers can do a better job by paying more attention
to what their clients are really thinking and what the true motivating
factors are. That is where psychology comes in. Consider a conference
with a client in your office. Here is where your client forms his opinion,
and where the "something else" is or isn't shown. We lawyers have to
learn to understand the client and what he is trying to say.
Here are some tips on how to hold a conference, as suggested by a
psychologist:
Your secretary ushers a client into your office. A conversation-that
is, a conference-begins. How do you proceed to make the most of it for
your client and yourself?
Here are some essential points on getting the most out of an office
conference.
I. The fellow who comes into your office comes for help. He is
usually stumped or he wouldn't be coming in to see you.
2. He wants expert advice. Never forget that, to him, you are the
expert. Act like one, even if you are stumped for the moment.
3. Don't stare at him. He is asking for help; don't make him uneasy.
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TYPE AND PROFITABLENESS OF YOUR PRACTICE
Based on the information produced by your calculations, analyze your
practice for a definite period (year or quarter) and classify it into the following four categories, based on the hourly return on the time expended:
CHARITY WORK-legal work done for clients who cannot
pay or for charitable organizations; undertaken on
this basis as an obligation and duty of the profession
UNPROFITABLE WORK-work for which the charge
does not equal the cost on an hourly basis; work which
pays part or most of the time cost chargeable against
it, but which is unprofitable .......................
...........
BREAK-EVEN WORK-work for which the charge meets
the cost of doing the work; pays its way, with no or a
modest profit .........................................................................
PROFITABLE WORK-work which much more than pays
its way, based on time or hourly charge basis; the
"cream" or exceptional case where charge is based
largely on results obtained ..................................

%

.

%

__

0
100%

Are the above percentages out of balance?

WHAT DOES ONE HOUR OF YOUR STENO'S TIME COST?
Assuming that the average stenographer in your office actually works the
equivalent of 46 productive weeks a year (allowing two weeks' vacation, two
weeks' sick time and ten days for holidays), that she works a five-day, fortyhour week, and that she has only six productive hours each day worked, we
find that her productive time is only 1380 hours a year. Thus if her pay is

$3000
$250 a month, her time costs -

or $2.17 per hour. This cost must be
1380
considered in billing for services. Also, do not fail to bill the client for items
such as mileage, travel time, disbursements, long- distance charges, etc.

WHAT MAKES UP YOUR CHARGE FOR DRAFTING A DOCUMENT?
The client should be charged an amount sufficient to cover all the following items whenever you bill for drafting a will, deed, mortgage or other
document on a fixed-fee basis:
Attorney's time (at $
per hour)
Client interview or conference ........

hours or fraction thereof

Research and study time ..................
Drafting time .......................................
Checking final document ................
Telephone calls or time with
Final client conference ....................

.

.

other parties concerned ..........
Stenographic time (at $
per hour)
Dictation ............................................
-

$
hours or fraction thereof

Typing, rough and final.............
Proof reading ................................
$
Forms, paper, carbons, mailing .................................... $
(Add for complexity of work, amount involved, responsibility
and results obtained) ............................................................
T otal ................................................................................
$
CHECK A DOZEN STATEMENTS IN YOUR OFFICE ON ABOVE BASIS
AND LEARN HOW YOUR CHARGE COMPARES WITH COSTS
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Most clients are shy people, low in self-esteem and confidence. Don't
aggravate that tendency toward self-depreciation.
4. Don't hurry your client. No matter how busy you are, try to
convey a sense of calmness and patience.
5. Since the client is there for help, find out what kind of help he
needs. Get advance information on the client and his problems, if that
is possible, and watch how he behaves. Listen carefully to what he has
to say, for most clues as to what people actually mean reach us via the
ears.
6. Don't be afraid to ask for personal information, if it will get the
problem squared away. The client trusts you and believes you can
straighten out matters when you get what you want to know.
7. Don't be surprised if there is a fair amount of confusion in what
your client tells you. Sure, he is really there for help. But all his life he
has been taught not to need help, so he is guilty in his own eyes when
he comes to see you. He is inclined to "cover up" by introducing a
strange cast of characters that takes the burden of guilt off himself.
In short, he lies-or almost so-and tells an illogical story.
8. Probe beneath the surface. Don't take all answers at face value.
If the client tells you three times in a row during the course of the conference that he doesn't mind one bit that his partner has inherited a
fortune and says he is glad of it, you had better note that he is jealous.
9. When your client leaves you, be sure he has benefitted. Don't
let him go away frustrated. That's how he came in.
10. For maximum effectiveness, an interview should be broken
down into four stages: First, you receive the client; then you explore
what is in his mind; then you talk with him in depth; and then you
break up the interview.
11. When a client comes into your office, tell him where to sitotherwise he will be uncomfortable about knowing what to do. Try to
Put him at ease. Then start talking to him-and listening to him. Show
genuine interest and understanding. Most important, pay attention.
Show that you have paid attention by talking to him on the basis of
what you know about his problem based on the data presented.
12. Next you probe around in what is really on the client's mind.
Watch carefully for signs of apathy, sadness, elation, over-dramatic speech,
hesitancy, habitual qualifying, tenseness, and fatigue. Any one of these
will give you a clue as to why your client came to seek help and what he
really wants-they are all signs of anxiety.
13. Clear the air if you find that the interview is getting out of hand.
Don't let a misunderstanding break it up. Immediately recapitulate the
situation as you see it and find out whether you and the client are still
broadcasting on the same wave length. Always bear in mind that the
client has an anxiety about something and that the chief handicap to
communication is anxiety.
i4. Part of a lawyer's skill and art lies in keeping things simple
enough so that something can happen; in other words, he clears the way
for favorable change, and then tries to avoid getting in the way of its
development.
15. Quit when you're ahead. When you have come to the conclusion
of the interview-that is, when the maximum amount of benefit has been
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achieved-break off the conference cleanly. Don't drag it on, because
new themes and situations will arise to complicate matters. Always call
it quits when you are winning.
Simple? Yes! You've know these things all along. But do you practice

them.?
LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT
A List of Useful References
1. Law Office Organization. By Reginald Heber Smith. American Bar
Association, 50 cents.
2. Law Office Management, 3rd edition. By Dwight G. McCarty. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955.
3. A Law Office System-a very practical system of accounts, files and
time records. By Arch M. Cantrall, Clarksburg, West Virginia. Published in The Practical Lawyer, Vol. 1.
4. Financial Aspects of the Practice of Law. By Jackson L. Boughner,
Chicago. Tentatively scheduled for publication soon by the American
Law Institute.
5. Personal and Business Conduct in the Practice of Law. By Francis
Price, 1952. American Law Institute, Philadelphia.
6. The Successful Practice of Law. By John Evarts Tracy. Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1947.
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THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONTINUING
EDUCATION OF THE BAR - SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS"
By

RAPHAEL

J.

MOSES,

Alamosa, Colorado

President-Elect of the Colorado Bar Association

Because of President McHendrie's inability to attend, I was privileged to be part of a conference sponsored by the American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association at Arden House, Harriman,
New York, December 16-19, 1958.
There were 110 persons in attendance, representing each of the
state bar associations, some of the major city associations, and several of
the nation's law schools. William Hedges Robinson Jr., of Denver,'representing the University of Denver College of Law, was the only other
representative from Colorado.
The final statement of the conference was "that national responsibility to stimulate a broader program of continuing legal education
should rest with the existing Joint Committee on Continuing Legal
Education composed of members of the two sponsoring associations,
but that, in the last analysis, the responsibility for the entire program
in each state rests with the organized bar of the state."
It was conceded that valuable programs already exist in many states,
but that in the future these programs should give increased emphasis
to the professional responsibility of the organized bar, while continuing
with the so-called "bread and butter" portions of the program.
Everyone agreed that the program should be expanded, and many
suggested that it could only be expanded through the aid of a full-time,
adequately compensated professional staff, such as the staff that supervises the very extensive California program. Although many of us from
the sparsely settled states of the West would like to see this objective
accomplished, we thought that it might be some time before we could
develop such an elaborate program, and that, in the meantime, we
should do all we could to encourage and extend the existing program.
The important role of the law school in continuing legal education
was noted, but the law schools themselves admitted that their staffs
could not take on the general burden of continuing legal education in
addition to their existing duties, but would be limited to special seminars
and to cooperation with organized bar groups.
I think the technique of the conference, called the "American
Assembly Plan," was interesting.
We were divided into five groups. In my group were twenty-one,
from Massachusetts to Arizona, and from Oregon to Alabama. Five
groups of leaders, each with a reporter, visited us in sequence, leading
the discussions on five phases of the subject.
On the night of the i8th, the leaders and reporters prepared a concensus, which was vigorously debated the next day by the entire body,
substantially amended, and finally released as a "Final Statement" of
the Conference, with this lawyer-like admonition: "Although there was
general agreement on the statement, the members of the Conference
*Published at the request of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
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were not asked to affix their signatures; and it should not be assumed
that every member necessarily subscribes to every recommendation included in the statement."
As a matter of fact, there was generally substantial agreement. Some
of us thought more emphasis should have been directed to the continuing legal education of the newly-admitted lawyer; others of us
thought that a professional staff was not "essential," but these were
minor details.
Interspersed among our panel sessions were addresses by some of the
giants of the profession. Judges Learned Hand, Charles Wyzanski and St.
John Garwood are names familiar to all of us. Judge Hand, now in his
fiftieth year on the federal bench, was the darling of the meeting. Judge
Wyzanski, with the steel trap mind often referred to but seldom encountered, interrupted his contempt trial of Bernard Goldfine to come
to the meeting, then returned to Boston, found the defendant guilty,
and sentenced him to ninety days. Judge Garwood of the Supreme Court
of Texas is no stranger to Colorado bar members, having been a speaker
at a recent annual meeting.
The omnipresent alumni of Harvard College will be pleased to
know that we heard from Dean Griswold, and some will recognize
the name of John Lord O'Brian, of the Washington, D. C. bar, a man
who has done much during his eighty-odd years to demonstrate the
public responsibilities of lawyers. We also heard from Ross Malone,
president of the American Bar Association, Harrison Tweed, president
of the American Law Institute, and Robert J. Blakely, vice-president
of the Fund for Adult Education, which fund paid the expenses of the
conference.
To me, the greatest delight of the meeting came from renewal
of acquaintance with friends from all over the country, and the opportunity to make new friends, and to learn how the problem of continuing
legal education is being met in the other states. The wonderful fellowship which comes from living with leaders of the bar of the entire
country for three days will linger long after some of the wisdom we
received has departed.
Arden House itself deserves some mention. It is an ideal place for
a conference. Only ninety-six could sleep in its forty-eight bedrooms, so
a busload had to drive back and forth to the Thayer Hotel at West
Point, the nearest town of any size.
Arden House is at Harriman, about forty-eight miles from New
York, and was built by E. H. Harriman about the turn of the century.
The music room, where the general meetings were held, will seat about
200. There are ninety-nine rooms altogether, including those Averill
Harriman had added to the original home when he brought his bride
there.
Averill Harriman gave Arden House and 100 acres surrounding it
to Columbia University for just such conferences as ours, and it is in
constant use. The actual housekeeping chores and food service are
handled by the Treadway hotel chain under contract. The remaining
19,900 acres are still owned by Governor Harriman.
One interesting sidelight; when the gift was made to the University,
it had to agree to continue to pay local property taxes-the town of
Harriman would have gone under if Arden House went off the tax roll.
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Vhe Jacultt and Students

of th1e

University of Denver College of Law

Extend their warm congratulations to
the University of Colorado Law School
upon the occasion of the opening of
the new law school building at Boulder.
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